
<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/">
  <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
  <dc:format>687041 bytes</dc:format>
  <dc:title xml:lang="eng">How can the efficiency of corporate governance in Serbian state-owned enterprises be increased?</dc:title>
  <dc:rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode</dc:rights>
  <dc:subject xml:lang="eng">Keywords: corporate governance, agency theory, stewardship theory, state-owned enterprise</dc:subject>
  <dc:date>2018</dc:date>
  <dc:source>Economic annals 63(216)</dc:source>
  <dc:creator id="https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3907-8860 https://plus.cobiss.net/cobiss/sr/sr/conor/12936039">Aleksić Mirić, Ana</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator id="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3578-6766 https://plus.cobiss.net/cobiss/sr/sr/conor/12810343">Todorović, Miroslav</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator id="https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3919-0086 https://plus.cobiss.net/cobiss/sr/sr/conor/12545639">Janićijević, Nebojša</dc:creator>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:description xml:lang="eng">Abstract: This paper focuses on the practical coexistence of agency and stewardship theories. By analysing the three dimensions of government structures, compensation schemes, and monitoring activities, we show that this coexistence is possible due to several situational factors. Using field research data, we examine the causes of this coexistence and the effects it has on the efficiency and effectiveness of corporate governance, and question the practical sustainability of this dualism. We conclude that coexistence is possible but is unsustainable, and it would be wrong to support such a situation for a long period of time. We discuss paths of potential action and their implications for key stakeholders.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>https://phaidrabg.bg.ac.rs/o:28583</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>doi:10.2298/EKA1816063A</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>ISSN: 0013-3264</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>
