

.

- 1943 – 1945.

, 2016.

.

- 1943 – 1945.

, 2016.

• • , , ,
•
• , ,
• , , •
• , , •
• , ,
• , •

• • , , ,
•

UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

Predrag Dj. Baji

MILITARY AID FROM ALLIED COUNTRIES
TO YANL 1943-1945

Doctoral thesis

Belgrade, 2016.

1943-1945.

:
2.

1938,

1940,

1941.

95%

e e. ,

1941,

“

(

o

)

“

1942.

1941/2.

1942.

1.

1943.

1941.

1943,

1944.

„guerilla scale“

300.000

2.

1944.

12

8.

4.

50%

PREDRAG BAJI
MILITARY AID FROM ALLIED COUNTRIES
TO YANL 1943-1945

Summary:

On the eve of the outbreak of the World War II Kingdom of Yugoslavia was in a very delicate political situation, virtually surrounded by the Axis powers and their satellites. This is further worsened in March 1938 when, following the occupation and annexation of Austria, the Third Reich reached directly the Yugoslav border, and especially in June 1940, after the capitulation of France and the British repression from the European mainland.

As there is no other European army, no army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was neither tactically nor materially ready for war in what was developed by German strategists, with massive air strikes and concentration of strong armored and mechanized units for rapid penetration of enemy's defense. Hence is a quick breakdown of the army of Yugoslavia in April 1941 was a logical consequence of disproportionate superiority of the aggressor, the fact that the country, even before the start of the operations was in the strategic completion and inadequate war plan, which had protruded all large units on the border, leaving no major reserves in the background. An additional aggravating factor was the functioning of the „fifth column“, primarily pro-Ustasha minded Croats and Nazism indoctrinated Yugoslav Germans.

In April War occupiers captured around 95% of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which has further aggravated the start conditions for the organisation of the resistance movement in the country. However, almost immediately began to form two resistance movements, the one with political objective of restoring the country on the basis on pre-war planning, and the other, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, has as one of its goals, not the primary one, but always present, the execution of revolutionary renovation of the country after the Soviet model. Common to them was that the both movements refused to accept the occupation and dismemberment of the occupying state territory. Both movements, militarily speaking, practically started from scratch, from the guerilla units armed with the light infantry weapons.

KPJ already in April and May 1941. began the political, and then military preparations for an uprising throughout Yugoslav territory. Already in the end of June was followed by the first diversions and the other actions. It was after the German attack on the Soviet Union. This lifted those actions to the level of aid the Allied units war effort. But, although guided by the same principles, local uprising commandans have worked sometimes at its discretion.

Only after the consultations in Stolice, at the end of September 1941, uprising is guided by the single military principles.

In the meantime, it has formed several major free territories, the largest of which was in western Serbia, the so-called „Užice Republic“. In this area, as well in the other parts of Serbia and eastern Bosnia there was at one time a pretty good cooperation between the Partisans and the Cetnik units. But the different tactics understandings and scope of the fight, resulting from different political goals of two movements, quickly led to conflict and permanent discord between them. The collapse of „Užice republic“ was the result of the military superiority of the German forces, brought from the other parts of Europe to quell the uprising in Serbia, but also of poor operational management of Partisan headquarters.

However, since the first months of 1942. to the end of the war, YANL permanently, though not without the periods of stagnation and crisis, becomes increasingly important military factor in the country. By the winter of 1941/42. were created the first brigades, in the fall of 1942. the first divisions and corps. Their sole source of supply of arms, ammunition and other war material was war booty. From the documents created on the eve of 1st session of AVNOJ is clear that since even then, even in perspective, wasn't expected any Allied aid in weapons, even from the Soviet Union, which is certainly contributed to vain waiting to Soviet aid in Zabljak during previous February and March, as well as a more realistic view of the military situation as a whole.

On the other hand, the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, with the support of the British and the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, relied on a policy of waiting for the „right moment“, i.e. landing or penetration of the Allied forces on Yugoslav territory after the collapse of the Axis powers on major fronts. These circuits are too many relied on their political beliefs that one parliamentary monarchy would not support a communist armed movement. But the strengthening of the YNLA, especially after the victory on the Neretva River, led to the fact that the Western Allies in May 1943 established a mission at the Supreme Quarters of the YNLA: In Mihailovič's headquarters it existed since fall of 1941.

Western Allies, particularly the United Kingdom, had organized sending of the military aid to the YNLA since October 1943, and the Soviet Union since February 1944. The scope of the Western Allies aid is generally held at the level of „guerilla scale“, i.e. light weapons units, but they also give a large amount of the artillery and fully equipped one tank brigade and two fighter squadrons. A total of British arms and equipment fitted close to 300.000 members of the YNLA. Aid addressed to YAIH was much smaller, both in terms of quantity of weapons

and other material. This policy was formalized at a conference in Tehran, held simultaneously with the 2. session of AVNOJ.

After the establishment of Soviet military mission in the YNLA Supreme Headquarters and Yugoslav permanent mission in the USSR begins to open the YNLA leadership alignment with the Soviet side, which resulted in Tito's trip to Moscow in secret from the Allies in September 1944. Then, after direct talks between Stalin and Tito, concluded up to date unpublished Moscow Treaty. What is known, and important for the subject of this study, is that the Soviet Union fully committed to arm and equip 12 infantry divisions and two aircraft, one fighter and one bomber. At the same time, another tank brigade is formed, trained in the USSR and equipped with the best Soviet tanks.

At the same time, agreement on co-ordination of Soviet troops in fighting in Serbia and Vojvodina is made, primarily for the liberation of Belgrade. On the other hand, Tito had avoided any major participation of Western allies units in the Yugoslav mainland.

In the last year of the war YNLA-YA entered reorganised into three armies, and in March 1945, after the reorganisation of the 8th Corps, the 4th Army is formed. End of the war was greeted with a completely liberated territory of the state, but also with already present major crisis in relations with the Western Allies.

In parallel, we see a gradual weakening of the occupying forces, as numerically and in terms of material equipment and combat readiness. The turning point was a capitulation of Italy. The Germans, which after it raised their engagement in Yugoslavia at the highest level, were no longer able to stop the growing resistance in Yugoslavia, in an atmosphere of their imminent military collapse on all fronts.

Qualitatively speaking, the weapons were obtained as an Allied military aid was high quality and modern, mostly models which are themselves used by the Allied armies. This is particularly matter of artillery and other heavy weapons. However, despite generous help, it is still over the 50% of YA were armed with weapons of war booty. It became apparent to the Allies, particularly the western, and because of it they weapons from their prey, and even more ammunition and equipment for it, constituted a substantial sentences of their aid.

Keywords: YANL, Great Britain, USA, USSR, armament and arming, combat readiness, Yugoslav Royal units, armed forces of the occupiers, armed forces of Yugoslav quisling forces, political relations in the World War II.

i

i

i

(1)

-			
	2.	.	1
-	,		3
-			-
			-
			6
-			
		1941.	33
-			
		.	34

I

-

(41)

1.			-	42
2.		-		46
3.				48
4.	-	1941.		51
)				56
)				

1.

62

5.			65
)		
		- 1942.	75
)	-	
	-		94
6.			98
)		
			107
)		
		1942. 1943.	111

II

(118)

1.			118
2.		-	121
3.		- ,	-
			130
)		130
	1)		130
	2)		132
	3)		138
	4)	, ,	140
	5)		141
	6)		146
	7)		149
)		150

4. 1944. 163

III

(173)

1. 173

2. 1941 - 1943. 180

3. - 183

4. 189

) , " "

) 189

) 197

) 199

) 201

5. 202

) 202

) " " 206

) " " 207

) 209

) " " 211

6. - , 212

7. 226

IV

(239)

1.			239
2.	" "	-	244
3.			246
)			246
)		,	254
)			255
4.	(1943 - 1944)	264
)			264
)		1944,	267
)			269
)			271
5.		(19.9.1944 - 1945.)	272
6.		-	275
7.	-	1944.	279

V

- (305)

1.	" "	1944.	305
2.	-		324
3.	-	1944.	331
4.	()		343
5.	-		346
6.			-
	1945.		348

VI

(359)

1.			359
)			359
1.		-	360
2.		-	363
3.			365
4.	1 "	"	367
5.			368
)			370
1.	" "		372
2.	" " 1 1		373
3.	" " "	"	376
4.			378

)			380
1.		" " (BREN)	381
2.		" " () -	
27			383
3.		" " 1910 1910-30	
			385
4.			
			386
)			389
1.			390
2.		"Boys"	390
3.		PIAT ("John Bull")	391
)			393
1.		-30 -33	393
2.		" "	393
3.		" " 1911	394
4.		38	395
5.			
			395
2.			396
A)			397
1.	12,7		397
2.	" M2		398
3.			
			399
)			399
1.		25 -	
1940 72-			400
2.			
			401
3.	A		401
A)			402
1.	50		402
2.	81		402

(The National Archives).

() (, .)

” “ (?) ,

1941/42,

2003,

，

，

·

，

，

·

，

·

(

)

-

·

，

(

，

),

·

，

·

·

，

·

，

，

·

，

·

·

，

，

·

1935, .

，

2.

，

，

，

·

，

-

·

—

2.

20.

-

1. , ” “

, , , , ,

.

- , ,

.

1934.

7.

, 1935, ” “

.

,

, , ” “ ,

1937.

,

.

1941.

,

.

,

.

,

(1936-

1939),

.

”

“

.

, 12. 1938,

, 15. 1939,

” “

-5,

(Special Operations Executive – SOE).

- “

- , 26. 1939,

” “ 2.

” “

1940,

” “ “

30-

1941.

24.

26/27.

6. 1941.

17.

II

⁶ : M. Bjelajac, *Jugoslovensko iskustvo sa multietni kom armijom 1918-1991*, Beograd, 1999.

⁷ 18 . 6. 1923.

⁸

27. 1941.

: . , (1934-1941), , 2013.

(
),
, 330.000,
.
, ,
.
: 1,5 (-1924 . 7,9),
20.000 ,, “ , 17.000 , 19.000
” “ ” “, 1. (1.000
), 2.000 , 500 -
, , 481 ” “ .
37 1. , 4.331
” “ ; 2.300 , 1.600 ,
75 931, 300 ,⁹ 65
75 466, 256 , 73 , 72 ,
(105 150 , 220 305) 592
, 96 , 1. , 580
(75-80), 80 ,
, 54 30 .¹⁰ , ,
,
,
(,)
,
.”
.”
.¹¹
,
,
j .

⁹ -27

¹⁰ , , 1983, . 47-48 . 30 . 48. ,

¹¹ XII, . 1, . 1, . 9-11. (:), .

¹⁴ R. Br i , *Vojne i političke mjere okupatora i kvislinga na gušenju ustanka 1941. godine*, Vojno-političko savetovanje u Stolicama – značaj i posledice za NOP, zbornik radova, Beograd, 1980, str. 373-377.

¹⁵ J.Broz –Tito, *Sabrana djela*, t.6, str. 189 – 191.

¹⁶ *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije* (Beograd: ZNOR), t. II, knj. 2, str. 1, str. 7-23.

¹⁷

: 22.750 , 550
 , 1.480 , 5 ,
 , 274 3,1
²⁰ .
 , , 1-2 %
 .
 .
 (²¹ .
),
 .
 , , , ,
 23. 1941, :
 „....“
 .
 ,
²² .
 „²³“
 23. , . 6
 , ,
 „
 “
 .
 : , (,
 , , ,),
 , . ,
 ,

²⁰ N. Ani , S. Joksimovi , M. Guti , *Narodnooslobodila ka vojska Jugoslavije*, Beograd, 1982. (: N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*), . 17.

²¹ B. Petranovi , *Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu*, Beograd, 1992, . 178-179.

²² .

²³ E. Glez fon Horstenau, *Izme u Hitlera i Paveli a*, Beograd, 2007, . 56.

24
1941.

25 K
12.000 , 30 , 135
, 50 , ,
, 3 , 27 ,

28
1918.
() 1939, 1940.
()

29

24

25 N. Ani i dr. *NOVJ*, . 15.

26 , . 16.

27 B. Jovanovi , *Crna gora u narodnooslobodila kom ratu i socijalisti koj revoluciji*, Beograd, 1960. (: B. Jovanovi , *Crna Gora u NOR-u*), . 36-45.

28 N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 14-15.

29 *Istorija SKJ*, Beograd, 1985, . 181-182.

7. 11. ,³⁰ , 1941.
³¹ , 14.
 ” “ —
³² .
 , 22. 1941.
 , — ,
 ,
 ” “
 .
 22. ,
³³ 27.
 (),
³⁴ .
 25. 1941.
³⁵ .
 ,
 ,
 , de
 facto ,
 ” “ 2. ,

³⁰ V. Ivanovski, *Oružani ustanak u Makedoniji 1941. godine*, Oslobođila ka borba naroda Jugoslavije kao opštenarodni rat i socijalisti ka revolucija, 1, Beograd, 1977, . 100-101.

³¹ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 15.

³² LJ. Bošnjak, *Diverzantska dejstva u narodnooslobodila kom ratu*, Beograd, 1983, . 34.

³³ *Istorija SKJ*, Beograd, 1985, . 182-183; ZNOR, t. I, knj. 1, . 22. , 12.
 25. , , .

³⁴ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 23.

³⁵ „.... , — ,

“ (ZNOR, t. I, knj. 1, . 22.)

1.

22.

29.

22.

36

37

287

6.000

38

27.

³⁶ N. Ani i dr., NOVJ, . 15 . 7

³⁷ N. Ani i dr., NOVJ, . 38.

³⁸ , . 34.

39

„ „ ()

1899. 1907,

1929,

1

(),

40

„ (12.), : „ (- . .)

41

3.700

, 150

, 960

, 75

, 25

42

³⁹ , . 41-42.

⁴⁰ B. Petranovi , *Revolucije i pokreti otpora u Evropi 1939-1945*, Skopje, 1985, . 18.

⁴¹ . - , , . 1, , 1959, . 3.

„...“ . , , , ,

“

2.000 150 , 900 10

⁴⁶

2. 1941.

⁴⁷

⁴⁸

⁴⁶ N. Aničič dr., *NOVJ*, . 45-42.

⁴⁷ „...“ . [] 2 . [] : I-
II - , . [] ,

⁴⁸ „ [] . [] ,
[] . (ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . 6, . 30-31.).

- . 1941.
: 4 , 12 , 2 5
, 2 10 , 20
, 400.000
.⁴⁹ 1941. 600.000, 480.000
: 90.000 , 330.000 , 45.000 , 15.000
120.000 . 31
(17 , 6 - 2), 5
(3 2), 15
.⁵⁰
12. , 1.500 ,
,
,
1942. ,

- ,
,
,
.[] .[]
...
.[] (),
,
(),
,
,
.[] .
...
- .[] .[] .[] ,
,
,
,
- ... ,
- ,
.

⁴⁹ N. Ani i dr. NOVJ, . 23.
⁵⁰ , . 187 . 111.
“(ZNOR, t II, knj. 2, . 11, . 43-44, .).

51
 , 15.
 ().⁵²
 „
 53
 (, ,),
 „
 (),
 2.
 54

⁵¹ , 2014, . 43-44
⁵² II, 3, 6.
⁵³ 27. , 26.
 : G. Miljani ,
Partizanski štabovi u prvoj godini narodnooslobodila kog rata, Vojnoistorijski glasnik (:VIG), br. 2,
 Beograd, 1981., . 88, 90. i 91.
⁵⁴ ZNOR, t. IV, knj. 2, 17.

. 1 , 20. 1941. ,⁵⁸

()

”“⁵⁹ :

”

:

1 -

2 -

3 -

4 -

5 -

6 -

⁵⁸ , .I, .2, . .6, .29-33.

⁵⁹ , .31.

7 -

60

8 -

“61

”

“?”

“

”

”

“

“?”

2.

“

”

”

(

) -

“62

60

(20.7.)

(27.8.),

(29.8.).

(

61

62

, . 31-32.

20/VII -

. [] ,

. []

) -

. (. 44, . 16, . .) ,

” : 66 : 10 . - 10 .

67 .

68

1941. , ,

22. 1941.

500 ,, “ (

40), ,

5 (), 4 ,

69 .

23.

70 .

7,9 ,, “ ?”71

66

67

68 , .I, .2, .8, .38-41, .40.

69 , .49.

70

71 , .I, .14, .72.

71 :
„ – 60 , 2 , 1 7,9 , 12
, 5 , 20 , 700 7,9 , . .
500. ;
“⁷²

⁷² , .73.

1. –

28.8.1941.

	⁷³	⁷⁴	⁷⁵	- ⁷⁶	⁷⁷
22. 1941.					
	29	62	38	38	66
	22	62	30	25	35
	1	1		1	2
	4	14 -	10 -	7	10 -
	3362		2.017	1.000	3.000
	21	25	40	13	14
	4			1	14
			” .70 x 12 , 12 x 100 “	.	.
				,	
				,	
				-	

⁷³ , .I, .2, .11, .45.

⁷⁴ , .46.

⁷⁵ , .47.

⁷⁶ .

⁷⁷ , .48.

94 .⁷⁹ , 28. .⁷⁸ ,
 , 10 , : „ ,
 , , „⁸⁰ .
 2 – 28.8.1941.

28. 1941.		
	43,	37,
	45; 12.	37
	1	
	2	2
	5	4
	4.000	2.500
		16 14
	60 . ; 100 .	15 . ; 20 .

⁷⁸ , . . 13, . 55-62.
⁷⁹ , , 57, VI.
⁸⁰ , . 55-56, I.

25. ,

81

3 –

25.8.1941.

25. 1941.	82	1. 83	2. 84	- 85	86
	25	22	54	11	40
	27	22	52		35
-	1	1	1 „ “		
	5	3	8		5
	1.000 72 , 9 -	1.800	3.500		2.000
	31	9	106		10
				” -	” 970 600

81 , .I, .2, . .12.

82 , .51.

83 , .52.

84 .

85

27 : ”” , 11

” [] .“ ,

” “ .

86 , .53.

					“	
						„87

5. 1941.⁸⁸

,
 ,
 ,
 - ,96 , 72 ,3 ,13 ,1.000
 11 .⁸⁹
 : 80 , 70 , 2 , 15 , 2000 12
 .⁹⁰
 .
 ,
 ,
 ,
 :
 „1) 205 . 114 .
 2) 190 , 5 , 3 , 20 , 30
 .
 „91
 .
 29. , 230 .
 .⁹²
 5. , , :
 „ 56 ... , 5
 , 100-500 „93
 -

87 „970 “ , 600 “ “ 600

⁸⁸ , .I. .20, . .21, .79-99.

⁸⁹ , .79.

⁹⁰ , .81.

⁹¹ , .83.

⁹² , .86-90. .87.

⁹³ , .91.

„ 3 80 [], 9 10 [], 1
[], 290 .

: 8 ,
: [] , , , , -
1, 2 , 1 – 11 130
3
[] ():
. 20. VII [] .

5 [] . ()
107 200-300 ,
„ 108
109

„ - :
„ 110
, 4. 1941,
16 ()
, 5 , 1020 „ 111

107 - . . .
108 . . . 1941-1945, (), -
109 , , . 1971., . 3, . 13. ; . Mom ilovi , *Kara or evo 1941. godine*, . 264.
110 , . I, . 6, . 3, 16-17.
111 , , . 19.743 (1942.), . 30.

(15),

2. 1941:

” () , ...¹¹²
1941.

” , ,

” []

” , ,

”¹¹³ , ,

1942, 10. :
” , ,

¹¹² 7, .26.
¹¹³ , .I, .6, . .4, .18-19.

„

1943,

15. 1943.

116 1943.

32

, 22. 1941,

1941. 60

1942. 150

¹¹⁴ 21, . 68.
¹¹⁵ G. Tikvicki, *Slike iz ustanka u Bačko*, Beograd, 1989, . 43-44.
¹¹⁶ 36, 115.

1941.

19. 1942, ().

“ ”

“ ”

, 24. 11.

117

“ ”

“ ”

“ 118 ”

30-40 20-30

“ ”

117

118 , , 7-1-15; , . XIV, . 1, . . , . 11-14; . , . (), , . 1, 1. , . . 1, . 93-95. , (:

:",

:

119

,

,

120

,

.

,

,

,

,

,

.

,

.

,

.

,

,

,

,

,

,

.

-

,

.

.

,

-

,

-

,

121

.

-

,

.

,

,

119

120 „

1.

121 . Stanislavljevi , *Pojava i razvitak etni kog pokreta u Hrvatskoj 1941-1942*, Istorija XX veka, zbornik radova, IV, Beograd, 1962, . 41-78.

122

123

124

122

1941, Beograd, 1971, . 134. –

123

124

vazduhoplovstvo 1942-1992, Beograd, 2006, . 16.).

“ (P. Mora a, *Jugoslavija*

. .).

“ (N. Popovi , *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 1941-1945*, Beograd, 1986, . 53.)

“ (B. Dimitrijevi , *Jugoslovensko ratno*

„ 128

28-29. 1941.

(„ “),

129

130

1943.

4

21.

¹²⁸ „2.

3.

7. . .

¹²⁹ „

„ (ZNOR, t. I, knj. 1, . 3, . 37-38.)

¹³⁰ „

„ (. I, . 2, . 15, . 65-67,

60

„ (. 5)

(„ „),

23.

131

23.

132

9.

133

134

131

1943.

132

„ 23. 20 4 4
(. - .),
()

133

134

: , XIV, .1, .4, .19-21. „(, 2).
:„

„(.)

137

¹³⁷ S. Brankovi , *O ustanku u valjevskom kraju 1941*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1986, . 81-83.

1)

26. 1941.

139

80-120

2-3

9

140

500 3.500

141

¹³⁹ R. Čolaković, *Zapisi iz oslobodilačkog rata, knjiga prva*, Zagreb, 1947, str. 299.

¹⁴⁰ O. Bjelica, *Savetovanje u Stolicama i jačanje vojne organizacije u 1941. godini*, zbornik radova „Vojno-političko savetovanje u Stolicama – Značaj i posledice za NOP“, Beograd, 1980, str. 79.

¹⁴¹ N. Aničić i dr., *Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije*, Beograd, 1982, (izdavač: N. Aničić i dr.: NOVJ), str. 65-66 i 68.

1.

142

143

”

”

“

”

/ 144

145

()

”

“

(),

(

).

“

2.

142

143

12.

ratu naroda Jugoslavije (:ZNOR), t. II, knj. 2, . 20, . 64.)

144 N. Ani i dr., NOVJ, . 66; O. Bjelica, . 80.

145 N. Ani i dr., NOVJ, . 68.

”

“

:

(, - , (. ;

), - , , , - ,

),

„150

„151

148

16-17.)

¹⁴⁹ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . 22, . 68-71; J Broz – Tito, *Vojna djela*, knj. I, Beograd, 1961, . 60-66.

¹⁵⁰ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . 23, . 71-74.

¹⁵¹ , . 24, . 74-77.

””””

“152

2.

”

“

1.

153

”

“

152

153

”

, .75.

”

“

—

,

, I

,

, 1959,

. 16.)

..“ (

de facto

a

1944,

154

155

. II,

3-

28.

1.

350

200.¹⁵⁶

30.

1.

3.

, 19.

1941,

, 3.

10.

¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ S. Brankovi, *O ustanku u Valjevskom kraju 1941*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1986, str. 91.
¹⁵⁷ . 3, . 11. 1941.

9.

„160

¹⁵⁹ . . . 1, . 108.; . . . 1941-1945, . 52-53.
¹⁶⁰ R. olakovi , *Zapisi iz oslobodila kog rata, knj. I*, Zagreb, 1947, . 292-293.

“ ”
 “ ”
 “ ”
 27.
 1.

1941,

4)

-

1941.

” “, 1941,
 ,
 , 1.
 (455),
 1.000
 1.800 4 , 1.500, 2.000,
 3.000.¹⁶²
 ” “
 ,
 , 21-23. , 342.
 ” “

¹⁶¹ , . I, . 2, . 50, . 176-180; . 179.
¹⁶² . 1941, 1963, . 161.

, ,

163

, ,

164

342.

9. , 24. 39 , 4

100

26 2 , 7. 165

“ “

” “

2.

1.415 , 528

, 8 ,

153 9

166

;

“167

5-

¹⁶³ , , 249.

¹⁶⁴ , , 251.

¹⁶⁵ ZNOR, t. I, . 196, . 493.

¹⁶⁶ P. Mora a, *Jugoslavija 1941.*, Beograd, 1971., . 669-670.

¹⁶⁷ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . 77, . 137.

1941. , ,

53 , 30 , 15 , 80

3.000 .¹⁶⁸

1. . ,

1942. 53 , 29.

1941. ,

3 , 9. 1941, 60 ,

, 50 , 15 100 .

7 , 4 , 3

2 .¹⁶⁹ ,

170

“

”

[]

...

¹⁶⁸ Ž. Atanackovi , *Vojvodina u borbi 1941-1945.*, Novi Sad, 1959, . 39.

¹⁶⁹ , .45. 49. . – , (, 1980, . 252.

¹⁷⁰ . – , . , . 50-51.

...

II.

...

...¹⁷¹

”

”

“

...¹⁷²

1.735) , (3.000) , (, 1.340) , 500 , .

...¹⁷³

3.690 ,

, 1/2 .

...¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ , .I, .6, . .2, .13-15. , (: ,) , .3, .1, .2;

¹⁷² . .I, .6, . .2, .13-15. , .66.

¹⁷³ .

¹⁷⁴ . 2.000. 2.375 218 , 269 , ” “

(
)

, 200-700 , 320

1. .

- 14. :

”

?

[]

13,

175

176

45

37 , ,

¹⁷⁵ :
¹⁷⁶ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . 59, . 102. 105.

. , ,
 ,
 177
 1941. 20.000 - .
 ” “ , ,
 ,
 ” “ .
 1941.
 : 1. 2. , , (),
 ” “ ” “
 , 1942,
 ” “ - ,
 ” - “ () .
 800 2.058 - .
)
 ,
 ” “ ,
 1941. ” “ ,
 ” “ 1898 .
 1924 ,
 , 236 .
 , , ,
 :
 (), , ,
 : ” “ ” “,
 DWM ” “ .
 26. ,
 , 21. 178

¹⁷⁷ M. Pajevi , *Artiljerijske jedinice u NOR-u*, Beograd, 1970, . 25.

¹⁷⁸ B. Bogdanovi , *Puške* , . 127 -129.

. 133

179

”

，
”

“:

“¹⁸⁰

1)

:

7,9 .

7,9 .

()

2)

“¹⁸¹

1.

7,9

179

180

¹⁸¹ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . . . 21, . . . 67-68.

1.

16.500

300

200 , 4.500, 300 , 300

10.000 , 184 , 2,7

16-18.000

185 , ,

450 ,

186

180 , 21. ,

” “ ” “

60-

” “ “ “

187 21. . 188 (.)

189 (.)

21 . .

¹⁸⁴ . - , *Desetogodišnjica naše narodne armije*, , . II, , 1959, . 230.

¹⁸⁵ B. Bogdanovi , *Puške*, . 129.

¹⁸⁶ V. Dedijer, *Dnevnik*, , , 1951, . 43.

¹⁸⁷ 450 , , 56 , 25.000 .

¹⁸⁸ : , . 1941. , 29.11.1941. – . . 29. ,

¹⁸⁹ , “ ” “1. 1. .
1925. , 1929. (B. Bogdanovi ,
Puške, str. 113-114.).

“190

650

”““

191

““

”

“

“

“

192

190

191

192

”

.I, ,1993., .287.

()

(

. .)

?

1943.

” “).

?

(

- . .)

,12.000

200

90

180

450!

(

- . .),

!

, 50

1000

193

“

”

“

”

“

1944.

193 . 42-43.) “ (V. Dedijer, *Dnevnik*, , 1951, ...
” 21. 1941. ...
“ (, . 13, . 43-44.)

)

1.

1941.

1942.

1.

:

„....

22.

150 .

194

8

1700

195

„196

¹⁹⁴ , 342. 113, 125. 164. ,

¹⁹⁵ , 1942. ,

¹⁹⁶ J. Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela*, . 8, . 60-61.

,
,
- - .
” “
,
,
,
,
,
- ,
,
,
2.000 200 197
,
,
1942. 198
,
,
199
1941.
,
,
2. 13. 8 23
1.842 , 1. 2.

¹⁹⁷ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije, knj I*, . 128-129.

¹⁹⁸ 1942-1943. 1942-

1943. , , 2014, . 16-17.

¹⁹⁹ 5

200

„1.-
2.-
3.-

201

10. 1941,

:

„1.-

2.-

3.-

40-50

„202

, 14.

203

18

”

200

201

202

203

”

200 1942- 1943, 1942-1943.

201 I, . . . 92, . . . 289-300.

202 1, . 2, . 11.

203

”

: „ (J. Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela*, t. 8, . 10-15, 10-11. . T. I, . 2, . 250-256.)

„204

48

5)

1.

,7.

16.

„205

1.

21.

1.

²⁰⁴ , . 13-14.

²⁰⁵ J. Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela*, t.8, . 21.

1.

:

1)

:) 1. 2. (1.),) 1.

,2. 3. (2.).

2)

,

3)

,

4)

,

3.

22. XII 1941. ²⁰⁶

1.

(- . .).

28. XII 1941. ,

(. -

. .)

, „207

: 159

, 189 , () 241

, () 207 () 171

, 967

²⁰⁶

²⁰⁷

(J. Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela*, t. 8, . 30).

13. 1942. () , 207 .

1.

1. 1942,

208

„....

116

4 ,2 3 260 ,2 ,

9 , 100 ,25 ,14

151 ... 1.

50 „209

1.

50

1.000 ,

2 9 .

1.

1942.

„ “;

300 ,

3-4 ,

4 ,

(),

²⁰⁸ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . 83, . 156.

²⁰⁹ J. Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela*, t. 8, . 61-62.

12 . , ,

500 1.300 ,

800 1.200. ,

1942. .

1. ,

- . ,

1942. 7

, 700 – 950

210

” “

(),

18. ,

1941/2,

1. , 2.

, 1. 1942. 2.

4 1.000 .

25. ,

²¹⁰N. Ani i dr. *NOVJ*, . 125-128.

13. , ,

” 13-II-1942 . - ,

100

211

212

213

214

211
212 . 5, 2.
213 - . . .
214

17

12

4

2

215

216

215

216

.[]- .[] ,

.

,

.

:

,

,

.

.

,

.

II

.

, .[] .[]

2

-

.

.

-

,

-

.

.

8

.

,

,

10-15

.

.

,

,

.

.

,

.

“217

²¹⁷ , .2, .2, .17.

1942.

).²¹⁸

„²¹⁹

5

.²²⁰

2. 1942.

1. :

„²²¹

3. 1942:

100

²¹⁸ ZNOR, . II, knj.3, . . 1, . 7-10.

²¹⁹ , . 10;

²²⁰ , . 8.

²²¹ , . II, . 3, . . 5, . 16-17, . . . 16.

„222

1941/2

9. 1942,

223

[]

224

()

225

[] []

(, ,)

(- .),

[] (- .)

),

„226

227

”

47

(1250)

222 , . 12, . 34.

223

224

225

226 ZNOR, T. II, knj. 3, . 30, . 88.

227

” “, 7,9 ,

. []

— ?!“228

33 :

” — , . []

„229

29. :

” 7,9 .

„230

1.000 , 2.500 ,

24. 1942., „ 2-3

“ , ,

:

” „231

, 5.

228 , . 88-89.

229 , . . 108, . 307.

230 , . 2, . 2, . 20.

231 , . II, . 5, . . 46, . 122.

958 , . 20

, , ,

15- , 1958. .

,4. .

1.000 . 2. , 48

. () ().

15- ()

845 . 1958, 15- .

46 .

, , ,

, ” “, 24. .

“ , ”

“ .

, .

)

- **1942.**

1. , 1942,

, . , ,

„ „ 1943.

1941.

342. 113. , 70.000 1942. ,
 234

, 19. ,
 235

, 24. ,

²³² N. Ani i dr, *NOVJ*, . 128.

²³³ , , 1987, .

502-503. ²³⁴ 1942-1943. , 1942-

1943. , , 2014, .15-16. 1942. 1943. -

²³⁵ , , .384.

,
 , , , . -
 236
 .
 1.
 . , 37
 .
 ,
 1.
 1920.
 237
 .
 , 5.
 ,
 - .
 238
 , 11. 18. ,
 2. ,
 .
 (230),
 - - . ,
 1942. ,
 . ,
 ,
 (-)
 ,
 - , .

²³⁶ . , . 18; . , . , . 388-395; . , . , . 511 -
 530.
²³⁷ . , . , - 1942-1943, 1942-1943 ,
 , 2014, . 104-105.
²³⁸ . , 1942-1943, , . 232-233.

, ,

, ,

239 .

1942. ,

1.487 , 28 1942. 1.500 ,

, 240 .

, ,

, ,

26.000 ,

, 20.000, (17. 21.) 1.

, , 1.000 ,

241 .

, ,

, ,

“ .

” ,

1942. - ,

242 .

, ,

, ,

243 .

²³⁹ M. , ,

²⁴⁰ . 1942-1943. , 1942-1943. ,

2014, . 346.

²⁴¹ , . , . 346-347. , ,

1943. , (. . , 1942-1943) .

132-133.

²⁴² . , . , . 347.

²⁴³ . , . , . 26-27.

* * *

1942.

1941,

244

1942.

” :
 (, , , -
),
 (, , , ,
); (, .
 246).

247

” “
 “
 ”
 “
 ”
 “248

249

²⁴⁵ ZNOR, t. I, knj. 6, . . 29, . 79-103.

²⁴⁶

²⁴⁷

²⁴⁸ ZNOR, t. I, knj. 6, . . 29, . 96.

²⁴⁹ , . 101.

1942. 350,

200 . 80 .²⁵⁰

“ ” !“ 400

” , 100 5.

” “

16 70 , 280 ,

9. , .²⁵¹

“ ” .²⁵²

14. 1942.

”²⁵³

254

” “

6.000 , .²⁵⁵

250 - , . 146 - 147.

251 , . 147.

252 , . 146.

253

254 . : - , . 157.

255 , . 157-159.

, () 3.
256 914 257

1941,

1942,

1943.²⁵⁸

4.

1942. 20.

, 29

1942.

1942.

M -

2.

259

* * *

1942.

, 24. 25.

256

257

258

259

, . 171.

- , . 161.
- , . 141-143, 167.

„

“

()

“

“

”

“

”

1942.

260

“

”

()

“261

²⁶⁰ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 6, . . . 58, . . . 153-157.

²⁶¹

„2)

“

3) ().

4)

“ (. . . I, . . . 19, . . . 10, . . . 58-66, . . . 62.)

1942,

23.

50%

262

200, 700 200.

500. 300.

263

110 [] 2 .

264

17. 1942.

²⁶² , .I, .19, .16, .67.

²⁶³

²⁶⁴ , .69;

„265

„

266

28.

1942.

13 . , 5

267

* * *

”

I.

II.

265

Vlahovi , emisija „Partizanski odredi albanskih rodoljuba u Metohiji“, *Borba za slobodnu Jugoslaviju*, Sabrani radovi, knj. II, Beograd – Titograd, 1981, str. 272.)

266

267

1942.1943. (), , 2014, . 84.

I. ,

50 - .

,

:

III. , , .

4 .

:

I. .

.

IV. .

3-4 .[] .

.

268

(. - . .) .

:

1.500 ,

150-250 ,

.

269

30. 31. ,

- - - .

²⁶⁸

²⁶⁹ ZNOR, t. V, knj. 3, . . 2, . 14-15.

. , . 23.
 .
 , 4 , ,
 , , ”
 “ , 220
 , 88.
 , ,
 , .
 24. 2. 1. , ,
 , 4 , , 20 , 200 , 150.000
 500 .
 , . 27.
 , ²⁷⁰ .
 , 22. ,
 28. , .
 , .
 .
 , 1. 2. , 2.113 .
 , .
 .
²⁷¹ .
 , ,
 - . 13.
 2. , 3. 4.
 . 5. ,
 4. . 4. .
 1. 1. .

²⁷⁰ M. Babi , *Oklopno – mehanizovane jedinice u NOVJ*, . 25-26.

²⁷¹ *Oslobodilak i rat naroda Jugoslavije, knj. 1*, . 239 – 241.

11. 1942.

8. 1942. 1. -

1. .

: „ „, „ „, 2. 1.

3. .

1.100 .²⁷² 2. 1.

, 4. , 320 , 295 , 11

²⁷³

2. 900

, 1.200 . 20. 1. , 900

7. 8. (1. 2.),

1.000 . 16. 2. , 700 , 1.

2. 1. 9

, 4 .

* * *

1942. „ „,

1941. „ „,

, 2.500

200 . ,

(9. – 11. 1942.), . 9

11 , , 50, 192

. 41 , 81

„ „

²⁷² J. Popović, *Prva lička proleterska brigada „Marko Orešković“*, Beograd, 1988, str. 20.

²⁷³ ZNOR, t. V, knj. 5, str. 68, str. 261.

13. 60

12 ,

274

“ , 21. .

(„oddelek“). 13 ,

275 100-200

5. , 1.

300 , 20

5.

5.000 , : „

276

“ ,

25/26. ,

6.

²⁷⁴ Z. Klanjšek, *Narodnooslobodila ki rat u Sloveniji 1941 -1945*, Beograd, 1984, . 101-103.

²⁷⁵ : . , . 113-114.

²⁷⁶ , .3, .1, . 24.

21. 2. ,
 ,
 , 70
 , 11
 , 278
 ,
 , 540
 120,
 - ,
 80.000 , 27
 , 279

* * *

,
 ,
 ,
 ,
 ,
 ,
 ,
 :
 ”
 1)
 : - : 30 ,
 (- . .); [] - : 10
 , 10 .

277 . , . 129-130.
 278 , . 125.
 279 , . 140-141.

2) : 3.000 500 280

. , ,
281

3) 1.000

4)

282

15.

1. ”

2.

500

, 20 . .

150

500

3.

125

283

4.

280

45 „Brixia“,

281

282 ZNOR, T. II, knj. 6, . 35, . 95.

283

125

II .[]

284

* * *

1942.

“

”

- ,

”

“

”

“

,

- ,

,

“

”

285

1942.

- ,

²⁸⁴ ZNOR, t. IV, knj. 7, . . 35, . 74 -75.

²⁸⁵

27. 1942, ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . . 82, . 225-233.

1942.

)

24. 1942.

287

“

50.000²

²⁸⁷
 1942, Beograd, 1965;
 revolucionarna smena vlasti, . 91 -94.

: M. Lekovi , *Ofanziva proleterskih brigada u leto*
 :B. Petranovi , AVNOJ –

4.500²⁸⁸

5.

” 65 / ” “

65 / ” “ ” “ 37 / ,

”²⁸⁹

” , 7.

2. : ”

: 10 ; 10

, 2 100 , 2 , 50.000

, 250 ...²⁹⁰

”

”²⁹¹

²⁸⁸ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije, knj.1*, . 263.

²⁸⁹ , . II, . 5, . 48, . 129.

²⁹⁰ , . 87, . 258.

²⁹¹ , . 258-259 . 4.

30. : 15 292

„... („.)

... 293

294

„295

1942.

296

297

23. 24.

63 [] 38, 101

: 36 ;

292

293

294 2.

295 ZNOR, t. II, knj. 3, . . 55, . 149-150.

296 „ (. 2), „

297 ZNOR, t. II, knj. 6, . . 8, . 34-39.

12 ; 30 ,

42

... „298

:

”

42

25/X

80 /

100 .

„299

25

„300

1942

150.000

37

298 , . . 108, . 277.
 299 , . . 105, . 272.
 300 , . . 119, . 295.

6)

„301

18.

„302

1.

()).

“

“

”

³⁰¹ M. Šumonja, *Značaj formiranja prvih divizija i korpusa Narodnooslobodilačke vojske Jugoslavije*, VIG, 1, 1983, str. 47.

³⁰² ZNOR, t. II, knj. 6, str. 94, str. 246.

303

()...³⁰⁴

1. 1942.

: 1. , 3. ()

3. 3.200

305

2. (), 4. () 2.

303

³⁰⁴ *Bilten Vrhovnog štaba Narodnooslobodila ke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije*, god. II, broj 20-21-22, septembar - oktobar – novembar 1942, . 1-2;

³⁰⁵ N. Ani i dr, *NOVJ*, . 203 – 204.

3.280³⁰⁶ , 8. ,
 3.155 . : 2.488
 , 94 , 20 , 7 , 311
³⁰⁷ .

- ,
 ,
 ,
 () ,
 .
 , ,
 , ,
 . , ,
 , ,
 . ,
 , 16
 . 2.

³⁰⁸ .
 1.

13. 1942:
 II
 „ :
 1. – 200.000 7,9 / , 24³⁰⁹
 2. – 40 , .
 3. – .
 4. – .
 5. – „ „³¹⁰
 1942. „
 „³¹¹

³⁰⁶ .
³⁰⁷ , . 731, . 1, . 37.
³⁰⁸ : B. Petranovi , *Revolucije i pokreti otpora u Evropi 1939-1945*, Skopje, 1985, .
 100-106 116-140.
³⁰⁹ .
³¹⁰ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 6, . 165, . 402.

, ,

20 :

”

„³¹²

” “

- , ,

6 7:

„6) „³¹³

314

- 60

...

7)

4“³¹⁵ : „ “, „ “, „ 3“, „

316

:)

37 – 47 ...

“;)

„... „“

³¹¹ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 7, . . . 74, . . . 207 - 220.

³¹² , . . . 217.

³¹³ - . . .

³¹⁴ :

³¹⁵ , . . . 208.

³¹⁶ , . . . 214 – 217.

: , 20 ,³¹⁷
 . 15 “ ” “ ,
 . 8 “ ” “ , ” 12-20
 , “;)
 37 ... () ,
 (500);) ... ;)
 : 75 80 ,
 100 , 105 , ,
 150 . ,
 “ : ”
 “ : ”
 “ , , , , ,
 , . (,
), , ” “ ,
 .
 , , —
 318
 319 18.
 4. , , .
 :
 ” :
) , , ,
 . , -
 .
) ,

³¹⁷ 20
³¹⁸ “ 35, .20/65 , - .20/77 .
 , .218 -220.
³¹⁹

)

)

-

,

,

,

,

,

;

-

-

;

-

)

)

-

,

;

-

(

,

,

,

),

;

-

-

.

.

.

,

,

,

)

,

,

.

„320

83

„ — . . .)

2.

1.

, 4.

1943,

321

14/15

1943,

2.

6.

600

(

),

, 4.

³²⁰ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 7, . . . 37, . . . 129-130.

³²¹ . . . , 1978., 267-270.

, 322 ,

9. 1942.

, 4. 5. , 6.

” “

4. ,

2,5 6.

5. ,

1, 4. 7. 323 4.

4.089, 5. 2.667 324

1942.

7.500 , 1. 1943. 8.677 .

: 7.188 , 233 , 45 15 325

3. ()

: 5. , 10.

1. ,

3 4.000 326

22. 1942.

: , 6. , 7.

8. ,

: 2. , 1. 3. 327 ,

³²² . Orlovi , *Napad na Gra ac(14/15 januara 1943)*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1981, . 75-93. ,
 1. ()
 4.),
 1. ,

³²³ , . 2, . 5, . 7.

³²⁴ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 203.

³²⁵ ZNOR, t. IV, knj. 9, . . 1, 14 15.

³²⁶ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 203. 205.

³²⁷ , , . 812, . 2, . 3 42; N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 205.

6. 21. , 1, 2. 3

1.082 . 827 , 7 , 43

2 . 2. 1.071 ,

969 , 12 , 56 - 5

, 3. , 1.201 1.076 , 936

, 6 , 20 3 ³²⁸ ,

4.000 , 3.029 ,

2.732 , 20 , 119 10

(,

) 2.539 ,

” “, 26.

16. , 7.

, 22 (,

) -

, 5. 15.

4.200 .

4. 1943. 10.167 .

: 8.196 , 275 , 62

, 20 10 ³²⁹ 5. 1943.

1942. ,

“ ,

18.

1942. , :

³²⁸ . Orlovi , *Šesta li ka proleterska divizija „Nikola Tesla“*, . 18-19.

³²⁹ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije, knj. I*, . 333; N. Ani i dr. *NOVJ*, . 221.

”

,

,

[]

.

.

„330

,

)

,

,

”

“

”

“

”

,

,

,

-

90.000

,

-

331

.

,

.

-

,

-

.

(

)

()

1.

2.

3.

.

1.

7.

,

9.

.

1.

,

15.

,

,

.

³³⁰ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 7, . . . 30, . . . 110.

³³¹

. 3.

:

3.220 , 227
,34 ,20 ,5 479 ³³²
15/16.
18. 2.
: „II
; : 5000 3
, 4 2 .
³³³ ³³⁴
³³⁵
1.000 (47), 4 81 , 12 , 25 , 500 , 10
, 10 ³³⁶
20. ³³⁷
6 1.
21. - - ,
: „X 20 . . 200 .
6 ,
12 .

³³² ZNOR, t. IV, knj. 10, . . 98, . 194-195.

³³³ , 9.

³³⁴

³³⁵ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 8, . . 49, . 91.

³³⁶ Lj. Bošnjak, *snabdijevanje Narodnooslobodila ke vojske i partizanski odreda Jugoslavije u 1943. godini*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1984, . 329.

³³⁷ ZNOR, t. II, knj. VIII, . . 74, . 141.

II

„338

„ 339

6. 1943.

4

„340

³³⁸ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 8, . . . 66, . 123

³³⁹ , . . 60, . 112.

³⁴⁰ , . 2 , . 2, . 12.

18. 1943.

4, 10. 12.

: 5. , 6.

³⁴¹ 9.950

³⁴² 5.

1943. 5.

„ 3“,

„ (Fall Schwartz)

1.

7. SS „ , 118, 369.

104. , 4. „ “

14.

4.

, 61. 63.

8 12 300

127.000 , 70.000

, 42.000 , 2.000 10.000 .

20.000 ,

3.000 .

5.

³⁴¹ , . 10. . 1, . . 51.

³⁴² D. Karasijevi , *Peti udarni korpus NOVJ*, . 94.

... , 5.

... 343

... 9.

... 344

... : „ ...

... „ 345

... ,

... ,

... , 3. 7. , 6

... , 3. 3.

... 4

... 7.

... 1. , 2.

... , 2. ,

... ,

...)

1942.

1943.

1943.

() ,

³⁴³ F. V. D. Dikin, *Bojovna planina*, . 36
³⁴⁴ , . 39-40.
³⁴⁵ , . 37.

27. 1943.

8-13.

, 28.

* * *

800

() 3.

6. , , 3 4

4.

400

3.

20. 1942, 1.

207 5

, 2. 193 4

³⁴⁶

* * *

1942.

, 60 , 3.

³⁴⁶ ZNOR, t. I, knj. 6, . . 49, . 173.

6. 1943. 35-40

220

15.

1943,

16,

20. 1943. 1. 2.

140

140.³⁴⁸

11. 1. 349

350

347 , .I, .19, .32, .195-196 .6 .196.

348 . 1942. 1943.

349 , .90.

350 , .94.

1942.

-

. 11
, 13 5 .

1942.

, 1. - ,

12. , .

1.147 .

1943.

” “

” “ () . , 7. 9.

500-600 .

9. . 8. ,

29. 1943.

4. 8.

2.543

1. 2.

7. 1943.

, 4. , 2. 7. ,

, 18. (11.) 21, 17. ,

10. , 28. . 4.

1. , 20. 6. () .

65 100 .

13. „ “

* * *

1942.

1943.

8. ()

14. .

8. 1943.

65 ,

3.

: 2 , 5 - , 7

, 77

, 45.534

30 .

³⁵¹

1943.

, 13. ,

1. 2.

, 14. 15. .

1. 1,

2, 3. 7,

2.

4, 5. 6. .

1.400 .

³⁵¹ Z. Klanjšek i dr, *Narodnoosvobodilna vojna na Slovenskem*, Ljubljana 1978, . 487.

24. 30.

2.

1943.

11.

* * *

1942.

“， 150-200 ³⁵²”

(， ，) ，
()

3.

() ，
5. 3. 3.
— 10. 1943,

³⁵² 1942-1943. ， .355-379.

2. .
. .

* * *

1942. 1943.

, .
, ,
, ,
. -
. ,
- ,
, .
, .
, .
, .
, .
- .
, .
“ . ”

II

1943.

1944.

1.

1943.

5.

23.

1943.

“
10.

II, 25.

(Pietro Badoglio),

353

1942,

32

23

354

2.

9.

355

4.

³⁵³ U. Kosti, *Borbena saradnja Narodnooslobodila ke vojske Jugoslavije i Crvene armije u Drugom svetskom ratu*, Vojnoistorijski glasnik (: VIG), br. 1, , 1981., . 54.; F. Trgo, *Bitne odrednice jugoslovenskog ratišta 1942. godine*, VIG, . 1, 1983., . 21.

³⁵⁴ .20- 21.

³⁵⁵ *Oslobodila ki rat*, knj. I, . 170.

1918.

356

³⁵⁶ , 103-3-28, . . . 3074.

2. -

54 , 18 4
,
, , 12 ,
80.000 .
32 , 6
4 . , 4
357 .
- , . 9.
-
358 .
11. ,
” “ ” “ ()
52.) ” “,
“ . ” “ ” “,
359 .
” “,
: ” ,
“ .

³⁵⁷ N. Ani , *Karakteristike razvoja oružanih snaga narodnooslobodila kog pokreta u Jugoslaviji u 1943. godini*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1984, . 84.

³⁵⁸ . 4

³⁵⁹ Z. Klanjšek, *Narodnooslobodila ki rat u Sloveniji 1941 -1945*, Beograd, 1984, str. 189 - 193.

15. . ,

24. 1943, 1.400 , , 8. 2.068,

, 5.628

,³⁶⁰ ,

” “ :
-³⁶¹ .

11. ,

: 100 , ,
³⁶² .

17 45 .

,
4 . 14.

18. , 6. ,

() . , 3.

, 6,
, 7. .

14. 1943.

, 8. ” “, 9.

10. „ “ .

3.350 . ,

- .

³⁶⁰ L. Ambroži Novljan, *Petnaesta slovena ka divizija*, Beograd, 1987, . 71.

³⁶¹ , . 66.

³⁶² ZNOR, t. VI, knj. 7, . 65, . 138.

6, 5. 7. , 14,³⁶³ 15. 18.
. 11.500 .
, .
6. 1943.
. .
27. , 32,
1944. 30. .
1, 2. 3. (17, 18. 20.) ,
, .
, () . 22. 12. 1943. 3.
, 9. .
2.200 ³⁶⁴ .
9. , ,
: 7. ” “, 16. ”
“ . 3.213 ,
. .
” “
, 30. 1.732,
31. 2.682. 9. ,
, 22. 12. 1943, 6.800 .
-
, .
, (19, 20. 26.), 8.
, 1945. 4. .
, 8. , 10. ,
. 1.300 ,
³⁶⁵ .
, 4. ,³⁶⁶ 12.

³⁶³ . . N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 792. 4.

³⁶⁴ Z. Klanjšek i dr., *Narodnoosvobodilna vojna na Slovenskem 1941 – 1945*, Ljubljana, 1978, . 556. 608.

³⁶⁵ V. Iveti , *etvrta operativna zona NOV i PO Hrvatske – prete a 8. korpusa*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1990, (: V. Iveti , *etvrta operativna zona*), . 185.

8. . (, . 186).

, , . : ,
 .
 , 13. ,
 . ,
 600 ³⁶⁷
 795 ³⁶⁸ 8.
 10. ³⁶⁹
 14. - ,
 , 8. 9. .
 , -
 . ³⁷⁰
 780 ³⁷¹
 , 21. 1943,
 , 1. , 12. ³⁷²
 26. 31. ³⁷³
 11. : 1.530 , 2.180 ,
 84 , 34 , 10 , 4 105 ,
 75 , ()
³⁷⁴ , ,
 .
 9. , 1.
 1. .

³⁶⁶ 8. . 4. ,

³⁶⁷ V. Iveti , *etvrta operativna zona*, . 185.

³⁶⁸ N: Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 713.

³⁶⁹ V. Iveti , *etvrta operativna zona*, . 186.

³⁷⁰ , . 185 – 186.

³⁷¹ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 713.

³⁷² V. Iveti , *etvrta operativna zona*, . 186

³⁷³ ; N. Ani , *Dvanaesta dalmatinska udarna brigada (Prva oto ka)*, Supetar, 1984, . 27 – 47.

³⁷⁴ N. Ani , . , . 33.

, 5 1.350
 . 8. 13. ³⁷⁵
 , 2. 1943, .
 () . 8. 11.
 . 800 ³⁷⁶
 1.500 ³⁷⁷
 4

1943.

			,	8.
	10. 1943.		1.300 , 4 .	8.
	12. 1943,	, ,	: ,	4.
	13. ,	,	600, 795	10.

³⁷⁵ V. Iveti , *etvrta operativna zona*, . 185-186.

³⁷⁶ ; N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 715.

³⁷⁷ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 715.

- ,	14. 1943,	-	4 780 .	9. .
1.	21. 1943.	,	11. : 1.530 2.180 ,84 ,4 105 6 75 .	12.
1.	1. 1943.	,	5 1.350 .	13.
	2. 1943,	,	3 800 ; 1.500 .	11.
2. 19.	5. 1943,		1.152	

	,			
			4 1.287	, 3. 19.

5. 19. ,

. 5, 6. 7. ,

. 3.600, 10. 4.500, 31.

6.053.³⁷⁸ 1.900 , 126

, 38 , 11 .³⁷⁹

. 19. , -

. 10. 1.152 .³⁸⁰

, 3.

19. . , 10. 1.287

.³⁸¹

, 2. 26. , 8.

. 11, 12. 13.

, 3.769

, 2890 , 145 , 65 34

.³⁸²

, ,

. ,

, 10. , 20. ,

. 8, 9. 10. 6

, - ,

³⁷⁸ V. Iveti , *etvrta operativna zona*, . 187.; N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, str. 797.

³⁷⁹ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, str. 797.

³⁸⁰ V. Iveti , *etvrta operativna zona*, . 186.

³⁸¹

³⁸² N Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 800-801.

30. 1943. 3.110 .³⁸³ 31.
 1943. : 1.856 , 67 , 34 13
 .³⁸⁴ , , .

5

8.

		8.
9.	3, 4. 5.	3.182 (8.10.1943.)
19.	5, 6. 7. , 2. 3. 19.	: (5.10.1943.) 1943. 3.600, 6.053. : 1.900 , 126 , 38 , 11 , .
20.	8, 9. 10. 6 .	30.10.1943. 3.110 . 31. 12. 1943: 1.856 , 67 , 34 , 13 .
26.	11, 12. 13. , ,	(8.10.1943.) 3.769 ; : 2.890 , 145 , 65

³⁸³ , . 796.
³⁸⁴ , . 797.

		, 34
--	--	------

() 7. .
 9. ,
 19, 20. 26. .
 , 385
 8. . 2. 1945.
 4. .
 8. : 13.049 ,
 9.166 , 113 , 482 , 162 , 86 , 44
 , 1 1 386
 1943.

(outlying islands).

(the worst of clashes) , (tending
 to side with the Germans).

³⁸⁵

³⁸⁸

³⁸⁵ , . 852-853.
³⁸⁶ , . 105, .3, . 33.
³⁸⁷

³⁸⁸ „After the Italian Armistice, Tito’s Partisans established themselves on Slovenia and Istria, and large forces of the German command for Northern Italy are being employed to regain control on this area. The Partisans have also occupied long stretches of the coast, and the enemy garrisons in the main ports are isolated. The Partisans control almost all the outlying islands. For the last fortnight the Germans have been trying to drive the Partisans off the Peljesac peninsula, but have met with strong resistance. Partisan forces have established themselves in Montenegro nad are now crossing into Serbia. These area were formerly held by Mihailovic forces, who have had the worst of clashes with the invading Partisans and are tending to side wiht Germans in the areas where these clashes have occured.

18.

”

“

,

:

389

,

80.000

9.

1943.

33

,

1943. 70.³⁹⁰

3.

-

,

)

1)

5. 1942,

:

Mihailovic's operations against the enemy have been confined to minor sabotage activity owing to his anxiety to avoid reprisals and to conserve his forces.

The main railway from Central Europe to Sofia and Salonika has been several times cut by the Partisans, and considerable German forces, aided by Croat and Bulgarian units, have had to be detailed to protect it. Most of the other railways throughout the country are either permanently cut or operating under continual attacks.“ (TNA, CAB 66/43/15, War Cabinet, weekly résumé No. 219, 11.11.1943, . 6, 36.)

³⁸⁹ „Yugoslavia

33. Fighting in Slovenia has continued, mainly in the mountains south of Ljubljana and near Aidussina (- . .) in the Italian side of the frontier. German forces have succeeded, after three weeks of stubborn fighting, in driving the partisans from the Peljesac peninsula. The Germans have also occupied the small islands off the entrance to Split harbour, thus securing their sea supply route between Sibenik and Split.

In the Northern Adriatic, the Germans have successfully attacked and occupied the important islands of Krk (Veglia), Lussin and Cherso which had been held by the Partisans. In Bosnia a German offensive against Tuzla is being stubbornly resisted; Srebrenica has been occupied by the Partisans.“ (TNA, CAB 66/43/25, War Cabinet, weekly résumé No. 220, 18.11.1943, . 6, 33, 1. 2. . , ,

III.)

³⁹⁰ N. Ani , *Karakteristike razvoja oružanih snaga narodnooslobodila kog pokreta u Jugoslaviji u 1943 godini*, VIG, br. 1, 1984, . 84.

„ 90.000, 30.000,
...“
391

„Come Arrivamo all'Armistizio”,

8. 1943.

,
:
,
,
.

„ “
392

,
XI , “
„ “ „ “ II, VI XVIII ,

(?-) 14. 1943,

„VI

393

, II
(XVIII VI
) II “394

391 , .3, .1, . 24.

392 . . , .V, . 690-691.

393 , Loer-a.

394 , 103-5-56, . 5-938, . 2053, 14. VIII 1943.

Ritters,

Fraffenrat.

Neihold

369 „ „ —

Egelscher 114 „Jaeger“

Zeller, 373

Ritter von

Chamonier „ „, 6

8. 1943.

9 6

2

1 „

„, 2 (2)

— „, . „ „,

8. 1943. :

„ 114. : 373. (-

)³⁹⁸ ()³⁹⁹, 187. , 369. (-

) 173. ()⁴⁰⁰, (?)

SS (), () ()

() : SS

/ ⁴⁰¹ „ „ () 118. (?- 108.)⁴⁰²

(,)⁴⁰³

26.

1943,

398

399

400

401

402

403

2. ,
5 : SS
„ „, 5. SS , 15. 21. 69. .
„ „ „ „, 44. „
“ 162. .
, 1. , ,
, 264. ,
181. 404
70.000
405
406

⁴⁰⁴ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije, knj. I, . 526 – 530.*
⁴⁰⁵ :

„Proposed recruitments of Dalmatia

(1) Some 70.000 Dalmatians who were interned in Italy are now, apparently, coming back to their homes. A German authority in Zagreb is enquiring from Berlin whether it would be possible to recruit these people and form detachments for some intended operation; in which case information is also sought whether arms and equipment will be available.“ (TNA, W 1/2332, Southern department, No. 457, dated 7.9.43., 1.)

⁴⁰⁶

407

408

25. 1943,

409

410

2. 1943.

„ („ „),

⁴⁰⁷ „

⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁹ „Yugoslavia

30. The battle in Slovenia has continued and Partisans are reported to be beleaguering the German garrison in Novo Mesto. (- . .) In the northern Adriatic the German landings on the islands of Veglia, Lussin nad Cherso on the 13th appear to have been successful and these islands are now under German control, although Partisan resistance continues.

In Bosnia the battle for Tuzla continues and the town appears to have changed hands several times.“(*TNA, CAB 66/43/26, 25.11.1943, t. 30.)

⁴¹⁰ „In the Mediterranean, bad weather conditions restricted operations. Enemy communications were attacked in Italy, Yugoslavia and Albania.“ , . 36,

5.

SS , 1.

2. 15. , , 5, 17. 27. ,

„ („ „).

18. 27.

13. „

5. ⁴¹¹

1943.

270.000 , , 5 , 17

⁴¹²

„

600 , 500 , 150 250 ,

4 . : 1.200 , 500

, 200 600 ,

, 4 , 4 , 20 (3) 5 „ „

7 „20

„ 250-300 , 280

, 500 100 „ „

(180 „ „ 3

) (150, 7). ,

⁴¹¹ „Balkans: The Germans were reported to have launched a general offensive against the Partisans in Yugoslavia in an attempt to liquidate or disperse them. A delegation from Partisan Headquarters had reached Alexandria on the 5th of December.“ (TNA; CAB 65/36/37).

⁴¹² N. Ani , *Karakteristike razvoja oružanih snaga narodnooslobodila kog pokreta u Jugoslaviji u 1943. godini*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1984, . 92.

413

8-9

13 SS

19.000

414

, 14.

1944, 27.

13 SS

2.

14. SS

415

1944.

SS

1942.

von Semenoff.

416

150

⁴¹³ , . III, . 7, . 4, . 12-15.

⁴¹⁴ (),

1984. (: -), . 281.

⁴¹⁵ : . , , 2. , 1990, . 285, 288-300, 309-

313, . 1944-1945,

⁴¹⁶ „von“

， - ，
 :
 ”
 : 1. ， 2.
 - 3.
 “ 421
 ，
 .
 ，
 .
 ” “
 .
 1943. ， . 9
 . ，
 . 28.
 1943, ，
 ” “ :
 :
 ; 14. ， - -
 ， ; 51, 52. 53. ，
 ， 14. 1. () , 5.
 () , 1. 2.
 () , 14. 14. ， 4.
 9. () , 12. () , 4-8
 (， ， ， ，) ; 15.
 ， - ， : 54.
 ， 3. ， 55. ， 2.
 ， 56. ， 15.

⁴²¹ ， ， . 28, . 3, . . 5,

， 18. 1943, . 13.

422

III.

, 28. 1943,

1944.

4)

80.000

423

1942.

⁴²² ZNOR, t. XII, knj 3, . . . 127, . . . 527.

⁴²³ - , . 47.

⁴²⁴ G. Tikvicki, *Slike iz ustanka u Ba koj*, , 1989., . 34-35.

1943. . , 15.

, 5. , ,

- . , 3. -

1943.

- . . ,

, , .

” “ , ,

15. 1944. , ,

, ,

.

, , ,

8. 25. 1944.

5)

.

1870.

, ,

” “ , ,

,

,

425

:

.

,

SS-

, . ,

,

.

⁴²⁵ TNA, WO 106/5689B.

6 3 ,

6 .

” “ - ,

,

- .

(Laxa).

” “ ,

,

()

426

369.

- . 23.

1941.

” “ ”

- “427

” 369. “ 3.685 428

12. 1943. ,

14.

1943. SS- ,

429

, 373.

-

,

a ,

.

2. 1941,

,

”

“ ,

”

⁴²⁶ E. Glez fon Horstenau, *Izme u Hitlera i Paveli a*, Beograd, 2007, . 90-91.

⁴²⁷ B. Krizman, *NDH izme u Hitlera i Musolinija*, tre e izdanje, Zagreb, 1986, . 69.

⁴²⁸ , . 73.

⁴²⁹ . , 2.

,
 — „430 ,
 431
 6. ,
 1942.
 , , 3
 , , 4.000 ,
 „ “ 432 ,
 ,
 50-55 ,
 340-360 . 2.000,
 ; :
 „ , 70 .
 ,
 1.500.
 , , (. . .) „433
 ,
 ,
 ,
 , ,
 369. („ “) .
 ,
 1.200 434
 , ,
 . 4 „

⁴³⁰ B. Krizman, *NDH između Hitlera i Musolinija*, . 71.
⁴³¹ 23. :

„ — — „
 (, . 69, . .)
⁴³² , . 5, . 2, . 1.
⁴³³ , . 2.
⁴³⁴ , . 11, . 2, . 4

“ , . , 60-70 40-50 435 . ”

“ 436 . ”

1942. -

437 , , “ , ”

27. 1942. 1. . () ()

438 439 :

„ II (- . .) 10 2 ; III 7

1 ; V 6 , 3 1 .

: 16 , 2 2 .

7 7 .

440 .

„ 1“ ,

“ , 53 , 13 3

2. () „ 1“

6.

435
 436 , . 5, . 1, . 10, 27.7. 1942.,
 437

438
 439
 440 ZNOR, t. II, knj. 7, . 64, . 187-188.

12. 7. 1943..⁴⁴¹

8

” “

442

()

21. 1943.

11, .10 3-

4

60- -

5/8 (60 mm Feldkanonne 5/8).⁴⁴³

444

1944,

” “

(6.)

, 8-11

, 30-50%,”

” “

, 9-15. 1945.

⁴⁴¹ J. Broz – Tito, *Sabrana dela*, knj. 16, . 280, . 165.

⁴⁴² , . 105 166 . 280.

⁴⁴³ , - - 314, 558, . 1120-1125. (. 1115-16)

⁴⁴⁴ , . 1125.

6)

29. 1941. . „

“

,

—

.

,

,

,

,

.

,

445

.

,

,

,

.

,

,

.

,

:

„2.

,

:

)

10.000

;

)

,

- 30.000-

;

)

))

“ 446

.

,

,

,

„

“

.

445 . , . 1, , 1995, . 135-141 143-144.
446 . , . 1, . 145.

1942. SS

786 18.984

30.000, 451

- , 15. 1941,

12 , 120-150 (),

452 ()

1942. 172 3.513

1943. 6, 7. 8.

⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁵¹ B. Petranovi , *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu*, . 324.

⁴⁵² . (. , . 304.).

4.624

217

7)

() , () ,

453

12.000.

8.000

21.

1944.

13. SS

21. SS

)

1. , 62-

5. , ,

27.

454

”

“

35 , 3.500-4.000 . 1942.

50 ⁴⁵⁵

25. 1944. ,

⁴⁵⁴ 120-122. . 2.
⁴⁵⁵ B. Petranovi , *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu*, . 415.

1941,

3.

” 3.

456

29.

. .)

456

” “
1944.

1)

2)

3)

457

(- . .)

458

1944.

459

, 11.

460

⁴⁵⁸ I, , 1995, . 149, 151-155.

⁴⁵⁹ TNA, HS 5/966.

⁴⁶⁰

150-300 ⁴⁶¹ 1942. 102,

1943. 34 , 3-5 , 2-5 1942. 2-3

1943-44

3.000 , ⁴⁶² 600 ⁴⁶³ 2.500-

(20-30)

(31-40)

(41-50)

⁴⁶⁴

(

⁴⁶¹ 1941 -1945, . 25.

⁴⁶² 1941 – 1945, . 27-28.

⁴⁶³ B. Petranovi , *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu*, . 365.

⁴⁶⁴ 27.

4) , :

- 4 - , 9 „ „, 15 „ „,
: 10.500 9 ⁴⁶⁹ 9.400 6,5 ,
20 500 , 20 , 100
, 288 (- . .) „ „,
2.500 , 1.500 , , 50 , 34
, 48 , 5.000 .

5) 1942. , :
- 12 „ „, 9 „Schwarz-leus“, ⁴⁷⁰ 3.600
9 , 13.200 , 140 ,
3.000 7.500 .

6) 1942. :
- 1 - 2 , 1 , 3 , 1 ,
, , , , , ,
;
- 2 „Thompson“ „⁴⁷¹
, 12. ,
, :
„... : 99 , ⁴⁷² 4 , 5 - 43 ;
: 680 , 190.000 264
„Mills“;
: 1.730 , 120 , 700 700 ;
: 4.500 ⁴⁷³ ; 4.100 ; 300
() ; 14 - , 25 6 ;
: 25.000 , 32.000.000 , 8.500
500 ; 8.000
, „⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁶⁹ „ „ „ „ , „ „ 1938.
9 „

„machine gun“ „ „

⁴⁷⁰ „Schwarzlose“ - . . .
⁴⁷¹ . . . , . 128-129.

⁴⁷² .

⁴⁷³ .

⁴⁷⁴ . . . , . 133.

(50,8 %).

2

volontaria anticomunista - MVAC).

1942.

“ (Milizia

2.

10.

1942. 2.000

1.000

6.000

3.000

475

⁴⁷⁵ , .145.

„ „⁴⁷⁶ (the accommodation), 2.
1942.

477

1943. ()
40.000-50.000
10.000 „⁴⁷⁸

2.

2.000

„⁴⁷⁹

30

„⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁸⁰

„ :
„ , 2004, . 55.
⁴⁷⁸ B. Petranovi , *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu*, . 365.

“ 481

1943.

“ (. .)

(- . .)

“ 482

School,

HW),

(Cypher

481

482

...

, .2,

.5, .15.)

“ (, , 12-3-38;

1943. 18.185 ,
 1.267.
 77 . 5 , 3.286 5.830 ,
 116 438. ,
 , 3
 , 24 , 15 ,, “ (), 951 , 24 ,
 27 3 ” “
 :,, .484
 , ,
 ,
 ,
 ” “ , ,
 - ,
 485

483 „Jevdjevic and collaboration

Jevdjevic the Chetnik leader (see our 431 of 25.8.43 and its Addition) has put up an urgent proposal to the Germans to initiate a two pronged Chetnik drive, under the german Supreme Command.

Northwards and North Westwards from Kalinovik against the Partisans.

The German General at Mostar declared it was not in his competence to make a d cision on this proposal, and has passed up to his higher authorities.“ (TNA, HW, 1/2332, No. 457, 7.9.43.; II)

484 , , .99, .1, .41.

485 “Mihailovic or Tito? How the codebreakers helped Churchill choose“,

⁴⁸⁶ H. Williams, *Parashutes, Partisans and Patriots*, Hurst, London, 2003.
⁴⁸⁷ . . . , . . . V, . . . 443.
⁴⁸⁸ . . . , — . . . , 2004, . . . 41. . . .

4.

1944.

80.000

30. 1944,

...489

1943.

6

, 30. 1943.⁴⁹⁰

3.

26.

III

⁴⁹⁰ „6.

4

, 200 (), 10

, 46

150 , 8 , 29

” “, 2 “, 3

. []

, 86 , 3

, 1 , 6

III

” “, 8 (- . . .)

5

, 5-6

60

: 2000 , 4000

” “,

. []

：“(, . III, . 6, . . 192, . 411-412.)”

III

491

1944. 26.

5.000

: 5

105 , 12

100 , 12

75 , 16

, 55

PIAT 20

20 .⁴⁹²

1. 1943.

11.

3.

(-2).

1944.

30.

⁴⁹¹ , .7, . .2, 2, .9.

⁴⁹² J. Broz Tito, *Sabrana djela*, .20, .296 .302.

24.

— -1 (),
⁴⁹³

() 20 ,
18. – 23. 1944.

550 , 170 ⁴⁹⁴

4. 1944. 5.
7. , 27 35

405 , 15%
⁴⁹⁵ 76 70. :

” : 50% [] ” „⁴⁹⁶ ,
” “ ” „⁴⁹⁷ , ” „⁴⁹⁸ ,
” „⁴⁹⁹ 30%, 20% ...“

23. , 30%.

⁴⁹³ K. Babi , *Materijalno i operativno prevoženje Mornarice NOVJ na području sjeverne Dalmacije (septembar 1943. – oktobar 1944.)*, VIG, br. 2, Beograd, 1985, . 73-80.

⁴⁹⁴ , . 84.

⁴⁹⁵ , . 1986, . 66. 70.

⁴⁹⁶ -30, -37.

⁴⁹⁷ .” “ - . .

⁴⁹⁸ - . .

⁴⁹⁹ - . .

a , 5. 1944,

„II -

. 75 , .28, - , . 52 , 42.

(6) 65 ⁵⁰⁰

III - : 20

8 . 6 20

IV - 19 , 5 ⁵⁰¹

V - 75 , .11:

V

„⁵⁰²

1944.

6. ⁵⁰³ 38.

: 17. 18.

19. 21. ⁵⁰⁴

5.

⁵⁰⁰ I , 122 , 35

30 () .

⁵⁰¹ 4 , .24 6

⁵⁰² ZNOR, t. IV, knj. 23, . 28, . 112-113.

⁵⁰³ , . 34, . 131 - 134.

⁵⁰⁴ , . 132, . 486.

” “
 , 1944. 1.
 ,
 1. 6.
 :
 ” :

1.-	. 7,9	2.500*	
2.-		. 7,9	400**
3.-		. 7,9	100
4.-		. 8	35***
5.-	7,9		2.000.000
6.-	8		300.000
7.-	_____		300
8.-			30
9.-			6.000
10.-			70
11.-			30.000
12.-			500
13.-			10.000
14.-			10.000
15.-		_____	300
16.-			_____ 35
17.-		47	_____ 15
18.-			10
19.-			10
20.-			50
21.- „	“		30
22.-			40 –
		10 –	„ „
23.-			_____ 15
24.-			
25.-			–

* 2.000

** 200

505

” “

X X X

I VI „506

(P. A. Wilkinson)

1944.

38

: 1. :

II;

2. : , 7. 9. ,

; 3. :

„Venezia Giulia“, 4. : ; : „Partisan political organisation“

507

100 2 10-12

” “ (.), - 508

505

, 2,
200,

400.

1.

506 , . 15 , 2/1-3. 1. .-21, 2. 1944.

507 TNA, WO 204/2285, „Memorandum on the revolt in Slovenia“ by Liut. Col. P. A. Wilkinson, O.B.E., Royal Fusiliers, 24.4.1944.

508 , . 14-15.

1. 15. 1944,

, , . 1.340 ,

: 566 - , 114 , 114 ,

80 , 8 , 89 , 5 3 ,

4 , 798 , ”

„509 , 16.

12. , ,

. 1944. 1. ,

. 26. .

, , ,

, , 8 100 .14/19

105 .

, „510

, ,

, 8. 3.

, :

„I

, , ,

:

1. 75 .15, (13.

14.),

- , .

- , :

) - , ,

,

) .[] VIII , ,

.

⁵⁰⁹ Vasi , S. Savi , *Prva vojvo anska brigada*, Novi Sad, 1979, .256.

⁵¹⁰ , . 15 , . 3 . 28., . 7,

15. 1944. .

3.-

.15,

II

75 .15,

VIII

3. 1.

16

()

10

III

1.-

(40)

.-

(30)

3.-

18.

10

4.-

-

10

.[]

VIII

75 .15,

III

3.

III

(10)

50 “511

3.

1944.

, 19.

⁵¹¹ , . 15 , . 3, . 31. 1944. ,

1)

1941.

12.

1941.

” ... “ ””

()

581

399

514

30.

” “

515

516

514

12.

1941.

232

, 2

6

, 99

13

, 122

24.

67

, 45

(.),

, 36

:

, 80

. (. , 2004, (.),
1941-1945, .29.)

515

”
400

, 36

; 1056

; 270

, 350

200

, 100

50

“ , 371-9-31,
, 371-9-32, 33.

30.

1941,

. 5347.

:

516

, 371-9-24 33.

6. .

11.),

(

(11-16) :

” :
1)

1)

,
517

2) 240

-

4

3) 600

-

47

400

4) 240

, 36

150

105

5) 100

20

6)

518

, 54

,
, 40

, 50

7)

8)

9)

(!)

7,92

40

10) 700

-

15 20

517

518

519
...
...

„520
9, „ 40

“
, , 40 (,40
“) 16

250.000
1928 1“

1941. . . .

„ 1“

32,2

„Daily dispatch“, 30.
1941. II,

⁵¹⁹ 11-16 : , , , , , , , , , ,

⁵²⁰ , 371-9-1,2, , 6. 1941. , . . . 885.

,

,

(
27.
27.
521

522
“523

2. 1941. -

“524

“
”

521 : - . . .
522
523 , 103-3-28, . 36/7/1,
524 ”

...
().
: “ (, , -0147/19).
”

13. 1941.

525
12. 1941.

80 -100.000 526

27. 1942:

⁵²⁵ *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ*, knj. 1, Beograd, 1988., . . . 52, . . . 98.

⁵²⁶ „I should be deeply gratefull if this request should be granted urgently, and I suggest that 120 light machine guns, 300 BREN guns, 72 trench mortars, 80-100.000 hand grenades be sent them...

...The number of fighters in Guerilla war in Yugoslavia is from 80-100.000 men.“ (TNA, CAB 120/735, V.K. 260, 20. oktobar 1941.)

2)

1941.

13.

18.

„1)

2)

⁵²⁷ , 103-6-61, . . . 255, 27. , . . . 1942,

⁵²⁸ . . . 526.

529 *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ, knj. I*, . . 54, . 99-100.
 530 . . 3, . 1999, . 30.
 531 : ;
 532 : (. - .).

„533

534, 535

”

” “

„536

537

1942.

538

1942.

1.

1942,

533

534

535 , 103-8-74 . 378 (231. -) . 1,

536 , 378, .1, . 1, 7. . 1942.

537 , . 3, . 29.

538 TNA, FO 954 B, Folio 360, F.O. dispatch No. 112, 15.4.1942.

1941/42.

27.

539

, 22.

”

“

”

...

1941.“,

”

„540

3)

1.

”

“

1942.

1.

⁵³⁹ D. Biber, *Dolazak britanske misije „Typical“ u Vrhovni štab Narodnoosobodila ke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije*, VIG, br. 1, 1Beograd, 1984, . 400.

⁵⁴⁰ . , , .76-78.

”
:
“541
”

21. 1943.⁵⁴²

:
”
“

⁵⁴¹ , . 6/I, . 2, . 5, 29.12.1942.
⁵⁴² : . 1 (3)

250
1942.⁵⁴³

(Ministry of Economic Warfare)

, C.J. Selbourne,

:

”

“⁵⁴⁴

”

“

1943.

⁵⁴⁵

:

II,

5.

1943.

6-7.000

6, 7. 8.

⁵⁴³ , 103-5-56, . 5-902.

⁵⁴⁴ , 103-8-68, F/7148/34 (

; 43 – . .),

⁵⁴⁵

10. 1943.

()

II,

II

“547

15

548

BBC-

9

, 18.

549

550

⁵⁴⁷ , 103-3-28, . . 2767, 12. . 1943.

⁵⁴⁸ , 103-8-68, . . No. 3340/43.

⁵⁴⁹ , .2, . 198, . . 2119, 19. 1943.

⁵⁵⁰ ,,,...

.“ (: - . .)

2.

4.

) , ” “
“
(Duane Tyrell Hudson),

”

“

554

13.

20.

554

(F.V.D. Dikin, *Bojovna planina*, . 164).

, . 3, . 20.).

555

”

“

10.

556

“, 27.

”

557

“

?

⁵⁵⁵ F.V.D. Dikin, *Bojovna planina*, . 160.
⁵⁵⁶ , . 158.
⁵⁵⁷ 1944.

1944,

8. 12. 1944.“

559

558

559

„On the collapse of organised resistance within the country in 1941, General Mihajlovic, a man assumed to be almost a fanatic in his anti-German views, escaped from Belgrade, took to the mountains in Serbia and there formed a resistance movement, backed by the Royal Yugoslav Government in Cairo. In 1942 he was appointed Minister of War in the Royal Yugoslav Government and the British and the United States Governments assured of this man's integrity supported him by every practical means at their disposal...

...guerilla groups of peasants and left-wing supporters were formed in Serbia, but these being driven out of this state...It soon became apparent that those groups of guerillas were under a centralised command...it was learned that they were commanded by a Croat Communist, Josip Broz, who has been given the pseudonym of „Tito“.

The first British liaison Officer had reached General Mihajlovic Headquarters in September 1941, and was present at two meetings between General Mihajlovic and Tito in October and November 1941, when they agreed to cooperate but this agreement was of short duration, with the result that two resistance movements within the country was divided into two hostile camps.

...At the same time he () initiated a programme of propaganda to impede the operations of the Partisans, declaring them enemies of the country.

Subsequently...General Mihajlovic adopted an attitude towards the German and Italian occupying forces which became increasingly passive, while at the same time fighting was taking place between his forces and the Partisans. It was during this period that accusations alleging that he was in contact with noted Yugoslav collaborationists, as well as local German and Italian commanders, were received.“

(TNA, CAB 106/665, . 1-2.)

19. 1942.
1943.

” “ (.

12. 1942.

⁵⁶⁰

(SOE),⁵⁶¹

2.

1946.

(.) 2.

1943.

13.000

⁵⁶⁰ TNA, HS 5/967, tel. No. 230, 12.2.1942.

⁵⁶¹ Special Operations Executive (.).

2.

(,),

“

”

1942.

1942.

24.

562

563

⁵⁶² , 103-3-28, .2.

⁵⁶³ D. Plen a, *Me unarodni odnosi Jugoslavije u toku drugog svjetskog rata*, Beograd, 1962, . 152-153.

28. 1943.

1942.),

1943.

4

19.

1943. ⁵⁶⁴

5. 1943. ⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁴ S “ : „We have four complete Liberator crews...“(HS 5/967, OODY 23, 2. March 43.)

⁵⁶⁵ , 103-8-70, , No. 75, 30th November 1943.; No. 3527. : , 103-3-28, . 3375, 10. 1943. ,

⁵⁶⁶ , : . , 1995., . 24-25.

1944,

1942,

1. 1944.

”

—

“

567

1941.

(

)

13.

1944,⁵⁶⁹

(Completely non-political).

⁵⁶⁸ „the whole Serb population“,

⁵⁶⁹ III
“ they remain in or near their homes.” “ : „The Cetniks...are static, *i.e.*

1941-1942.

1944.

?

1942.

25. 1942.

, 28. 1943,

„570

14.

571

1943.

572

1943,

⁵⁷⁰ „ , 20/3-4.
⁵⁷¹ „ 28.

()
 .“ (F.V.D. Dikin, *Bojovna planina*, Beograd, 1973, . 227.
).
⁵⁷² . 1941 -1945, . 192. (1914 -1987)

„ „573

574

575

1944

576

31. 1944.

1943. 1944.

577

)

27. 1943,

-

573 178.

574 186

575 194-199.

576 ; 103-8-69, No. 110, 28.2.1944,

577 233-234.

19.

578

7.

579

9

580

“ 581

”

“

582

578 . ,
 579 . , . , . 209.
 580 . ,
 . 411.
 581 . ,
 582 , . 3, . 306.

1944,

583

584

)

500

585

586

587

⁵⁸³ D. Plen a, *Me unarodni odnosi Jugoslavije u toku drugog svjetskog rata*, . 252.

⁵⁸⁴ 235, 241-242.

⁵⁸⁵ 209.

CIA.

⁵⁸⁶ , . 216-217.

⁵⁸⁷ 2012.

5.

)

„South Slav Herald“.

O’

25.

588

10. 1942.

„ 4)

589

15. :

”

[] ,

590

”

“

⁵⁸⁸ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . . 208, . 442.

⁵⁸⁹ ZNOR, . II, knj.3, . . 34, . 96-99; . 4, . 98.

⁵⁹⁰

591

592

, 16-

„ 593

„594

17- III 6

19-

6

595

591

1942.

20.

592

593

594 ZNOR, t. II, knj. 3, . 48, . 132-133.

595

, : .[]
 .
 , , - .[],
 :
 ,
 : .[]
 .[] .[]
 ; .[]
 .
 596 .[]
 .[] .[]
 .[] ,
 „597
 - , 1,
 2. - .
 , ,
 15/16 , .
 16.
 , :
 „ 15/16 :
 - ,
 - ,
 - . .
 , ,
 - .

⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁹⁷ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 3, . 54, . 149-150.

„598

5000

„599

22.

je

600

⁵⁹⁸ , . . 149, . 391-392.

⁵⁹⁹ , . . 148, . 388-390; . 390.

⁶⁰⁰ F.V.D. Dikin, *Bojovna planina*, . 205-206.

601

1943,

602

21. 22. 1943.

603

604

18/19.

(William Jones)

⁶⁰¹ . . . , . . . , . . . 3, . . . 93-95.

⁶⁰² . . . , . . . , . . . 27-28.

⁶⁰³ N. Ani i dr., nav. delo, str. 235; F. V. D. Dikin, *Bojovna planina*, . . . 20, 243-244.

⁶⁰⁴ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 9, . . . 125, . . . 159.

(Anthony Hunter).⁶⁰⁵

27/28. 1943,

9.

1934.

1913,

XVIII

1942.

1943:

606

607

⁶⁰⁵ F. V. D. Dikin, *Bojovna planina*, . 245-247.

⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰⁷

608

609

, 27.

, 3.

BAF-

608

⁶⁰⁹ B. Davidson, *S.O.E. izme u etnika i partizana*, Zagreb, 1983, . 48-49.

2005.

)

17. 1943.

(Fitzroy Maclean),⁶¹⁰

(1911.)

(

),

1937. 1939.

(Orr).

⁶¹¹

(Brigadier).

⁶¹²

⁶¹³

⁶¹⁰

„ “) .

⁶¹¹ D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 16-17.

⁶¹² F. Meklin, *Rat na Balkanu*, Beograd, 1980, . 18-19.

⁶¹³

„5.

6.

;) (, . – . .) (

614

615

II

616

617

Churchill *strogo tajno*, . 12.).

⁶¹⁴

⁶¹⁵

Beograd, 1980, . 23.)

⁶¹⁶ F. Meklin, *Rat na Balkanu*, Beograd, 1980, . 70-71.

⁶¹⁷ , . 28-29.

.“ (D. Biber, *Tito* –

(.) .“ (F. Meklin, *Rat na Balkanu*,

„ (Ratweek – . „

“),

, 6. 8. , 6. .

1943,

619

6.

1943, . 11 ,

14. , 24.

620

5. 1943. - :

⁶¹⁹ F. Meklin, *Rat na Balkanu*, . 214-215.

⁶²⁰ M. Boji , *Propreme vrhovnog rukovodstva narodnooslobodila kog pokreta za drugo zasijedanje AVNOJ-a u svjetlosti dokumenata Centralnog komiteta komunisti ke partije Jugoslavije i drugih arhivskih izvora*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1983, . 27-28, 39-40.

”
(?)

„621

”

„622

(, 18.10. - 1.11. 1943.),

”
- ,
”

„623

2. -

:

II

624

621 , . 14, .6, . 34.

622 , . 35. ” “

- 2. - ,

623 „... („)

- - - 313, . 196/7457174-78.

624 . 6.

„626
 :
 ”
 “ ”
 ?
 ...
 ...
 „627
 2.
 14.
 ,
 , „... ”
 „ ”
 „628
 ”

⁶²⁶ D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 64.
⁶²⁷ , . 65,

⁶²⁸ :
 ”
 (

1944.

1943.

9. 1944.

narodi, . 170; S. Nešovi , *Svet o nama*, . 2, . 436-437.).

⁶²⁹

„Yugoslav Partisans suffering defeats“, a glasi:

„CAIRO, DEC 31 – Official statement of the Royal Yugoslav Government rereases here today claim partisan forces suffered irreparable loses, with 1.400 men of General Mihailoivc´’s forces cut of in the Dinaric Alps. Partisans have been pushed back from all mayor towns and villages, broken into small group fleeing towards western Bosnia. Faulty operatinal tactics are blamed for looses, accoding to announcement.

Free Yugoslav Radio Broadcast have reported the continuance of bitter fighting, but a slackening of activity in the Livno and Duvno sectors. Germans are reported to be massing troops in Dalmatian preparatory to attempts to sieze adriatic islands now in the hands of Army of Liberation.

Important development in the yugoslavian situation may be expected in the next two weeks, the spokesman of Royal Government announced. (TNA, PREM 3/511/7, . 220).

„Your GRAND No. 1240 and 1241.

Yugoslav Government living in safety under our protection issued a lying statement gloating over the fact that their fellow countrymen who are fighting so valiantly for their native land had been routed by the Germans. This statement was utterly false. I cannot feel that the Foreign Office expression in paragraph 2 of GRAND 1241 that „when statements are far from helpful“ is in any way adequate for such conduct.

3. Maclean and Randolph are here and leave this morning for their jump in a few days. Maclean is very pleased with my letter to Tito but of course there will be no improvement in the King's position until he has cut himself clear from Mihailovic. I agree with general Wilson that it would be better that the King should do it on his own initiative than that we should conceal him.

4. I cannot understand what is holding up our action. I am quite ready to signal to the King as follows:-

BEGINS.

In the name of His Majesty's Government I must strongly advise Your Majesty to dismiss from your counsels and from his Command General Mihailovic who has long been collaborating with the invaders of Yugoslavia and who is according to our information the greatest barrier between Your Majesty and the vast majority of your people. The more closely

Your Majesty can be personally identified with this act the better are the prospects of our being able to arrange to you to enter the war zone. Our officers will work steadily to promote unity in Yugoslavia and in Your Majesty's interest but as long as you are tied to Mihailovic the task is hopeless. You are being dragged down by your people through this collaborator with enemies. It is much better that you should have the credit of his dismissal with your own people. If you feel this cannot be done by you we shall of course make it clear that we have broken finally with him and that he will receive no support from us which will all be given to the Partisans.

(ii) I was shocked to read a few days ago a statement by Royal Yugoslavian spokesmen in Cairo that "the Partisan forces had suffered irreparable losses owing to faulty operational tactics and had been pushed back from all major towns and villages and that, broken into small groups, they were fleeing towards Western Bosnia." This gloating over the defeats of these heroic men who are defending your native soil with so much success was disgusting to Your Majesty's English friends. Moreover there was not a word of truth in it, in fact all my officers report that the Partisan armies are doing extremely well. I fear Your Majesty's reputation with your own people may be seriously affected by the class (?) views of your advisers and if any of them chose to resign you would be no loser. Indeed the more you stand by yourself at this time the better chance you have of regaining the good will of your people and showing that you have not been responsible for the many wrong and foolish actions which Ministers have taken in your name.

I trust Your Majesty will not resent the plain speaking of one who is a sincere friend both of yours and of your country.

ENDS.

5.⁶³⁰ If you agree and the war Cabinet whom you should consult concur, have this delivered by Stevenson personally to King Peter and let Stevenson use all his ability to procure the most spirited action. If you prefer another method of making the demand let me have your proposals.⁶³¹

8. 1944. :

” ,

,

,

-

.

,

,

.

⁶³⁰

⁶³¹ TNA, PREM 3/511/1, FROZEN NO: 1184, . 211-213.

II

632

„633

28. 1944,

II

⁶³²

⁶³³ Lj Dimi , A. Životi , *Napukli monolit*, . 74-75;

. : TNA, CAB 66/46/50, . 1.

„634

10. 1944.

2.

„635

5.

⁶³⁴ D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 8; Lj. Dimi , A. Životi , *Napukli monolit*, . 76;
: TNA, CAB 66/46/50, Tel. II, 2, . 2..

⁶³⁵ „It was considering in December a plan to persuade a King to throw over Mihailovic, whose continuance as Minister of War was a standing obstacle to any chance of uniting the contednig factions, when on the 17th December „Free Yugoslavia“ radio, which is situated on Soviet territory, broadcast a claim for political recognition on behalf of the administration which Tito has set up in Yugoslavia under the title of Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation, and also attacks on the King and the Yugoslav Government in Cairo. The gulf between the King and the increasingly important Partisan movement was clearly widening. I therefore proposed that the head of our military mission to the Partisans should try to find out from Tito whether there was any possibility of a *modus vivendi* between the Partisans and the King. If the King were to proceed to Yugoslavia and set up a new Government there in which the Partisans would be represented this would give Tito the political recognition which he desires and would solve our present dilemma of reconciling our political obligations to the King and his Government with the military necessity of continuing to support Tito. An attempt to reconcile the King and Tito would be in accordance with the professed wishes of the Soviet Government, who have told us that they want to find a means of bringing together the Partisans on the one hand and the King and the Yugoslav Government on the other.“
(TNA, CAB 66/45/19, . 1 2, . 6.)

2.

636

3.

637-638

„1.

29. 1943.

636

2. - ,

637

VI - . . .

638 J. Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela, knj. 19*, . 241 -242; Lj. Dimi , A. Životi , *Napukli monolit*, . 77-78.
: TNA, FO 954/34, 19 20 CAB 66/48/5, . 1.

2.

II

3.

II

4.

II

II

„639

⁶³⁹ J. Broz – Tito, Sabrana djela, .19, 79-81.

,1984, . 25-26; Lj. Dimi , A. Životi , Napukli monolit, . 28.

“
 2. -
 1. 1944.
 24.
 “
 ”
 “642
 9. “
 643
 “644
 ”
 “645

⁶⁴² . Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela*, t. 19, . 63.; Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ, knj. II, . 30, . 47.
⁶⁴³ 650 200 , 800, . 260,

⁶⁴⁴ D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 101-102.

⁶⁴⁵ J. Broz - Tito, *Sabrana djela, knj.* 19, . 162., . 245 246, . 318-319.

22. 1944. 75% ... “ ” “

“646

31. 1943. “ ” “)

“647

()

()

⁶⁴⁶ , 103-3-37, 22.3.1944.
⁶⁴⁷ , . . . 43, 28.3.1944.

...

(- . .)

... 648

1974.

9.

2.

“ 649

7.

13.

650

648 , 103-6-61,

. 48, , 14. 1944.

649

1941.

650

„THE PRIME MINISTER informed the War Cabinet that he had just had an interview with King Peter of Yugoslavia. For some months past we had been pressing to dismiss General Mihailovich. It was clear that the connection with General Mihailovich was doing him very great damage.

The Prime Minister said that he had urged the following policy on King Peter:

(I) He should at once dismiss the whole Puric Government, including General Mihailovich as War Minister;

(II) He should issue a proclamation, which had been drawn up by the Foreign Secretary. The general thesis of this proclamation (the text of which was read to War Cabinet) was that the King urged all his subjects to join in fighting the Germans, and said that he would give his support to all who took this course;

(III) The King should then form a Government of a neutral character, which would not be objectionable to Tito.

, 18. 19.

24.

651

II

200.000.

(IV) He should give orders to ships of the Royal Yugoslav Navy to engage actively in carrying supplies to Tito.

The Prime Minister said that if King Peter adopted this course (and he had promised to give him an answer the following day), he would advise him then to allow events for a time to take their course and see what developments followed.“(TNA, CAB 65/46/3)

⁶⁵¹ D. Plen a, *Me unarodni odnosi Jugoslavije u toku drugog svjetskog rata*, . 253- 255.

“ 652

:

”

“653

26.

“

” (. . .)

“ (broad-based), ”

“ (not obnoxious to the Partisans).⁶⁵⁴

655

⁶⁵² . . . , . V, . 456-457.

⁶⁵³ , . 457.

⁶⁵⁴ :

„King Peter is very anxious to have the Ban of Croatia over here as soon as possible. I am most anxious he should form a Government which will not tie him to Mihailovich, a weight which cannot well be borne. The Ban is essential to his plans for forming a broad-based administration not obnoxious to the Partisans. Could you find the gentleman and put him on an aeroplane as early as possible. He may need a little encouragement. Halifax will do this if the Ban is directed to the British Embassy.“

(TNA, PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT Personal and top secret No. 563, 26.4.44., PREM 3/511/10, . 476.)

⁶⁵⁵ TNA, PR M, 3/511/10, . 447. : , . 454.

(Hoppenot)

20. ,

28. .

“ 656

22. ,

()

657

656

„Le remaniement au cours de son gouvernement inspire à mon collègue yougoslave de sérieuses préoccupations dont l'élément personnel n'est pas exclu. Il y voit l'aboutissement de la pression exercée depuis plusieurs mois par les gouvernements américain et anglais sur le roi. Il y a quelques semaines M. FOTITCH s'était cru fondé à espérer que les affaires prendraient un tour légèrement différent. Deux officiers supérieurs américains, envoyés en mission du général MIHAILOVITCH, venaient de rentrer à WASHINGTON et leur témoignage favorable à ce dernier avait, parait-il, impressionné les hautes autorités militaires américaines et même la Maison Blanche. D'après ces enquêteurs l'autorité du général MIHAILOVITCH sur toutes les populations serbes demeurait prépondérante, et même dans les régions occupées par les partisans, de nombreux éléments civils croates se détournaient du maréchal TITO dont la personnalité et les tendances inquiétaient la classe paysanne... (: 2 wrong groups. - .)...ces espoirs. M. FOTITCH m'a dit hier qu'un revirement total venait à nouveau de s'opérer à la Maison Blanche, sans doute effet d'une pression anglaise. Il en tire les conséquences les plus pessimistes pour le rétablissement de la paix intérieure de son pays et pour sa collaboration future au maintien de l'équilibre européen.“ (TNA, HW 1/2854, No. 131898. Date 28th May, 1944. From: M. HOPPENOT, WASHINGTON. To: Diplofrance, ALGIERS. No: 2923-2927. Date: 20th May 1944.)

657

„ 2. THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had sent a telegram to Marshal Tito informing him that King Peter had dismissed M. Puric's administration, and was about to form a new Government under the Ban of Croatia. A satisfactory answer to this communication had now been received.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that King Peter was moving very slowly as regards setting up a new Government. The suggestion had been made that it might be better that the new Prime Minister should be not the Ban of Croatia but M. Grol, who was a Serb. In this event, the Ban of Croatia would support the Government, but it did not seem certain that he would be a member of it.

1. 1944,

()

(!),

”

“

658

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Ban of Croatia, who had been brought over from America, should certainly be a leading member of the new Government. Moreover, he thought that a very early decision should be reached on this matter, so that a public announcement could be made.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that Mr. Stevenson, our Minister to the Government of Yugoslavia, would be seeing King Peter on the following day.”

(TNA, PREM, 3/511/10, . 448.)

658

., **Yugoslavia.** (Previous reference: W.M. (44) 67th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

2. *The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs* said that no Serb was willing to join the new Government which King Peter was in process of forming unless His Majesty's Government would give an undertaking to support General Mihailovich. This condition was, of cours, unacceptable, and King Peter had accordilngy invited the Ban of Croatia to proceed with the formation of a Government without the support of the Serbs. The necessray documents were being signed, and a declaration by King Peter on the lines which we had suggested would be published to-day. The aim of the new Government would be to co-operate with all genuine resistance movements, and it was intended that the Ban of Croatia should go to Bari in order to establish contact with Marshal Tito. Recent information showed that Marshal Tito and the British Mission with him had eluded the efforts of the enemy to capture them.

The Prime Minister said that steps should be taken to make suitable provision at Bari for the reception and accomodation of the Ban of Croatia.

The War Cabinet-

(1) Took note of the statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to communicate wiht the appropriate authorities in Italy with a wiew to ensuring that suitable provision was made for the reception and accomodation of the Ban of Croatia.“

(TNA, CAB 65/42/29, W.M. 71 (44), . 68-69, 2.)

3 7. „ (- .) .“

”

, (. -

: .) „659

- , 5, 10. , , :

”

- , 660

...

:

;

„661

”

“, 1. 1944., :

” (. , -

. .)

659 „Yugoslavia 3. The War Cabinet was informed of the latest position in regards to Yugoslavia. The view was suppressed that the present afforded the best opportunity which we were likely to get of working on the understanding between Marshal Tito and King Peter's new Government under the Ban of Croatia.” (TNA, CAB 65/42/31, agenda 3, 7.6.1944.)

660

661 , 103-3-36, . . . 321, 10. 1944.

662 . , , 1995. (: . , , . 283. . .)

663 , .284. . .

II

„1.

666

667

173,

666
667

2.

3.

4.

.763

3.⁶⁶⁸

„669

670

668

9.

tajno, . 183; : TNA, PREM 3/512/7, . 42).

⁶⁶⁹ D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 185; : TNA, PREM 3/512/7, . 34-35.

⁶⁷⁰ „King Peter of Yugoslavia is going to Vis with the Ban of Croatia, his new Prime Minister, and Mr. R.C. Stevenson, His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government.

The Ban of Croatia and Mr. Stevenson are going ahead to prepare the way with Marshal Tito. King Peter will remain in Malta until it is convenient for him to follow them.

King Peter has expressed the wish to visit you and the Italian battle fronts while he is waiting.

If time permits I have no objection to this suggestion and should be grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements.”

(TNA, PREM 3/512/7, . 28.)

(form outside attack),

671

, 12-16.

3

672

5

14. 15.

673

⁶⁷¹ TNA, PREM 3/512/7, . 23, Prime Minister's personal telegram, serial No. T. 1264/4, T.O.O. 16252, 11th June, 1944.

„Top Secret and Personal for Prime Minister, repeated C.I.G.S., from general Wilson.
Reference Your special un-numbered signal T.O.O. 102220.

1. King Peter, the Ban and Stevenson had conference here to-day Macmillan and self. Programme has been which is being sent to Foreign Office this evening by Macmillan.

2. I accept responsibility defence Vis from outside attack, but as Tito has insisted on retention of territorial command for island, battalion H.Q. contains certain dissident factions, responsibility personal protection of King's party against assassination must be undertaken by Tito. Have informed Stevenson of this.

3. Maclean is being kept informed throughout.

4. Consider Randolph useful to Maclean during these negotiations and have told Randolph to contact him. At their conclusion have no objection to his return to Bosnia.

⁶⁷²
673

2()

„The position was discussed with King Peter and General Wilson, Ban of Croatia and Mr. Stevenson here to-day. Following programme was driven up.

2. (a) June 12th the Ban and party of three accompanied by Mr. Stevenson will arrive at Bari about midday by air from Malta. The King and Bailey will remain at Malta.

(b) June 12th and June 13th the Ban will have conversations in Bari with Topalovic and others.

(c) Evening of June 13th of the following morning (whichever is more convenient) the Ban and Mr. Stevenson will leave Bari for Vis by destroyer.

(d) June 14th and June 15th the Ban has conversations with Tito.

(e) About June 16th if conversations show promise the Ban and Tito with Mr. Stevenson will fly to General Wilson's Headquarters at Caserta. Tito has already expressed will-ingness to pay such a visit. Arrangements are being made for King Peter to leave Malta for Italy to visit the Italian front as guest of General Alexander about this time and he will therefore be available at Caserta for conversations.

3. This programme was enthusiastically endorsed by King Peter and the Ban.

4. Please ask Maclean to inform tito of the Ban's proposed visit to Vis on June 14th and June 15th. As Tito has already agreed in principle to the visit it is presumed there will be no difficulty about this. He should also extend to Marshal Tito an invitation from the Supreme Allied Commander to visit him in Caserta on June 16th (or such date as may be convenient immediately after his conversatios with the Ban). Maclean should however on no (repeat [?grp. omit.]) (- . .) of Mihailovich's followers can be very great and considers that it will be lessened as a result of proposed declaration by the King. He has not yet decided on actual process of disposing of General Mihailovich himself but is inclined to think it may not be necessary to take any active steps at all in regard to him." (TNA, PREM 3/512/7, . 8-9. : FROM ALGIERS (RESIDENT MINISTER) TO BARI. Mr. Macmillan No. 104. 11th June, 1944.)

674

20.-27. 1944.,

675

1943,

676

18. 1944.

677

⁶⁷⁴ J. Broz - Tito, *Sabrana djela*, . 20, . 173-174. : TNA,

PREM 3/513/2, . 25-26.

⁶⁷⁵ „In Serbia, Partisan operations designed to secure more suitable basis for attacks upon the main railways have achieved some success. Strong oppositions is being encountered from Cetnik and Bulgarian forces.“ TNA, CAB 66/53/15, War Cabinet, weekly résumé No. 256, 27th July 1944., 38, . 7.

⁶⁷⁶ „Clashes between the Partisans and Bulgarian troops have occurred in Serbia, and there are some indications that Mihailovitch units are assisting the Bulgarians in this area.“ , CAB 66/43/25, War Cabinet, weekly résumé No. 220, 18.11.1943, 33 (), . 6.

⁶⁷⁷ „THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS informed the War Cabinet that he had today had a very satisfactory discussion with M. Subasic. He thought the agreement now contemplated between M. Subasic, on behalf of the Royal Yugoslav Government, and Marshal Tito, if it worked out in practice as well as it looked on paper, would be an excellent one.

The Cabinet proposed was representative and did not include an undue percentage of Communist members. The Russian attitude had been very satisfactory on that point. His own view was that we should do all we could to get the agreement clinched as soon as possible.“

(TNA, CAB 65/48/20, . 4.)

1.

” “

, 28. ,
9. ,

, 1911.

2.

(SIS – Secret Intelligence Service),

(Century)

” “⁶⁷⁸

, 26. 1943.

” “
, 2.

⁶⁷⁸ D. Biber, *Dolaza britanske misije „Typical“ u Vrhovni štab Narodnooslobodila ke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1984, . 399.

„3.

(- . .)

“.

...

5.

679

—

...

10.

680

681

“682

679

680

— . .

— 9.

: „

681

“

9

21

(. . . , . V, . 347).

682 . . . , . V, . 55 – 57.

”

“

2,

”

683

1943.

684

1943.

685

8.

683
684
685

“691

22.

”

692

“693

II, 23. 1943.

”

“694

9. 1943.

691 . . . , . V, . 444.

692

693 . 14.

694 , 103-3-33, . . . 379, 23.7.1943.

“ (forces of liberation),

695

1943.

2.

19. 30. 1943.⁶⁹⁶

2.

2.

II,

()

697

30.

698

⁶⁹⁵ „I must give also the following warning. I have learnt that in some areas of Western Yugoslavia particularly in Dalmatia, certain men dishonouring the name of Chetnik are helping the Germans in their vain attempts to subdue the forces of liberation. These men are shamefully betraying the cause of their country adding to this shame by claiming that their actions have British approval.“ , 103-3-33, . . . 3362, 9. X 1943.

⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹⁷ , - , 1943/280; S. Nešovi , B. Petranovi , *AVNOJ i revolucija*, . 389; Lj. Dimi , A. Životi , *Napukli monolit*, . 60.

⁶⁹⁸

“ : ”
()
1941.
?
()
?

2.

1943.

6

(Foo Ping-Sheung),

(6) []

;...(.7 - . . .)“⁶⁹⁹

(„ “) ⁷⁰⁰

(, - , 1943/338; *Dokumenti o spoljnjoj politici SFRJ, knj. I*, . 405; Lj. Dimi , A. Životi , *Napukli monolit*, . 62.)

⁶⁹⁹ *Dokumenti o spoljnjoj politici SFRJ 1941-1945, knj. I*, . 462; Lj. Dimi , A. Životi , *Napukli monolit*, str. 60-61.

⁷⁰⁰ *Dokumenti o spoljnjoj politici SFRJ 1941 – 1945, knj. I*, . 460.

3.

)

,

-

,

,

-

,

.

...

,

,

.

,

,

.

,

.

,

,

,

.

:

701

”

;

.

“702

.

,

,

.

.

,

:

701

702

... ,
.

, . V, . 328,

,

„...“

703
,

?

704
.

;

“

705
.

”

“

:

”

,

,

-

,

,

„706
.

”

„707
.

”

“

,

,

35

”

“

: „...“

703

704

705

706

707

, . 334.

, . 335.

, . V, . 333.

1943,

22. 1941,

1)

716

2.

1.

⁷¹⁶ , . 384.; *AVNOJ i revolucija*, . 466; *Napukli monolit*, . 68, 69.

“ ”

1943. : “ ”
“ ”
“ ”
(,)
(.).

718
1920.

“ ” ?

718
1925, “ ” 1923.

719

720

1942.

721

25.

15

722

“ (

”

“

),

”, 6

723

2.

13.

2.

:

[]

724

719

720

„ , 1995., . 277. ((, . 100.).

721 B. Petranovi , *AVNOJ revolucionarna smena vlasti 1942-1945*. Beograd, 1976, 163.

722

723 . 3, 6, . 31. 1943,

724

„725

1944.

(1943 – 1944)

II

10.

726

3. 1944.

(premature).⁷²⁷

9.

, 13. 14.

⁷²⁵ *Dokumenti o spoljnjoj politici SFRJ, 1941-1945 II*, . . 14, . 30-31.

⁷²⁶ D. Plen a, *Me unarodni odnosi Jugoslavije u toku Drugog svjetskog rata*, . 221-224.

⁷²⁷

„THE FOREIGN SECRETARY reminded the War Cabinet that he had told our Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government that he was prepared to recommend our breaking with General Mihailovic, but that he was unwilling to do so without adequate proofs. The evidence on the subject was now being prepared by S.O.E...

He reminded the War Cabinet that he had exchanged telegrams with the Prime Minister regarding the possibility that the Prime Minister, in response to a telegram from Tito about his health, might ask Tito whether the King could not now come and join his forces.

The Prime Minister had thought that it would be premature to make this suggestion to Tito before we had definitely broken with General Mihailovic.“ (TNA, CAB 65/45/1).

”

()⁷²⁸

[]

729

()

(?)

“730

⁷²⁸

: [grp. undec:]

⁷²⁹

: He was not (repeat not) prepared to override this and it could only be repealed by fresh meeting of the Council which could not be convened at present [grp. undec.] time.

(),

⁷³⁰ D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 102-103;) 327 (2.).

: TNA, PREM 3/511/9, . 328 (1.

15. 1944.

„
“
(
)
“
“
(..., he would urge him to act on the lines suggested).

731

731

15. 1944

„THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had had a long discussion about Yugoslav affairs on the previous day with the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Stevenson, the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government, and Colonel Bailey, Joint Liaison Officer with General Mihailovitch, had also attended the meeting, at which the conclusion had been reached that we should adopt the following course:-

(1) We should advise King Peter to dismiss his existing Government, including General Mihailovitch as War Minister.

(2) A telegram should be sent to Brigadier Maclean for communication to Marshal Tito –

(a) informing him that we had withdrawn our Liaison Officers from General Mihailovitch;

(b) informing him that King Peter had been advised to dismiss his existing Government, and giving the names of some of those persons whom he was suggested should be included in the new Government, (e.g. M. Simovich)

(c) saying that we should like to know what he thought would be helpful from the point of view of our common aims, namely, united action by all Yugoslav forces against the enemy, and the reconstitution of a Government of Yugoslavia on lines which met with approval of the Yugoslav people.

(3) In the meantime, King Peter should take steps with a view to formation of a new Government; but it was undesirable that he should be finally committed on this matter, for a week or two, in order to allow for a reply to be received from Marshal Tito.

The War Cabinet were informed that the Foreign Secretary was seeing the King of Yugoslavia that afternoon and that, if the policy outlined was approved, he would urge him to act on the lines suggested.

The draft telegram to Brigadier Maclean on the lines of (2) above was read to the war cabinet by the Prime Minister.

The War Cabinet gave general approval to the policy outlined, and agreed that a telegram on the lines proposed should be dispatched, provided that the King of Yugoslavia decided to act on the advice tendered to him by the Foreign Secretary.“ (TNA, CAB 65/45/21, . 2. 3.)

9. (

“),

”

732

16. , :

”

“733

“734

, 16. 1944,

„1.

2.

3.

⁷³² : D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 101.

⁷³³

⁷³⁴ D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 105. : TNA, PREM 3/511/9, . 322-323.

4.

„735

II

e

II.

⁷³⁵ , . 105-106;

: TNA, PREM 3/511/9, . 324-325.

2.

736

, 13.

II.

⁷³⁶ „Please inform Molotov that as a result of our discussions with King Peter we hope he will shortly dismiss his present Government and appoint in its place one prepared to collaborate with Tito if the latter will reciprocate. He (— . .) has expressed readiness to do so in principle but no details have yet been fixed and our talks have been temporarily suspended as a result of his marriage.

2. In informing Molotov you should impress upon him the need to keep these discussions with King Peter secret. You should tell him that we shall keep Soviet Government fully informed of further developments. Meanwhile we hope they will approve line we have taken with the King.“ (TNA, PREM 3/511/9, DRAFT TELEGRAM TO MOSCOW No. 735, . 275.)

⁷³⁷ „1. Yesterday i saw King Peter and advised him to dismiss the Puric Government immediately and form a small administration composed of people not particularly obnoxious to Tito but still preserving a certain relation with the Serbian nation. This step will automatically deprive Mihailovic of his position as War Minister. What he will do in the areas he controls, I cannot forecast. We have been for some time in process of withdrawing our liaison officers and I have obtained the agreement to supply Tito in response to his appeal and hot up the war in the adriatic islands.

30. 1944,

“ (Italian soldiers of Slav origins)

„738

1.

2. I thought that after the new Government was formed, the best first step it could take would be to throw all Royal Yugoslav Forces in Egypt and Bari, including some useful small ships, into the support of Tito. My correspondance with Tito is very agreeable.

3. When this has been done I have advised the King to lie quiet for a bit. The action which you took in Italy with Badoglio encourages me to think you will look on these affaires from a realistic point of view. My only objective in Yugoslavia is the united action of the three elements, Serbians, Croats and Slovenes of all classes and politics, into an intense effort to kill the Germans or drive them out and to get into friendly touch with any guerillas who may take to the mountains from Hungary as well as with any Roumanians who choose to side with them on the eastern frontiers of Yugoslavia.

4. I am sending you a short account of events in Egypt which I have been trying personally to steer during the last ten days. We cannot have mutineers of flotilas and brigades making political decisions under our Command in the Mediteranean. I am sure you will see that nothing but anarchy lies that way. On the eve of great events there must be discipline in the Armed Forces. They must leave politics to the politicians and to the broad decisions of the leaders of the great Allies. I hope you will back me up on this at least and we can leave details for further discussion between us while presenting a stiff front to outsiders.

5. I am expecting the Soviet Government to take the lead about Roumania on the terms we have agreed. I have not yet heard the American view but you probably are already informed direct from Washington. Let me know whether there is anything you want me to say or to do help.

W. S. C.

14.4.4“ (TNA, PREM 3/511/9, . 234-235. Prime Minister’s personal telegram, Serial No.

T.819/4.)

738

: „Reason that he (- . .) gave was that Partisans needed stores and equipment but not reinforcements of man-power.“ : TNA, PREM 3/511/10, .

481.

21. 1944,

(, . - . .) .
 ,
 ,
 ,
 .
 ” “ ,
 . ”
 “ ,
 ” “ ” “ .
 ,
 ,
 ” “
 3,5 ” “ 150.000 (men
 of military age) , 100.000 „ “
 (working as slaves) .
 ,
 ”
 „739

739

„MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 327 to Naples

Following from Stevenson telegram No. 18.

TOP SECRET

Position of King has been improved very considerably by the recognition of his Government by Tito. Tito is willing to meet the King when the fact of the agreement with the Royal Yugoslav Government has had time to take effect in the country. He is unwilling as I stated in my telegram No. 13 to meet the King now and i do not think it would be wise to press him. Yugoslav Prime Minister is in complete agreement with this. General Wilson also agrees.

2. The question of Serbs was discussed at length by Yugoslav Prime Minister with Tito and will form one of the subjects of a conference between S.A.C. and Tito and Yugoslav Prime Minister which it is hoped will take place at Naples in two or three weeks time. Prime Minister's idea is that the King should call on all Serbs who wish to fight for their country to do so with Partisans and under the supreme command of Tito. This they can do without actually joining Partisan movement and they can continue to wear Yugoslav cockade. I spoke to the King about this last night. He is in agreement with the idea and is in general, delighted with the outcome of negotiations.

3. Yugoslav Prime Minister is impressed by the fact that out of 3,500,000 population of „Nedic“ Serbia 150,000 men of military age are in German prison camps 100,000 are working as slaves in Germany and a further 100,000 as conscripted labour in Serbia. He does not think therefore that actual strenght of Mihailovic's followers can be very great and considers that it will be lessened as a result of proposed declaration by the King. He has not yet decided on actual process of disposing of General Mihailovich himself but is inclined to think it may not be necessary to take any active steps at all in regard to him.“

TNA, PREM 3/512/7, . 8 9, FROM NAPLES (HIGH COMMISSIONER) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

4.

)

13. 1944. , 12.

2.

(2) Even if he got to Yugoslavia, it is doubtful whether he has the necessary strength of character to see the job through, to dismiss Mihailovic and reverse his policy and to withstand the very strong pressure which would certainly be brought to bear to make him change his mind.

(3) An essential feature of the scheme is that we should have to vouch to Tito for the King's behaviour when in Serbia, and yet we obviously cannot guarantee that he will in fact be able to induce the Serbs to collaborate with the Partisans against the Germans however sincere may be his wish to do so. If he falls or allows himself to be persuaded to become merely the head of Mihailovic's organisation, His Majesty's Government will be held responsible by Tito for having strengthened the anti-Partisan forces in Yugoslavia. If Tito secured control of all Yugoslavia after the war our post-war position would be hopelessly compromised.

(4) Tito will certainly regard the scheme with the utmost suspicion. Even if he could be persuaded to believe in the King's sincerity, he would be most unlikely to agree to a scheme which would obviously lessen his chances of mastering the whole country and establishing his own régime after the war. In Brigadier MACLEAN's opinion there is not the faintest chance of Tito agreeing to the proposal. Our only chance therefore of winning his consent would be to threaten that if he refused he would be shown up in public as a man less interested in promoting the unity of his country against the Germans than in securing his own and his party's political position for the future.

(5) If we sponsor the scheme and Tito turns it down, what is our next step? **In view of Tito's military importance we cannot withdraw our military support.** Nor can we even publicise his refusal without ruining our relations with him both now and in the future. Such publicity might temporarily help King Peter but even then it would probably be twisted by Mihailovic against him and against us. On the other hand we cannot afford to threaten – and to persuade Tito to agree we should certainly have to threaten – unless we are prepared to carry out our threats.“

(TNA, PREM 3/511/10, . 497-499. . . : D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 142-143.)

742

”
743
...

”

744

12.
1.
12.

1.

12.

745

2.

2()

()

()

746

742
743

744
“
10-13.8.1944. . . : TNA, WO 204/5663.

745
746
(„Kettledrum“) : , CAB 120/138.

: Gamell.

3.

10.

AFHQ

⁷⁴⁷
,

84

⁷⁴⁸

75

4.

12.

2()

10.

1.

2.

3.

4.

“749

⁷⁴⁷
⁷⁴⁸

1.

Mountain Howitzers;

13.

⁷⁵⁰

1941.

„....

“

⁷⁵¹

)

1944,

19.

1944.

3.

()

21.

⁷⁴⁹ D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 293-294.

⁷⁵⁰

. : TNA, PREM 3/512/5, .30-32.

⁷⁵¹

. 65, . 87.

12

28.

752

)

(Allied Force

Headquarter – AFHQ)

30. 1944.

:

752

6.

„1.

2.

„753

1944,

10.

1.

1.

28.

1945.

⁷⁵³ J. Broz- Tito, *Sabrana djela*, t. 19, . 191.

„I have today returned from a short succesful visit to Belgrade. I found Marshal Tito very friendly, sensible and cooperative. He has agreed with the proposals i made to him. Venezia Giulia is complicated because of its political aspects. From the purely military point of wiew i can get all i require and more because he wanted us to use the rail communications through Ljubljana...I am sending you a full report about a situation about Venezia Giulia.“

„I visited a Partisan front line at Sid. This is a properly organised front with brenches, artillery, machine guns, anti-tank guns etc. There has been heavy fighting in this sector and the Partisans have been succesful in raiding German posts and taking prisoners. There was a small battle going on during my visit. My oppinion is that the Yugoslavs are worth helping and that they are fighting to clear the Germans out of their country with the limited resources they posses.“

().⁷⁵⁴

7. 10. 1945.

13.

4

„“

“:

„Agree that Tito’s efforts are assisting your battle, but doubt whether they are of unsufficient importance to justify increase to considerable supplies which he is already receiving...If however of operational grounds you are anxious to do so you might accede to this particular request, but you should make it clear that it is for the last time.”

⁷⁵⁴ TNA, AIR 20/5156, MS 4470, MA 1073 cipher 28th February, personal from CIGS from Marshal Alexander.

⁷⁵⁵

„ â “,

(Central Supplies Service – C.S.S.):

„If you decide to give that food to Tito, would therefore urge you to refer Tito’s request and your action to C.S.S...”⁷⁵⁶

23.

13.

500

:

„Thanks for advice...of 13. April. I have informed Tito that...I cannot furnish additional supply. We have however helped him by transporting by the air 500 tons of his own supplies...to Zemunik and we are helping him with medical supplies.”⁷⁵⁷

)

3.

⁷⁵⁶ TNA, AIR 20/5156, WO to AFHQ, MS 6872, 14th April 1945.

⁷⁵⁷ TNA, AIR 20/5156, MS 7443, 23th April 1945., for CIGS from Marshal Alexander.

7.

758

5.

(19.9.1944. - 1945.)

9.

1944.

(imediately)

(joint Yugoslav Governement).⁷⁵⁹

19.

„I consider it quite unacceptable that Tito should refuse to co-operate in entry of further British troops.“

3.

(- . .),

⁷⁵⁸ J. Broz – Tito, *Sabrana dela*, . 24, . 18; *Jugoslavija i ujedinjeni narodi*, . 241.

⁷⁵⁹ TNA, CAB 119/131, COS (44) 959, 9.11.1944.

1944,

761

11. 1944.

“ 762

(- - . .)

⁷⁶⁰ Further I propose that I would take advantage of agreement reached in Moscow and send Gamell to visit Tolbukin on my behalf.

A. To ascertain what directives if any the Russians have given to Tito.

B. What force they are providing or propose providing with our assistance.

C. The impress upon the Russians how important it is for their operations in S. Hungary to destroy German divisions still in the Balkans.

D. To explain to the Russians the steps we were presently „talking towards that end.“ (TNA, CAB 119/131, Rwed 1415, 19.11.1944.)

⁷⁶¹

„Message to Marshal Tito.

Maclean has been shown the draft message to Tito which I gave you yesterday, and has raised the two following points.

First, Maclean points out that the statement at the end of paragraph 2 to the effect that we have provided Tito with equipment for nearly 300,000 men is incorrect and a gross exaggeration. According to Maclean, this figure does not represent what we have given, but the maximum requirements of Tito as estimated by himself. Tito would not be slow to point out this error. As, however, this passage was inserted at the suggestion of the C.I.C.S., you may wish to consult him before making the amendment.

Secondly, in the penultimate sentence in paragraph 4 Maclean sees the danger of Tito retorting that he cannot be expected to allow traitors and collaborationists to organise themselves into parties and to put up candidates at the elections. I suggest that this difficulty would be met if, after the word „candidates“, the words „other than traitors and war criminals“ should be inserted.“

(TNA, PREM 3/510/10, P.M./44/722. . 80-81.;

: 25th Novemebr 1944.)

⁷⁶²

145,

“

763

2.

⁷⁶³ „The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum (W.P.(44) 707) by the secretary of State for Foreign Affairs circulating a memorandum on the Macedonian problem, and the idea of a union between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

The memorandum suggested that we should inform the Soviet Government of our views and make it clear that while we would welcome a federation between all the Balkan States, allied and enemy alike and including perhaps Turkey, we could not regard an exclusive Yugoslav-Bulgarian union as in any way an alternative; and that while we were prepared to acquiesce in the creation of a Macedonian State in the future Federal Yugoslavia, we must insist that this State should not annex nor lay claim on any territories belonging to either Bulgaria or Greece, on the ground that these territories were „Macedonian“.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that he thought there would be advantage in our talking to the Russians in London on the lines proposed in paragraph 11 of the papers circulated under W.P. (44) 707. Admittedly it might be rather optimistic to hope that we should in fact be able to veto a Yugoslav/Bulgarian combination. That was the more reason why we should, without delay, talk the matter over with the Russians and make it clear to them that if the object of the manoeuvres which appeared now to be taking place was to enable Bulgaria to acquire Greek territory, and possibly, at the expense of Greece, an outlet on the Aegean, we should be strongly opposed to this.

THE PRIME MINISTER urged the importance of our avoiding a clash with the Russians over this matter. There could be little question under present circumstances that Communist influence, under Russian patronage was in due course, even without specific action by Russia, likely to establish itself throughout the Balkan peninsula, save possibly in Greece...“ (TNA, CAB 65/48/15, 2.)

”

764

1945.

V

7.

5. 1944.

”

“

21.

1.

23.

765

369.

24.

1944,

⁷⁶⁴ B. Petranovi , *Balkanska federacija 1943-1948*, Šabac, 1991, . 48.

⁷⁶⁵ J. Broz-Tito, *Sabrana djela*, . 19, . 75, . 299.

“ 12.2.1944. (, . 32).

766
 3/4. 767
 21.
 5. „ „
 „
 „768
 1944. 1. 2.
 1. 4 57 1-4
 57 769 1.
 2.
 8. 770
 27. 1944. 67
 „
 „771
 1944.
 : 96.515 , 20.528
 , 68.423 , 3.797 , 512
 „ „, 3.364 (50–120), 170
 895 , 491 , 65

⁷⁶⁶ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije*, knj. II, . 73; . Broz-Tito, *Sabrana djela*, . 19, . 66 72, . 141 142, . 305-306.; U. Kosti , *Borbena saradnja NOVJ i Crvene armije*, VIG, br. 1, 1981, . 55.

⁷⁶⁷ J. Broz -Tito, *Sabrana djela*, . 20, . 140, 246, 371-377, . 221, . 291.

⁷⁶⁸ . Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela* , . 19, . 59.

⁷⁶⁹ N. Ani i dr., *Narodnooslobodila ka vojska Jugoslavije*, . 409-410. 2.
 1.

⁷⁷⁰ , . 410.

⁷⁷¹ .Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela*, . 20, . 188. . 317, . 304.

, 1.329 - ,7 4

⁷⁷²

3. ⁷⁷³

7. 1944

(!)

”

⁷⁷⁴

„⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁷² , .94.

⁷⁷³ - . . .

⁷⁷⁴ .

⁷⁷⁵ *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ, knj. II*, . .90, .121, VI. 1.

13. 1943.

776

3.

5.000

1.200

777

(Royal Air Force – RAF)

(USAAF)

6. 1945.

778

6

RAF-a.

8.700

RAF-a,

⁷⁷⁶ Zbornik dokumenata sanitetske službe NOVJ, knj. 1, . 182.

⁷⁷⁷ G. Nikoliš, *Korijen, stablo, pavetina*, Zagreb, 1980, . 607.

⁷⁷⁸ , . 91, . 24, . 2-1.

8.

1944.

2. 1943.

779

780

781

8.

⁷⁷⁹ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije*, knj. II, . 74; N. Anić i dr., *Narodnooslobodila ka vojska Jugoslavije*, . 409.

⁷⁸⁰ , . 234, . 20, . 15, 17. VIII 1944.

⁷⁸¹ „Mitchells (B.25) obtained four hits on a large ship in the harbour at Split; further hits were made on small craft and the railway. Fifty-nine fighters and fighter-bombers carried out an armed reconnaissance of the Dalmatian Coast; attacks were made on trains, a camp, vehicles and a Siebel ferry. Fifty-seven aircrafts of a similar type attacked the airfield ta Mostar (50 miles N.N.W. of Dubrovnik).“

TNA, CAB 66/43/15, War Cabinet, weekly résumé No. 119, 11.11.1943., . 9, 44, .

„782

28. 1944,

:

”

()

„783

1944.

1944. 130 :

„We were also able to continue nightly supplies to those Partisans remaining on Hvar and Solta...during the two first months of the year dropped approximately 130 tons of supplies.“⁷⁸⁴

1944.

785

(WEAPONS), (AMN,

⁷⁸² *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ, knj. II*, . 18, . 33.

⁷⁸³ , . 22, . 36. J. Broz - Tito, *Sabrana djela*, knj. 20, 295, . 301-302.

⁷⁸⁴ TNA, CAB 106/665, ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER DISPATCH, YUGOSLAV CAMPAIGN, 8 JANUARY – 12 DECEMBER 1944, . 7.

⁷⁸⁵ TNA, HS 5/968.

ammunition), (EXPLOSIVE), (((MISCELLANEOUS), (CLOTHING).
W/T), (TOTAL No. SORTIES)
(TOTAL TONNAGE).

:
VOJVODINA (Savanna)⁷⁸⁶: WEAPONS: Mortar 45 mm 2, MMG 303 14, Bren 16, Sten 43, Rif. 7,92 60, A/T Rif. 5.⁷⁸⁷ AMN: Mortar 81 m⁷⁸⁸ 181, Mortar 45 m⁷⁸⁹ 2240, PIAT 184.000, 6.5⁷⁹⁰ 31.600, 303 1200, A/T .55⁷⁹¹ 312, Grenades⁷⁹² 50.000; EXPLOSIVE: Explosive 920, Dem. Accs. 3 Cans.; W/T: Batteries 4, Generators 2⁷⁹³; MISCELANEOUS: Petrol Gals 44⁷⁹⁴, Medical 7, Ration 8, Food 240; CHLOTING: Battledress 382, Great Coats 53, Ground Sheets 150, Pullovers 120, Shirts 536, Underwear 170, Socks 923, Boots 346.⁷⁹⁵ TOTAL No.SORTIES 10, TOTAL TONNAGE 15,0.

SLOVENIA (Flotsam): WEAPONS: Mortar 45 mm 3, Bren 8, Rif. 6,5 120, A/T Rif. 16; AMN: Mortar 45 m 780, 7,92⁷⁹⁶ 7.600, 6,5 15.000, 303 102.000, A/T .55 5.100, Grenades 484; EXPLOSIVES: Mines 120, Explosive 9.160, Dem. Accs. 22 Cans; W/T: Sets⁷⁹⁷, Batteries 18, Generators 3; MISCALLENOUS: Petrol Gals 68, Medical 95; CLOTHING: Battledress 170, Shirts 120, Socks 530, Boots 210. TOTAL No. SORTIES 10, TOTAL TONNAGE 17,7.

786
787 . 45 , 14 ,, “ (medium machine gun), “ “ .
303 (7,7 ;), 16 “, “, 43 “, 60
7,92 (“, “, “), 5 ,
788 “ “
789 . 81 .
789 „Brixia“ . 45 .
790 . 6,5 , “ 1891/30.
791 “ 55 , 14,5 ,
792 “ “
793 , .
794 44 . 4,5 .
795 382 , 53 (“), 150 (?), 120 , 536
, 170 . , 923 , 346
796 . 7,92 .
797 - .

MONTENEGRO (Rakaoff): WEAPONS: Bren 14, Sten 20, Rif. 303, A/T Rif. 3; AMN: 7,92 1.800, 6,5 6.000, 303 27.500, A/T .55 750, Grenades 240, 9mm⁷⁹⁸ 11.300; EXPLOSIVES: Explosive 2.950, Dem. Accs. 2 Cans; W/T: Sets 2, Batteries 8, Generators 2; MISCELLANEOUS: Petrol Gals. 16, Ration 149, Food 4.200; CLOTHING: Battledress 81, Shirts 24, Underwear 24, Socks 138, Boots 94. TOTAL No. SORTIES 26, TOTAL TONNAGE 36,4.

N.E. ITALY (Crayon):⁷⁹⁹ WEAPONS: / Rif. 10; AMN: A/T .55 1.950, Grenades 380; EXPLOSIVES: Mines 32, Explosive 2.240, Dem. Accs. 5 Cans; W/T: Sets 1, Batteries 2; MISCELLANEOUS: Petrol Gals 36, Medical 61, Ration 7; CLOTHING: Socks 20, Boots 10. TOTAL No. SORTIES 4, TOTAL TONNAGE 7,5.

SLAVONIA (Geisha): WEAPONS: Mortar 45mm 2, Bren 10, Sten 35, Rif. 7,92 20, A/T Rif. 10; AMN: Mortar 45m 180, PIAT 11.600, 7,92 17.800, 6,5 12.500, A/T .55 2.660, Grenades 924, 9mm 27.400; MISCELLANEOUS: Petrol Gals 28, Medical 9, Ration 18; CLOTHNIG: Battledress 84, Great Coats 12, Socks 120, Boots 60. TOTAL No. SORTIES 10, TOTAL TONNAGE 15,6.

W. CROATIA (Fungus): MISCELLANEOUS: Medical 73, Ration 6; CLOTHING: Boots 2. TOTAL No. SORTIES 1, TOTAL TONNAGE 2.

“ (S. BOSNIA)

“ (N. BOSNIA).

S. BOSNIA:

Toffee: WEAPONS: Bren 12, Sten 21, Rif. 7.92 70, A/T Rif. 14; AMN: 7.92 11400, 303 10400, A/T .55 2170, Grenades 435, 9mm 14900; EXPLOSIVES: Mines 160 A/T, Explosives 5020, Dem. Accs. 11 Cans; W/T: Sets 1 MkII, Batteries 2 , Generators 1 Pet⁸⁰⁰; MISCELLANEOUS: Petrol Gals 32 Gals, Medical 60 Cans, Rations 54 cans, Food lbs 150

798

799

800

Petrol,

S.R. 1 Can; CLOTHING: Battledress 254, Great Coats 258, Pullovers 240, Shirts 400, Underwear 200, Socks 600, Boots 440, Blankets 40. Total TONS 13,1; Total SORTIES 9.

Relator: WEAPONS: Bren 6, Sten 18; AMN: 7.92 18000, 6.5 13600, 303 7.400, 9mm 10700; EXPLOSIVES: Explosives 2160, Dem. Acss. 5 Cans; MISCELLANEOUS: Petrol Gals 64, Medical 5 Can, Rations 50, Food lbs 150 E.R.; CLOTHING: Battledress 388, Great Coats 285, Pullovers 120, Shirts 1016, Underwear 826, Socks 652, Boots 296. Total TONS 14.3; Total SORTIES 8.

N. BOSNIA:

Ballinclay: AMN: Grenades 84; EXPLOSIVES: Explosives 1770, Dem. Acss. 4 Cans; MISCELLANEOUS: 3 Cans. Total TONS 1.2; Total SORTIES 1.

Rowena: WEAPONS: AA Guns 3x20 mm, PIAT 2; AMN: PIAT 190, 7.92 mm, 6.5 13800, 9mm 4000, 8mm 6300; W/T: Batteries 2, Generators 2 Pet; MISCELLANEOUS: Petrol Gals 96, Medical 7 Cans, Rations 63 Cans, Food lbs 300 E.H's; CLOTHING: Battledress 250, Great Coats 210, Ground sheets 100, Shirts 400, Underwear 150, Socks 600, Boots 200, Blankets 6. Total TONS 12.9; Total SORTIES 8.

Monkeywrench: WEAPONS: Bren 16, Sten 24, Rif. 7.92 90, Rif. 6.5 50, A/T Rif. 4 .55⁸⁰¹; AMN: 7.92 16800, 6.5 11000, 303 22400, A/T .55 775, Grenades 252, 9mm 17000; EXPLOSIVES: Dem. Acss. 1 Can; MISCELLANEOUS: Petrol Gals 12, Medical 7 Cans, Rations 9 Cans; CLOTHING: Battledress 100, Great Coats 20, Shirts 160, Socks 300, Boots 60. Total TONS 5.9; Total SORTIES 4.

MACEDONIA:

Brazenose: WEAPONS: Bren 8, Sten 18, Rif. 7,92 30; AMN: 7.92 7500, 303 3500, Grenades 108, 9mm 10000; MISCALLENIOUS: Medical 6 Cans; CLOTHING: Battledress 30, Shirts 80, Socks 300, Boots 50. Total TONS 1,4; Total SORTIES 1.

Entanglement: WEAPONS: Bren 12, Sten 27, Rif. 7.92 30, A/T Rif. 6; AMN: 7.92 5700, 303 14700, A/T .551350, 9mm 15000; MISCELLANEOUS: Petrol Gals 16, Medical 3 Cans; CLOTHING: Battledress 148, Great Coats 60, Socks 550, Boots 10. Total TONS 3.5; Total SORTIES 2.

24. 1944.

⁸⁰¹ 4

: , ,
 , „Resselsprung“ (7.) ,
 , 804 ,
 .
 , ,
 , (, -
), 5.000
 104 805
 , ,
 15. 13. 1944.⁸⁰⁶ ,
 , ,
 , 12.
 :
 „ [] .
 „807
 , ,
 . 6.
 , . „Resselsprung“.⁸⁰⁸
 19. .
 (Caffey). (BRUCE B.

HANGER Jr.):

⁸⁰⁴ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije*, knj. II, . 89-92.
⁸⁰⁵ . Broz - Tito, *Sabrana djela*, knj. 20, . 294, . 301.
⁸⁰⁶ . Broz - Tito, *sabrana djela*, knj. 20, 295, . 302.
⁸⁰⁷ , . 329.
⁸⁰⁸ TNA, WO, 106/3283.

„1. Major General Velebit stated that Operation KNOCKHOLT WOULD BE IMPRACTICABLE FOR THE PARTISANS TO ACCOMPLISH AT THIS TIME. He pointed out that Partisan assistance could be offered if the Allies at any time contemplated the establishment of a bridgehead in the Dalmatia.

2. in regard to INTERFERENCE OF OPERATION OF CHROME MINES in YUGOSLAVIA, General Velebit called attention to the extremely strong German forces now maintained in the area. He also mentioned the uncertainty of the Albanian population which would affect sabotage efforts. He felt that it would be possible to perform sabotage operations, but stated that Partisans preferred using their efforts to damage rail lines which would in effect accomplish the purpose – mainly – prevention of chrome ore from reaching Germany. Groups of partisans are at present doing all possible to damage two rail lines leading from the mines, but he asked that supply to these groups be increased. He was informed that every consideration would be given to this matter. General Velebit agreed sabotage action in connection with bombing was feasible and desirable and as plans are developed, Marshal TITO's Headquarters will be advised.

3. JOINT OPERATIONS BY ALLIED AND YUGOSLAV FORCES IN COASTAL AREA. General Velebit stated that Partisans have in the past taken part in joint operations with the Allies, but has been requested by the Allied Forces to discontinue this assistance. It was pointed out to him that the best use of his troops would probably be in diversionary operations with which he agreed.

4. General Velebit was informed that this Headquarters is doing everything possible to supply YUGOSLAV needs with the facilities now available; if more aircraft would be assigned to this Headquarters for Special Operations, the effort could be proportionally increased. At the present time YUGOSLAVIA receives more than one-half of the total tonnage allotted. The needs of the Partisans are fully realized, and every effort is being made to increase that is now being done. General Velebit described the pitiful conditions of both civilian and Partisan troops and was assured that the utmost effort is now being, and will continue to be, exerted in their behalf.

6. General Velebit was advised that certain medical supplies are available in Italy for delivery to the YUGOSLAVS on a lend lease basis. He indicated that a proper representative of the Partisans would be designated to receive the supplies.

7. General Velebit called attention to the difficulties encountered in submitting supply requirements and priorities, and a conference has been called so that he may go over these problems with the supply representatives of this Headquarters.

8. The procedures in connection with lend lease requests and requirements will be discussed in the meeting mentioned in Minute #7. In regard to the UNRRA, General Velebit was informed that Marshal TITO had already been in communication with Governor Lehmen on the subject. He requested that a representative from Partisan Headquarters be authorized to be placed in Cairo in connection with UNRRA so that the current story of YUGOSLAVIA could be presented. A meeting has been arranged for General Velebit with the Military Government Section to discuss these problems.

9. The limitations of Allied capabilities to supply a large Partisan army with facilities available in this theatre were emphasized. General Velebit was informed that this statement should not be interpreted as indicating that we were presuming to tell Marshal TITO the size of his army, but that we were pointing out that we could only supply with our present facilities an army of about 300,000 men and that we could not undertake a commitment for the supply of a larger number.

10. General Velebit stated that Staff Officers of Partisan Headquarters are now developing war establishments for Partisan troops. He was informed that questions concerning the training of Partisans in Italy should be directed to DMT in Naples and questions arising in the Middle East should be submitted to AFHQ, both through HQ. S.O.M.

11. On the subject of EVACUATION OF REFUGEES, Major Jaksi stated that it was very difficult to estimate the number of refugees which still remain to be removed from YUGOSLAVIA, but that a rough guess would be approximately 4,000 to 5,000 per month. The refugees at present in the Middle East together with these now in Italy to be moved there, completes the commitment of 25,000. Since facilities in North Africa are stretched to the utmost, the feasibility of accommodating any further refugees in that location is doubtful. A meeting is being arranged with military Government Section to discuss this problem.

12. In regard to the YUGOSLAV CENTER IN ITALY the MISSION stated that the administration and accommodations were generally favorable and are improving.

13. The Partisans are unable to get but meager information about administration of refugees in the Middle East since communications are unsatisfactory. The lack of mail service will be investigated. The MISSION indicated that the climate in Egypt formed the principal objection and requested that these refugees be moved to a more satisfactory location, such as North Africa. This matter will also be discussed with the Military Government Section. General Velebit again requested that the representative from the Partisans be allowed to proceed to Cairo to assist in the refugee problem, particularly regarding the release of individuals whose previous activities have not been properly investigated.

„ - ⁸¹⁶ Hurricane ,

Spitfire- ,

(-

. .) Hurricane „⁸¹⁷

2.

„ IV“.

818

2.

. IV

(?)

„ IV ⁸¹⁹

1. (352.)

820

2.

„

821

. IV, 2.

2.

⁸¹⁶ (fighter).

⁸¹⁷ 3. B. Lazarevi , *Vazduhoplovstvo u NOR-u* , . 134.

⁸¹⁸ „ IV“ 5. V.

⁸¹⁹ B. Lazarevi , . 132 – 134.

⁸²⁰ , . 127 -129.

⁸²¹ : A. On evski, *Lova ki avioni ju e, danas, sutra*, Beograd, 1992, . 58.

, 42.
 „ -2 “,
 2. .
 , 21.
 1944. 2. 30
 , : „ [] “
 10 ,
 822
 ,
 ,
 388 2.660 823
 , 6.
 „Time“, „Life“
 „Fortune“, (John Talbot), „ “.
 , .
 :
 „6) - ,
 ?
 : ,
 . ,
 ,
 ,
 -
 -
 ,
 600 ,
 .
 ,
 ,
 .

⁸²² , . 394, 21-16/2; J.Broz – Tito, *Sabrana djela*, . 20, 169., . 285, . 300.
⁸²³ *Vojna enciklopedija*, t. IV, . 138.

824

825

(5.

6.

)

5.

826

827

1944.

. 256, 20.

1944.

828

829

12.

824

⁸²⁵ J. Broz- Tito, *Sabrana djela*, knj. 20, . 64.

⁸²⁶ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije*, knj. II, . 178 -180.

⁸²⁷ , . 589/ , . 4/32, 13.6.1944.

828

⁸²⁹ „German forces launched determined attacks in Bosnia in mid-July, as a result of which the Partisan landing grounds at Osmaci (50 miles N.N.E. of Sarajevo) and Glamoc (80 miles west of Sarajevo) were captured. A similar attack in Montenegro, with the landing ground at Berane as its ultimate objective, was held by the Partisans. The latter have counter-attacked east of Andrijevica.“
(TNA, CAB/66/53/15, weekly résumé No. 256, 27.7 1944., . 7, . 38.)

„2.

(— . .)

...

4.

5.

„830

1941,⁸³¹

„Decompose II“,

1944.

⁸³⁰ D. Biber, nav. delo, .291.

⁸³¹ ***

(rubber tire soled shoes)

(quick and unobtrusively).

:

„Protection was to have been found by 2 HLI but they were unable to take a part and Comd XXVI Div NOVJ⁸³³ stepped into the breach and made available a Bn of 1st (Assault) Bde. Lt Cole who carried out the preliminary recon for a covering position accompanied the Partisan covering force and Capt Hart also accompanied as Liaison Officer and Rep of Force HQ.⁸³⁴ Major Bogdan Stupar (the Bde Comd⁸³⁵) himself commanded the Partisan force.

Once ashore, the Partisan force (who wore rubber tire sole shoes) moved with great speed and were soon in position and well concealed. Their system of intercommunication by runner was very efficient, and when ordered to withdraw they pull out quick and unobtrusively.⁸³⁶

1944.

(Korkula)

(Campo Lovisto),

837

200.000

300.000

838

⁸³² TNA, CAB 106/397, „Decompose II“, . 6.

⁸³³ 26.

⁸³⁴ : Representative of [Allied] Force Headquarter ().

⁸³⁵ : Brigade Commander ().

⁸³⁶ , 10, . 6.

⁸³⁷ TNA, CAB 106/665, ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER DISPATCH, YUGOSLAV CAMPAIGN 8 JANUARY 12 DECEMBER 1944, . 17-18.

⁸³⁸ „These successes on the sea, on the land and in the air were reflected in the increase of recruits to Marshal Tito. Estimates have been based on having to equip 200.000 Partisans. The number increased rapidly to 300.000 and in the same time demands of heavy equipment...

1944.

819 , 1.694 , 69

78 .

22.

12 -47 „ “ , 839

36 22.

15. 1944.

44 . 840

1943.

BAF „ “

1944.

841

14. 1944.

BAF-

During the month (1944 – . .), supplies to Marshal Tito were again increased by sea and air, 309 net tons of British stores were landed and 189 tons infiltrated and 1.696 Partisan wounded are evacuated. The outstanding airlanding operation was accomplished on 22nd August, when thirty-six C-47s, escorted by Balkan Air Force and 15th United States Army Air Force fighters evacuated 1.059 Partisan wounded, 12 Allied aircrews and 9 other persons.

In addition to these air operations by British and United States Air Forces, the Russian aircraft based on Bari and placed under command of Balkan Air Force, since June, dropped 244 tons of stores, landed 77 tons, evacuated 625 Partisan wounded, 57 Allied aircrews and 69 other persons.“ (, . 18)

⁸³⁹ , . 9.

⁸⁴⁰ TNA, HS 8/1011, table 2a, Location state of BMM to JANL personell in the field, 15. sep. 1944.

⁸⁴¹ „In the following month (1944. – . .) Balkan Air Force operations effected great coordination and intensity of effort in direct and indirect support to Partisans, who had now gained the initiative and were able to extend their activities in Serbia and carry out attacks against the important railway communications loading into Greece and Bulgaria.“

(TNA, CAB 106/665, ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER DISPATCH, YUGOSLAV CAMPAIGN 8 JANUARY 1944 – 12 DECEMBER 1944, . 17.)

/ ⁸⁴⁹ 40 2 ⁸⁵⁰, : 2.000, -.
 57 6 ⁸⁵¹, : 2.000, -.
 , ⁸⁵² : 1.500, -.
 / ⁸⁵³ ,, “ 20 , : 40.000,
 240; 0.6%.
 , : 30.000, 27.700; 92,5%.
⁸⁵⁴ : 500, 54, 18,8%.
 ,, “: -, 60.
 ,, “: 70, 8; 11,4%.
 / ,, “ 20 / : 50, 4; 8%.
 / ,, “ 20 : -, 4.
 . 81 : 12.000, 10.000⁸⁵⁵, -.
 . . 40 2. . . ⁸⁵⁶: 10, -.
 (), : 10, -.
 - ,, “ 303 .: 520, 120; 23%.
 - ,, “: 6.000, 2.904; 46,8%.
 - ,, “: 874.400, 453.024; 55,8%.
 / ,, “: -, 1.
 ,, “: 200, -.
 ,, “: 12.000, 102; 0,9%.
 Rocket (Bazuka): 200, -.
⁸⁵⁷ : 12.000, -.
 . 36 : 50.000, 1.992; 4%.
 : ⁸⁵⁸ 1.000, -.
 303 : 10.000, -.
 303, : 5, -.

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

- . .
 2-pounder, , . 2 .
 , 6-pounder, .
 - . .
 - . .
 4 ,, “ - . .
 , , , ,
 , . . 173.
 ,, “: .
 ,, “: .

(), : 120, 8; 6,7%.
 () : 25.000, 43.000; 171%.
 , : 600, -.
 161: 7.500, -.
 . 2⁸⁶⁸: 200, 8; 4%.
 . 2⁸⁶⁹ : 80.000, 8.462; 10,4%.
 . 2⁸⁷⁰ _____: -, 1.330.
 . 3⁸⁷¹ : 100, -.
 ()⁸⁷²: 65.000, 9.984; 15,4%.
 3⁸⁷³ _____: -, 1.002.⁸⁷⁴
 . 4,2⁸⁷⁵: 10, -.
 4,2⁸⁷⁶ : 5.000, -.

***⁸⁷⁷

. 45 : 50, 10; 20%.
 . ⁸⁷⁸ 45 : -, 15.
 45 : 30.000, -.
 9 : 600.000, 127.200, 21%.
 : 5.000, -.
 : 10, -.
 - : 1.000, -.
 : -, 12.280.
 (): -, 50.
⁸⁷⁹: -, 2.
 / ⁸⁸⁰ 74 . I: -, 1.095.
 81 , , ⁸⁸¹: -, 6.564.

⁸⁶⁸ - 50,8 - . .
⁸⁶⁹ - 76,2 . . .
⁸⁷⁰ . . .

⁸⁷¹ . . . ()
 , , , ”)

⁸⁷² 4,2 - 105,88 . . .
⁸⁷³ 16.000 , 50.000 50 . . . 81 ,

⁸⁷⁴ . . . , , . . .
⁸⁷⁵ . . . , , . . .

⁸⁷⁶ - . . .

:

. / ⁸⁸² „Domenico“ 17. IX . . .:

1/	.	75						. 4730					
2/	„	.	„	.	:	37	„Tracer“ –	/	.	66	20/ ⁸⁸³	„	1320
3/						9		/	„	5	2000/	„	10000
4/	„						38					„	1332

. / „Annunziata Madre“ 19. IX. . . .:

1/		75	.										.	8
2/						. 75		:						
	/											„		16
	/											„		10
	/		–									„		2
	/											„		2
	/											„		2
	/											„		2
3/		–						/	.	3/		„		5
4/								/	„	1/		„		7
5/								/	„	1/		„		11
6/			„			303“		/	„	1/		„		4
7/		.	.	„		303“	/Ball. M/K VII Z/ ⁸⁸⁴	/	„	4	1248/	„		4992
8/		„	„	„	„	„	„	/	„	78	60/	„		4680
		„	„	„	„	„	„	/	„	3	12/	„		36
9/		9	.	/				/	„	20	10/	„		200
10/						9	.	/	„	200	80/	„		1600
11/						9	.		„	2	--			-- ⁸⁸⁵
12/						9	.	/	„	9	1200/	„		10800

⁸⁸²

⁸⁸³ 66

⁸⁸⁴

⁸⁸⁵

20 – . . .
.303 British

174 (11,3).

, . 200 (. 9).

13/	38	886	/ „ 3/	„	250
14/	38		/ „ 4	348/ „	1392
15/	37/54 H.E.		/ „ 44	25/ „	1100
16/	„ „ „ „Tracer“		/ „ 10	25/ „	250
17/	8 „ “		/ „ 10	1/ „	10
18/	3		/ „ 145	6/ „	876
19/	No 33		/ „ 5 a	200/ „	1000
20/	/ /		/ „ 1 a	8/	8
21/			/ „ 1/	.	5

. / „San Gennaro“ 21. IX . . .:

1/	„	„ ⁸⁸⁷ .303 /Bellcarton/ /	. 499	1000/	. 499000
2/	„ „ „	. 7,9	/ „ 331	1500/ „	496500
3/	„ „	. 8 „ “	/ „ 188	1600/ „	300800
4/	„ „	. 38	/ „ 15	348/ „	5220
5/	.	2	/ „ 553	18/ „	9954
6/	.	3	/ .1506	6/ .	9036
7/	. 3		/ „ 100	1/ „	100
8/	/ /	3			„ 100
9/	. 9		/ „ 180	10/ „	1800
10/	„ 303“		/ „ 50	4/ „	200
11/	. „ 303“		/ „ 2	60/ „	120
12/	„ „ “ 8		/ „ 30	15/ „	450
13/	„ „ „		„ 5	--	--
14/	„ 37 .54 ⁸⁸⁸		„ 5	--	--
15/	„ “				
8			/ „ 5	--	--
16/	/ /		/ „ 3	21/	63
17/	„ / /		/ „ 2	5/ „	10

⁸⁸⁶ 9,6 (38).

⁸⁸⁷ „ “ „ “

⁸⁸⁸ 2. VI, 2.

.		:		
1/	/	/	.3	8/ 24
2/ „	/	/	/ „ 16	„ 18/ „ 288
3/ „	„	„	/ „ 1	6/ „ 6
4/	.	.36	/ „ 837	.12/ .10044
5/ „	„	.	/ „ 95	„ 25/ „ 2375
6/	.	.	/ „ 8	„ 1500/ „ 12000
7/ „	„	„	/ „ 8	„ 1344/ „ 10752
8/ „	„	„	12 / ⁸⁸⁹	/ „ 28 „ 2000/ „ 55000
()		

(Sl. Hvakalj ?),

„890

889

1911“
⁸⁹⁰, „ .2097, „ .9/1-3,
 1944.

„

. 35, 25. IX.

1. „“

1944.

1944.

, 24. 4.

4

12. 1944,

”

()

“

”

800, 300, 200,

1300.⁸⁹¹

7

6

41.

⁸⁹¹ , .234, .1, .20 (5. VIII 1944., .1. 3.

24.7.1944.), . .12,

, 3. , 600 19. 41.
⁸⁹⁴
, 8. 2. ,
. 950 , 4
. 7. 1944.
, 3, 8. 12.
1.200, 5.994 . 6. 1944.
12. , 14. 16. , 9. 1945. 7.
- . 18. 1945.⁸⁹⁵
16. 1945. : 4.280 , 125
, 146 , 37 , 31 445
⁸⁹⁶
, 15. , 9. 1944.
. 300 .
10.
. 5. 7. ,
9, 6. 11. - .
1.500, 30. 1944. 5.435 . 1.
1945. 3.097 , 81 , 29 ,
13 213 ⁸⁹⁷
(), 13. 14. , 17.
. ,
450 , 3.
42, 41. .
. 50. , 800 ,
. „ “, 700

⁸⁹⁴ N. Ani i dr, *NOVJ*, . 362 722 – 724; *Vojna enciklopedija*, . 4, . 36-37.

⁸⁹⁵ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 810 -811.

⁸⁹⁶ , , . 1315, . 7, . . 6.

⁸⁹⁷ , , . 1374, . 8, . 12.

13. . 3 .

50, 42. .

50 , 4, 13. 14. . 13. 14.

, 19. . 1.

1944. 4.216 , 3.425 , 95

, 75 , 20 , 14 6 ⁸⁹⁸

, 28. , 48. ,

. 1, 6. 15. 4. .

2.500, 2.879 . 10.

1944. : 1.856 , 119 , 24 , 12

1 ⁸⁹⁹

, ,

„ “, 440.000

, 500 10.000 .

350.000 ⁹⁰⁰

: 22, 68. ⁹⁰¹ 91. , 21.

, , .

10. 21. 2. .

21. SS „ “,

, 181. 297. ,

. 47.000

. „ “

(Scheurlen), , ,

, „ “

5. . „ “

, ,

⁸⁹⁸ , , . 233, . 5, . . 8.

⁸⁹⁹ , , . 1362, . 5, . . 25.

⁹⁰⁰ E. Schmidt-Richberg, *Das Ende auf den Balkan*, Heidelberg, 1955, . 74.

⁹⁰¹

, 22. ,
 „“, 104. ,
 41. 49. , 16. .
 15 .
 .
 , , 11.
 , „“ ,
 17. 18. - 4.
 .
 , 8. 25. .
 , 11. .
 , 8. , 50.
 5. 4. .
 51. 7.
 . 22.
 8. .
 „“ ,
 . 14.
 , ⁹⁰⁵ .
 ,
 ,
 - ,
 - .
 , 93, 113. 223. 68. 3. , 2.
 , 17, 24. 46. , , 22. 24.
 2. .
 - (, 4. -), 3.

⁹⁰⁵ *Olsobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije 1941 – 1945*, . 377, . 460.

5.

, 45. , ⁹⁰⁶
 , 46. , 20.
 , 1. 2. 1. (3. 25, 26. 27.)
 . 3.000 .
 1. 47. , 15, 28. 29.
 . 4.706, 18. 6.500
 . 13. ⁹⁰⁷
 , ”
 “ ,
 ” “ ,
 - ,
 .
 , 11. 22. 1944,
 . 20. .
 ,
 , 3. ⁹⁰⁸ .
 , 1. , 5-9.
 ,
 , ⁹⁰⁹ -
 ,
 . ,
 ,
 , 19. 21.

⁹⁰⁶ 5 IV.

⁹⁰⁷ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 812-813.

⁹⁰⁸ - . .

⁹⁰⁹ . , 1941 – 1945, , 1997, . 211-212.

, , ,
 ,
 . :
 : 1. , : 1. (1.
 6. , 5. 21.) 12. ,
 .
 17. 1. . 23.
 14. . 4.
 (36. , 13, 14. 15.
), 3. , 73, 74,
 233. 236, 109. 2. , 9.
 17. .
 100.000
 .
 13. .
 , .
 ,
 .
 9 14. .
 .
 , . 14/15.
 , . 15.
 (.),
 .
 ,
 , . 16.
 , 14. .
 : , ,
 . 12. .
 15/16. 16. .

911

” “

1. (

) 2. „ “ . 15.

4.

” “

15/16.

16.

” “

16.

21.

74. 233.

17/18.

” “

5. 1. 11. 1.

36.

16 18.

” “

18.

19/20.

, ” “, 20.
.
,
,
, 912
,
,
22.
, , ,
, 12.
, 22.
, , , ,
2.953 1.000 ,
, ,
25.000 ,
, ,
,
” “ 2.
223.
16. 17.
, ,
, 7. SS ” “,
, 113.
17 , 20/21. , 25.
, ,

“ ”

“ ”

“ ”

“ ”

24.

15.000

2.

“ ”

606.

“ ”

“ ”

“ ”

“ ”

, — — — — —
 , “ , — — — — —
 , , — — — — —
 , 913
 20-24. 12.
 24-25. ” “
 ” “
 : ,
 — — — — —
 . 25. , ,
 27. .
 . 30/31.
 1. ,
 ” “
 ” “⁹¹⁴ 12.
 3. . 6. ”
 “, 118. , .
 , , 7.
 .
 118. ” “
 .
 29. 31. 15.

⁹¹³ , 1944-1945, , 1979, (: .
), . 18-19.
⁹¹⁴ , . 39-40 48-51.

,
2. , 5.
,
, 15. 1. 49. , 7. ,
4.
42. , 9.
,
12.
14. ,
42. 50. .
” “ ,
,
,
” “
,
,
,
12.000 .
,
14. 19.
, 19. ,
— .
” “, 16. , 22.
, 2.
,

27.

15.

3.

12.

30 %

⁹¹⁵

1000

“⁹¹⁶

3.

13. 14.

, 17, 23, 25, 28. 45,

⁹¹⁷

1945.

(),

2.

9. 10/11.

1944.

2.

⁹¹⁵ A. onlagi , 27. isto nobosanska divizija, Beograd, 1983, . 292 -317; . , . ,
16. , , 1981, . 193 -215.

⁹¹⁶ . , , 172.

⁹¹⁷ . , , 1962, . 300.

3.

75. 64.

57. 3.

51. 30.

7, 8. 12. 5.000

14.

15. 8.883 12.

8.

7.

14. () 12.

12.

16. 36.

31. SS „ „⁹¹⁸ 44. „

13. SS „ „ , 4

100.000,

60.000

(OKH),

(OKW).

918

“ ”

16. 919 (169), ”

8.

920

”

”

“ ”

921

”

8. 51. ...

(.)

” “ ” “

” “ 922

919 . , . 124-144.

920 : . , . 187-198, 201-204., 257-275.

921 8. - . .

922 . , . 318.

,

1. 7.

475

24 4

, 4 82 4 ⁹²³

, 19. 8.

: 2.775 , 6 88, 6 40

, 1 40 , 17 11 , 22 , 27

, 174 , 284 2.000 .

, , ⁹²⁴

19.

19. .

, , -

, .

, , .

, 19. 23. ,

2. .

, 51. :

3.940 , 415 , 68 , 1.153 , 82

, 21 553 ⁹²⁵ 19. ,

, 9.582 , : 4.819

, 1.280 , 414 , 113 .

⁹²⁶

, , .

, , .

, , .

⁹²³ , . 246.

⁹²⁴ , . 184.

⁹²⁵ , . 1213, . 16, . . 6 . 1396, . 8, . . 8.

⁹²⁶ S. Savi , 51. vojvo anska divizija, Beograd, 1974, . 13.

27. , . 29.

1.000 , 927 1.297

536.000 , 6. 10. , 856,

321.000.⁹²⁸ , 11. 1. , 18-24.

68. , 14-16. , 13. , 1.

” “ , “ ,

⁹²⁷ () . : . , . 407 - 464.

⁹²⁸ , . 375-376. . 22 376. .

1942.

23.

25.

929

930

[]

5,

3

931

5.

932

⁹²⁹ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 2, . . . 210, . . . 445-446.
⁹³⁰

⁹³¹ ZNOR, T. II, knj.2, . . . 217, . . . 456-459.
⁹³²

...

„933

934

6.

:

”

(12 2 ?)

„935

21.

”

26,

...

„936

, 24.

”

„937

⁹³³ , . 3, . 16, . 42.

⁹³⁴

” „ 24.
⁹³⁵ ZNOR, t. II, knj 3, . 23, . 67.

⁹³⁶ ZNOR, t. II, knj. 3, . 69, . 184.

, , 12

4. . , 16. , ,
, ,
1. , ,
1.420 (300
), : 347 , 662 , 438 , 20
,, “ 16 82 , 4 50 28 .
, ” “⁹⁴⁸
, , ,
, 51.
:
19. 1944. : 627 , 38
, 4 , 38 , 38 4 , 3 -
, 6 - 62 ⁹⁴⁹ 1. :
747 , 42 , 6 , 44 , 13 4
, 6 - 70 ⁹⁵⁰
- .
, 11. 1944, 790, 20.
2.100 . : 688
, 32 , 1 , 38 , 10 21
. 20. 6 -
- ⁹⁵¹
51.
. 1945, 2. ,
, ,
. 1, 2. 3. (

⁹⁴⁸ . , 4. , 1973, . 199-200.

⁹⁴⁹ S. Savi , 51. vojvo anska divizija, Beograd, 1974, . 14.

⁹⁵⁰ .

⁹⁵¹ , . 16.

” “

” “

1.

1. 19. 1945,

”

Para 6. Tendency of fighting to develop into pitched battles is putting a severe strain on Partisans who have neither necessary training nor equipment and whose enthusiasm and lack of experience leads them to make serious blunders.

Para 7. Russians have provided Partisans with a certain number of Light AA and 45 mm A/TK guns and have given some assistance with training in their use. An Artillery School has been established near here under Partisans Command but possibly with a certain number of Red Army instructors, have also supplied Partisans with some trucks and as reported separately with numerous aircraft. They were also reported to be going to deliver tanks but so far these do Not rpt Not seem to have materialised.

Para 8. As regards MACEDONIA APOSTOLSKI is no rpt no more independent than any other of the commanders not does HQ MACEDONIA enjoy any greater measure of independence than any other considerable H.Q. Policy is dictated from BELGRADE though elsewhere owing to poor communications it must often take form of general directives which local commander is left to interpret. TITO has lately (?- . . .) more than once mentioned to me that his leaders in MACEDONIA were rather hot-headed () and apt to go off the rails ends.

3. This information has been incorporated in a general survey of the JANL for presentation to M.I.3(b).“ (NA, WO 204/1973, Rear HQ 37 Military Mission G1/12, 4 Jan. 45. , : for Lt Col GS, Comd Rear HQ 37 Military Mission.)

”

„957

18. 22.

958

1944.

21. 1944.

3

„Meanwhile take no further action and make no rpt.⁹⁵⁹ no contact with Cetniks. Show any further letters received by you from Cetniks to Pzn. Commander.“⁹⁶⁰

1944.

29. (The GOC Ptzn Div),

961

29.

„FLOYDFORCE“.⁹⁶²

⁹⁵⁷ TNA, AIR 56/8411, 21.11.1944. Pzn, 2011, . 31.

⁹⁵⁸ TNA, AIR 56/8411, 21.11.1944. Pzn, 372-373.

⁹⁵⁹ TNA, AIR 56/8411, 21.11.1944. Pzn, „repeat“ ().

⁹⁶⁰ TNA, AIR 56/8411, 21.11.1944. Pzn, „make no contact with Cetniks“.

⁹⁶¹ TNA, CAB 106/759, „FLOYDFORCE“, „Cetniks“, . 10 (14).
5.

⁹⁶² TNA, CAB 106/759.

18
 : 5
 , 2
 , 3 , 3 - , 4 -
 963 , 23.
 1944. (,
 29. ;),
 , ” “ ,
 , ” “ BBC-a.⁹⁶⁴
 () ” “ (Political influence)
 965
 - (n)
 966
 19.
 1944. ,
 ,
 , “

⁹⁶³ , . 7(11).
⁹⁶⁴

„MENTAL BACKGROUND“:

(a) FLOYDFORCE was composed almost entirely of units drawn from the grn (- . .) of the Dalmatian Island of VIS and had tehrefore already received a ground basic education in the JANL outlook on matters military and political. Those units had shared with the ptzns (- . .) the safe custody of Marshal Tito himself during his stay on the Island, besides participating with ptzns in many reids on enemy-held islands in the vicinity. In this island base, a strong bond of comradeship-in-arms had been built up between British and JANL tps (troops - . .), and whilst the former fully cognizant of the latters limitations as fighting discipline, cleanliness, and sence of duty. These same units were to notice a subtle (substantiale () - . .) change in attitude on the soil of the JUGOSLAV mainland. (, . 2(6)).

⁹⁶⁵ „POLITICAL INFLUENCE“:

(a) On the 23rd Nov. General VOKANOVIC completely changed his attitude toward FLOYDFORCE...“ (, . 17(21)).
⁹⁶⁶ (n) During that time everything possible was being done in higher level to adjust a situation which was now confirmed to have been caused by the BBC Broadcast already refered to. (, . 22(26)).

” “ (The Terms of reference issued under the above number of 20th November 1944, is now withdrawn),

3.

2. , 3.

”
1.

2.⁹⁶⁸

967

„WAR CABINET
JOINT PLANNING STAFF
RELATIONS WITH PARTISANS IN YUGOSLAVIA

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting today, the Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed the Joint Planning Staff to examine and report on a personal telegram dated 19th November 1944, from General Wilson to the Prime Minister.

2. In this telegram, General Wilson gives a details of a message received form Marshal Tito in reply to a request for co-operation in the introduction of the British force throught the port of Zara. Marshal Tito is suggesting that he should be supplied with equipment rather than that he should be supported by Birtish units, and refuses to deal with the subject of British operations in Yugoslavia except by dircet communication with the Prime Minister. General Wilson gives his comments on Marshal Tito’s reply and goes on to discuss the relation between the help which Marshal Tito is receaving from the Russians and that for which he is asking from ourselves.

3. The Stragetical planning Section is invited to examine the telegram in question and to prepare, as a matter of urgency, a draft report. This report should take the form of a draft minute to the Prime Minister, of which a copy will be adressed to the Foreign Secretary.“

(TNA, CAB 84/68, JP (44) 295 (S) (T. Of R.), 20th Novembar 1944. : M.F.BERRY.)

968

3.

13. (— . .)

969

. 14.

HMS⁹⁷⁰ „ “.

. 16.

30.

971

3.

(— . .)

969

970

971

4.

972

„973

„1.

, 6.

7.

:

2.

3.

(?

972

973 : D. Biber, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, . 384-385.
3/512/10, . 70-73; TNA, WO 106/5693, No. 989, 3.12.1944.

. : TNA, PREM

e

,7.

4.

5.

(?).⁹⁷⁴

2,5

975

„976

974

975

976

. 391-392.; TNA, WO 106/5693, McLean to WO, No.1, 7.12.1944.

,
 . 9. 1944,
 ,
 35.000 .⁹⁷⁷ 21. ,
 - - ,
 , 2.
 . , , 22.
 „ “ , -
 (Alexander Löhr), 22. , 91. ,
 -
 21. , ,
 „ “
 5. 7. .
 17. , ,
 , ,
 1944. .⁹⁷⁸
 .
 , .
 „ “
 , 21. :
 „ 3. , ,

⁹⁷⁷ TNA, WO 106/5693, 9.12.1944; CAB 119/131, F65755, 9.12.1944.

⁹⁷⁸ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije, knj. 2*, . 398-403.

2.

3.

11.

. .)

⁹⁷⁹ 407-408.
PREM 3/510/10, . 8-9.

(in a hostile or unmannerly fashion), „ 980
(. . .)

18. 1944,

981

(McCree)

(H.S. Banks), 982

1944. :

⁹⁸⁰ „THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRES informed the War Cabinet that while apologies had been received from Marshal Tito in respect of a series of recent incidents in which his followers had behaved in a hostile or unmannerly fashion to British Forces or representatives, further incidents had now been reported on the Yugoslav Coast. No action was called for here and Brigadier Mclean would take the matter up direct with Marshal Tito.“ TNA, CAB 65/48/15, . 2.

⁹⁸¹ N. Ani i dr., *NOVJ*, . 403.

96 „URGENT NEED FOR AMBULANCES IN DALMATIA

Colonel Neubauer, head of the Yugoslav Medical mission in Bari, has appealed to me to try to obtain at the earliest moment a member of ambulances to deal with a desperate situation which has (arrisen) in Dalmatia. The heavy and continuous fighting in Slovenia had already produced more than 4000 wounded Yugoslavs, of whom less than half can be cared for in the underground hospitals of the area. The remainder must be evacuated, and in fact are being evacuated in considerable numbers, mainly by means of horse-drawn carts through the mountains to the most northern freed port on the Dalmatian coast. These wounded soldiers are accumulating in this port and must be distributed throughout the hospitals in freed Dalmatia; hance the urgent need of transport for wounded men and women. Lt. Colonel McCree, P.M.O., ML (Yugoslavia), who has recently returned from the country, informs me that there is not a single ambulance in Dalmatia. It follow therefore that the situation outlined above is only one of the many which calls for the use of ambulances in a freed part of Yugoslavia. In fact reports are constantly being received from Dalmatia and Montenegro for ambulances for removal of large numbers of sick and wounded, civilians and military, who require transport daily.

Ambulances from ML sources of supply will not arrive for at least several months, and the UNRRA sources lie much further ahead.

An appeal is therefore made to Voluntery Societies interested in Yugoslavia to fill this gap by providing any ambulances which they can collect, with the minimum possible delay. I understand that an approach will be made to AFHQ to provide priority for the transport of these ambulances from Britain to Yugoslavia.

(Sgd.) H.S. BANKS
Director of Health,
Yugoslav Mission.“

(TNA; WO 204/1973, U.N.R.R.A. JUGOSLAV MISSION, 23rd January, 1945.)

„58 Anti-Tank Guns, 33 2-inch Mortars, 240 Light Machine Guns, 1700 Tommy Guns,⁹⁸³
 3200 Rifles, Ammunition for above weapons, 24 Tons explosive, 4000 Mines, 35000 Suits
 Battle-dress and underclothes, 27000 Greatcoats, 40000 Pairs of Boots, 11 Tons Medical
 Equipment, 100 Tons Signal Stores, 500 Tons Bulz Food.⁹⁸⁴ 250

, 1.450 .⁹⁸⁵

„Baffle“.

12.000 2.000 .

„Baffle“

1.

17. : „Date now postponed to 1st

February since Naval Agreement has not been reached. If agreement not reached by 17th
 January planning date will be further postponed.“⁹⁸⁶

„Baffle“:

„Operation BAFFLE now indefinitely postponed pending development operational
 situation in Balkans.“⁹⁸⁷

„Baffle“

1945.⁹⁸⁸

31.

⁹⁸³ „ 1 1.

⁹⁸⁴

⁹⁸⁵ TNA 120/734, 3 8. 1945. : E.I.C. JACOB.

⁹⁸⁶ TNA, AIR 20/5156, AFHQ to AMSSO, 14th January, FX 84585, 2.

⁹⁸⁷ , 17th January, FX 86680, 1.

⁹⁸⁸

7.

300.000

“ 989

131.000

„TOPSEC (.) PERSONAL for Field Marshal ALEXANDER from General HARDING. Your 927 of 7. Feb. Regarding supplies being sent to TITO present position is as follows.

First. Provisions have been made for equipping and maintaining up to 300,000 Yugoslav partisans until 31 March 45 on a guerilla scale. Provision has been made for maintaining 131,000 on the same scale for the period April-June 45.

Second. Guerilla scale is clothing and limited food supplies, medical supplies, signal equipment, infantry weapons and ammunition.

Third. Following stores are held by AFHQ for delivery to TITO as and when required in addition to guerilla scale.

50,000 suits battle dress

2,000 P.O.L.

90 tons Medical stores

Considerable quantities ammunition, explosive and fuzes, equipment for 3 X 500 bed hospitals and 12 X 100 bed extensions are also held.

Fourth. Deliveries for the Months of December – the last month for which detailed figures are available included.

320 Rifles – and ammunition for same weapons also.

1700 T.M.Gs⁹⁹⁰

240 L.M.Gs⁹⁹¹

59 Anti – tank guns

33 two-inch mortars⁹⁹²

24 tons explosives

4,000 Mines

35,000 Suits Battle dress and under-chlotes

40,000 Pairs boots

27,000 Greatcoats⁹⁹³

11 tons medical equipment

⁹⁸⁹

⁹⁹⁰ The Machine guns –

⁹⁹¹ Light Machine Guns –

⁹⁹² 2 (50, 8).

⁹⁹³

500 tons bulk food⁹⁹⁴

100 tons Signal stores

Deliveries in January were much on the same scale as these figures which represents a fair average of stocks held for delivery for February and March.

Fifth. Cross average tonnages being dispatched per week are as follows:

By air- 250

By sea- 1,450

Sixth. Above does NOT include civil relief supplies which is as last month total 1,500 tons. 7,000 tons have been earmarked to go to DUBROVNIK if port usable and 10,000 tons of supplies to go into SPLIT. 300 lorries out of 1,200 to be used for relief purposes are earmarked due to move in the next shipment.⁹⁹⁵

(1.700)

(320 240, . 560).

4. ()

1945.

(Crimea conference).⁹⁹⁶

1938.

⁹⁹⁷

⁹⁹⁴ ” “ ().

⁹⁹⁵ TNA, WO204/1973, Orig No. CS 54.

⁹⁹⁶ ∴ TNA, PREM 3/513/2, . 8.

⁹⁹⁷ Lj. Dimi , *Yugslav – Soviet relations: The view of the Western Diplomats (1944-1946)*, Belgrade, 2011, . 120.

13.

„4. Agree that Tito’s efforts are assisting your battle, but doubt whether they are of insufficient importance to justify increase to considerable supplies which he is already receiving...If however of operational grounds you are anxious to do so you might accede to this particular request, but you should make it clear that it is for the last time.“⁹⁹⁸

(Central Supply Service – C.S.S.):

„If you decide to give that food to Tito, would therefore urge you to refer Tito’s request and your action to C.S.S...“

23.

500

„

„Thanks for advice...of 13. April. I have informed Tito that...I cannot furnish additional supply. We have however helped him by transporting by the air 500 tons of his own supplies...to Zemunik and we are helping him with medical supplies.“⁹⁹⁹

29.

⁹⁹⁸ TNA, AIR 20/5156, MS. 6872, 14th April 1945.
⁹⁹⁹ TNA, AIR 20/5156, MS. 7443, 23th April 1945. For CIGS from Marshal Alexander.

1945.

” “ ”

“:

„1. Present policy laid down by A.F.H.Q. for supplies of arms and the other warlike stores to Yugoslavia is that the quantities should be restricted to the minimum required

- a) to ensure the security of Zadar
- b) to enable Yugoslav forces to continue operations on their present scale without further increasing their offensive capabilities.“¹⁰⁰⁰

4.

1001 8.

(not

necessary).¹⁰⁰²

1945.

17.

¹⁰⁰⁰ TNA, AIR 20/5156, From Minister Residence Off. Central Mediteranean Caserta (Mr. Broad) to FO, No. 734, 29.4.1945.

¹⁰⁰¹ (N. Ani i dr., nav. delo, str. 448).

¹⁰⁰²

¹⁰⁰³ „Following us the latest information from the British Liaison Officer with the Yugoslav 4th Army Headquarter.

He has conferred with General Drapkin (sic!) and the Slovene Chief of Staff. They have both astonished that British 8th Army units were on the outskirts of TRIESTE.

2. They stated that Yugoslav Forces have occupied the coastal sector to Aurisina.

3. They regarde that 8th Army intervention in this area as not necessary. The Slovene Chief of Staff said that it had been agreed between SACMED and Tito, that this area would be Yugoslav operational responsibility, though Trieste would be the supply center for SACMED's operations northwards.“

8TNA, AIR 20/5156. Stevenson to FO, 2nd May 1945.

„701 tons Seeds, 75 tons Clothing and Boots, 70 Vehcles, 50 tons Milk, 121 tons Soap, 12 tons Blankets, 16 tons M/T Spares, 4372 tons other supplies including food.“

60 (60 tons flour), 19. 54.¹⁰⁰⁴

(Appendix E)

(Infants), (Boys) (Girls),

(Appendix F)

(35), (45), (80), (10), 820), (20), (30), (30), (30), (5). 26. 25.

„6580 tons bagged wheat, 150 Nos. knapsack sprayers¹⁰⁰⁵, 30 . 30-cwt vehicles¹⁰⁰⁶, 16 Nos 2-tons vehicles, 2 cwt miscellaneous RE stores.“

„5196 t. bagged wheat, 5 tons sulphur oitment, 150 Nos. knapsack sprayers, 40 Nos. 3-ton portees.“¹⁰⁰⁷

(Appendix C)

11.000 16.400 5. -

II.¹⁰⁰⁸

¹⁰⁰⁴ TNA, WO 204/5902, Progres Report No. 4, 17-23.3.1945. t. H, . 3.

¹⁰⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰⁶ 30-cwt (centum weight) 3000 (30), 1,35 .

¹⁰⁰⁷ TNA, WO, 204/5902, Progress Report No. 5, 26.4.1945. t.H, . 3.

¹⁰⁰⁸

74-78, 79-85. : TNA, PREM 3/513/2, .

1009

„If the King does not accept the Tito Subasic agreement to-morrow, we shall „presume“ his acceptance“.¹⁰¹⁰

1011

1012

1013

(...without informing us of his intention.“)

6. 1945,

1014

¹⁰⁰⁹ : TNA, PREM 3/513/2, . 62-63.

¹⁰¹⁰ , . 86-87.

¹⁰¹¹ : TNA, PREM 3/513/2, . 52 56-57. .

: F. Mekiln, *Rat na Balkanu*, . 242-243.

¹⁰¹² TNA, PREM 3/513/2, . 40, No. 739, 23.1.1945.

¹⁰¹³ , . 41, No. 371, 24.1.1945.

¹⁰¹⁴ “

1944-1953, I, 1944-1948, . 58, . 194-195.)

“ ”

6. -

1945.

1945. 1945.

1, 2. 3. , 1. 1945, 4. .

(),

: 1. (1. , 5. 11. , 6. ,, “, 21.

15. , 66.000 , 42. 48,

: 16, 36. 51.

6. () 10. () ,

(12. 40, 32. 33.)

50.000
1.
11. () 42. ()

11. „ -1“, 42.
„ -2“,
“.

14. : 23, 25. 45. , 17.
28.

17.
: 2. (3. , 29. 37.), 3.

5. (27. 38. , 4. 10.).
60.000

3-5.
1015
17. , 1.

“
1.
2.529
“1016

1945. , 2. , 3.
“

11.

¹⁰¹⁵ , . 154-160.
¹⁰¹⁶ , . 180-185.

3. , 22. 2.

22. ,

104. ,

2. ,

45.

25. ()

12. 14. . ,

25. 21/22. ,

” “ ,

2.

2. 1017

: 7,9

7, 71 (.303),

7, 62 („ ,“),

6,35 7,5

2. , -36 7,5 .

9 ,

7,62 . ,

¹⁰¹⁷ *Oslobodila ki rat naroda Jugoslavije, knj. 2, . 526 – 534.*

1. 1945.

1945., : 16, 36. 51. , 6. 10.

49.394

: 14 76 „ „, 34 -27 76 , 13

„ “ -28 75 ,

53 45 , 37 - 25 , 7 , 10

122 , 7 105 , 34 120 , 198 82 , 80

81 , 253 50 , 67 46 , 2

, 71 , ¹⁰¹⁸ 246 , 39 , 2206 , 6739

, 285 23808 .¹⁰¹⁹

16. 275 , 204,

49, 22. 2081 , 1996

85 ,

36. : 438 , 326 , 50 62

, 1453 , 1319 134 . 51.

¹⁰¹⁸

¹⁰¹⁹ S. Savi , Ž. Atanackovi , *Tre a armija*, Novi Sad, 1981.(: Tre a armija), . 105-106 (). VI.

43 - ,
6. 10. , 29 -
. - ,
, , (1.629)
. 1.
, . 6. ,
, ,
1024 ,
1. .
20. , .
, . 4.
. - ,
, , ,
: (1. 3.), (2.)
(4.).
, 1. 1945, 4.
8. , 9, 19, 20. 26.
. , 4. : 1.
, ,
67.000
, 8.
, .
8. ,
. 4. 7, 9. 11. ,
. 7. () 14. 18. , 9,
30. 31. , 11. ()
13. - , 35. 43. .
, 110.000 .

¹⁰²⁴ M. Gon in, *U rovovima Sremskog fronta*, Beograd, 1988., . 73.

„ „ „ „
 4. , ,
 BAF- ,
 1. 2. , 351. 352.
 RAF- . „ mk. Vc“ „ mk. IV“.
 4. , - -
 15. .
 , 1944, „ “
 () 999 (),
 10. 11. - 373. 392.
 , 104.
 97. ,
 : , : 188.
 237. , 4 SS
 , 4 , 2 1 , 2
 „ “ ,
 , 4.
 : - ,
 - ,
 - 15.
 - -

4. 20. 1945.

26.

20. 8. 20.

26.

4.

23.

26. , 8.

20. 7. 8. 4.

28.

4.

4.

4. , 15.

4. , 11.

28.

()

,
 .
 ,
 .
 1. ,
 . 2. ,
 7. , 11. .
 .
 , 12. . 1.
 , 3.
 12. ,
 , 14. .
 , 6 ,
 . ,
 / 13.500 .
 1.100,
 650.
 , 16. , 1. , 3. .
 .
 3. 18. 20.
 . 23. -
 (-),
 , 26. .
 , 1. ,
 ,
 ,
 7. . 3. 9. .
 , 3. .

, 3.
17.
97. ,
- ,
1920. . 20.
4.
4.
20. 3. 43.
4.
97. , .” “(21-29.).
,
, 24.
4. 43. ,
,
” “.
2. .
, , .
,
,
4. 2.
,
, 9. ,
30. 31. ,
30. (9.),

1938

1936.

„ 1903“ .30-06, .7,62 (2.)
„ 1“,

2.

1. _____
_____ -

– 15. 1943. 31. 1945.

137.092 -

„ - “ SMLE, .303.¹⁰²⁵

: SMLE No.

I Mark III, SMLE No. I Mark V, SMLE No. 4 Mark I, SMLE No.V Mark I,

„ “ (Jungle Carbine).¹⁰²⁶

„ - “

.303 British (7,7),

1889, , 50-

XX

2. .303 British Mk VII.

¹⁰²⁵ 303 (2,54), .7,7 . SMLE Short Magazine[Rifle] Lee-Enfield.

¹⁰²⁶ B. Bogdanovi , *Puške. Dva veka pušaka na teritoriji Jugoslavije*, Beograd, 1990, (: B. Bogdanovi , *Puške*), . 129-131.

1027 „ - “ 1028
 , 1944, 21.
 ,
 1029 („ “).
 (, ,) ; ()
)
 60- 7,62
 (2 2 1), 1030
 (James Paris Lee, 1831 - 1904),
 60-
 1861. „ “
 80-
 19. , . „an bloc“
 1888.
 1895. - .
 (Royal Small
 Arms Factory (RSFA) Enfield).
SMLE No I Mk. III 26. 1907.
 „ - “
 „ - “ ,

¹⁰²⁷ „ , , , , „ (I.V. Hogg & J. Weeks, *Enciklopedija ru nog oružja dvadesetog veka*, Novi Sad, 1994), (: Hogg & Weeks), . 99.

¹⁰²⁸ B. Bogdanovi , *Puške*, . 130.

¹⁰²⁹ 1944-1945, , 1979, . +++

¹⁰³⁰ I. Skennerton, *The Lee-Enfield story*, Gold Coast, Queensland, 1993, . 153 230; , *The Lee-Enfield*, Gold Coast, Queensland, 2007, . 264 587.

, 10 ¹⁰³¹ , ,
 (-) ,
 „ - “ 1931. „ “
SMLE No I Mk. V , 20.000 ,
 1922. 1924. ¹⁰³²
 „ , „
 „ , , ,
 . No.
I Mk. VI.
 , 1941. 250.000
 „ 1“ , „ 1928 1“ , .
 „ , 11. ,
¹⁰³³
 , 1938/9, .
 No. IV, 1941.
 No.I Mk. VI, , , ,
 . , 2.
 , ,
 .
No. 4 Mk. I „ “ ,
 .
 - .
 „ - “ ,
 1.129 , 640 4.140
 (4,14). ¹⁰³⁴
 , „ - “ Mk IV,

¹⁰³¹ „ - “ „ - “ 6 , .
 . (Hogg & Weeks, . 99-101)

¹⁰³² I. Skennerton, *The Lee-Enfield*, 2007, . 187.

¹⁰³³ III, , 1965, . 115.

¹⁰³⁴ B. Bogdanovi , *Puške*, . 130; Hogg & Weeks, . , . 104.

” “
 1035 , “ 1036
No. 5 Mk. I, “
 (Jungle Carbine). ,
 , 12. 1944,

1944. 1947. 250.000 ,
 (Royal Ordnance Factory (ROF)
 Fazakerley) BSA (Birmingham Small Arms
 Company)
 , “
 169.807, 81.329, 251.368 1037
 10 (1.003) (3,2) No.4.

No.4,

2.

” - “ M
1891/30, 7,62 . 1891.
 (1849 – 1902)
 (1833 – 1900). ,
 (7,62). 1910. , 1906,
 1904/5.

1035 , 2012, .30.
 1036 , .24-25.
 1037 I. Skenneron, *The Lee – Enfield*, . 244. 232 (169.807 +
 81.329 = 251.136). , BSA ,

1038 1930. 7,62 54R,
(1874 – 1966). –

1039 , ,

1040 , .43.

1041

1.230 (1.660), 730

, 657 54 , ,

865 / .¹⁰⁴² 500 ,

() 800 2.

(1891/30) 17,4 .

, , 37

, **M1938 M1944,**

1891/30.¹⁰⁴³

a : „

1944.“¹⁰⁴⁴

(1944;

1938 , ,

),

,

1938 512

(439), 1944 517 (444).

¹⁰³⁸ B. Bogdanovi , *Puške*, . 101-102.

¹⁰³⁹ , , 1995, . 55-56.

¹⁰⁴⁰ , . 56; B. Bogdanovi , *Puške*, . 103.

¹⁰⁴¹ , . 60-61.

¹⁰⁴² , . 61.

¹⁰⁴³ , . 58.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Ian V. Hogg & John Weeks, *Enciklopedija ru nog oružja dvadesetog veka*, Novi Sad, 1994, . 134.

1020 , 1944 1330 . ,
 1891/30, , . 820 / .¹⁰⁴⁵
 , - ,
 , - 96.515 ,
 , ” „¹⁰⁴⁶
 . ,
 1947. -47,
 ” “ 1948. ,
 , ,
 1965.

3. _____

- 40 - 42 (- 40).
 20-

, ,
 - , , ,
 , (1943.) (1894 -1975).
 (1916.),
 ,

¹⁰⁴⁷

20- 30- ,¹⁰⁴⁸
 . (1871 - 1968),
 1939, - 38.¹⁰⁴⁹ ,

¹⁰⁴⁵ 58. 18.

¹⁰⁴⁶ B. Bogdanovi , *Puške*, . 103.

¹⁰⁴⁷ , , 1995, .

14-15.

¹⁰⁴⁸ , . 65-75.

¹⁰⁴⁹ : ().

1934, -36.
1940, 65.800 1050
1938. , ,
” “ ,
() ,
1051
- 40.
-38, -36 -38.
- 40
: , ,
1052
- 40.
1940. 1941.
- 1940. 3.416 11.960 , 1941.
1.031.861. 1942. 264.148. 1053 1.
1942. 1054
- - 40 2. , 3.
1945. 1055
1056
1050 72. -38,
1051 ” , ... “
(. . . . 77.)
1052 B. Bogdanov , *Puške*, . 130.
1053 , . 130-131; 80.
1054 79.
1055 , . 80; B. Bogdanovi , *Puške*, . 131.
1056 36.

1942.

- 40

- 42.

,
- 40,

1945.

-45 ¹⁰⁵⁷

” “ ” “.

2.

1941.

G-41 G-41W

- 40

1.226 ,

1.465 .

3,9 ,

4,3 .

555 .

7,62

830 / ,

1.500 .¹⁰⁵⁸

1.045 (

1.313),

407 .

790 / ,

700

4. _____ ” 1“

” “ 1.

2. ¹⁰⁵⁹

1 „ “

. . . 1936. 1957. .

.30-06 „ -

“,

7,62 x 63 .

¹⁰⁵⁷ . . . , . 83-85.

1938.

¹⁰⁵⁸ , . 88.

¹⁰⁵⁹

(. , . 38),

” “.

(John Cantius Garand, 1888-1974),

(St. Rémi),

(Jewet city)

¹⁰⁶⁰

1928, 1936.

„ “ 1903

¹⁰⁶¹

(gas trap),

8

1,1

609,6 (24),

4,31

863 / ,

457

(500).

21

5,5

¹⁰⁶²

5.

(

6,5-

„

–

“)

, .98

7,9

1.600

1.

.1924

¹⁰⁶⁰

(„ “ „ “ „ “ .)

¹⁰⁶¹ John Walter, *Rifles of the World*, (3rd ed.), 2006, . 142-143.

¹⁰⁶² Hogg & Weeks, . 175.

6,5

2.

¹⁰⁶⁷

1938,

7,35 x 51 ¹⁰⁶⁸

G-41(W) G-43.

-40. ¹⁰⁶⁹

2.

„1070

1071

„1072

¹⁰⁶⁷

¹⁰⁶⁸

¹⁰⁶⁹ B. Bogdanovi , *Puške*, . 125.

¹⁰⁷⁰ -34.

¹⁰⁷¹

¹⁰⁷²

-38 -40.

, 1990, . 309.

XIX
„Parabellum“¹⁰⁷³

2.

„-96“

7,63

9 x 19

, 1908,

„-96“

.45 (11,2)).

1943.

(- . .).¹⁰⁷⁴

-18/I, 9 „Parabellum“,
Schmeisser, 1884 - 1953).

9 x 19 „Parabellum“

(Hugo

2.

-36),

¹⁰⁷³

„ XX „ -08,

1908. 1943.

¹⁰⁷⁴

, .59, .1, .18,

1. , 1943, .7.

1. _____ „ _____ “

„ _____ “, o je a _____ -28
(Royal Small Arms Factory –
RSAF)

1941.

. II,
2,3 ¹⁰⁷⁵
„ _____ – _____ “
(Reginald V. Shepherd),
(Senior Draughtsman) (Design Department) RSAF- ¹⁰⁷⁶

. II 76 , 196 ¹⁰⁷⁷
(2.95),
-36, -38 -40,
„ _____ “, 9 x 19 mm
„Parabellum“ , 365 / ,
-40 „ _____ “, 100 .

¹⁰⁷⁵ _____ ,
¹⁰⁷⁶ Hogg & Weeks, . 217.
¹⁰⁷⁷ _____ , . 218.

. II

. I 32

(50) „ „

BSA

(Royal Ordnance Factory – ROF) (Fazakerley)

(Maltby) (Theale)

(Lines Bros. Ltd.),

(Long Branch).

3,7 4,6 . O 2

. II.¹⁰⁷⁸

1079

2.

60-

1080

40-

¹⁰⁷⁸ Hogg & Weeks, . 218.

¹⁰⁷⁹ „ „

¹⁰⁸⁰ S. Jovi , *Prvi padobranski bataljon NOV i POJ*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1984, . 203 -211.

2. _____ „ 1 1“

„ “ 20- ,
,
,
9 x 19 mm
Parabellum, „ “ 11,2- .45
(ACP), „ “ M 1911,
„Government“.

1928. 1934. 400 -

, 50-100

2. ,

, 18-30 ,

1928 1,

. 1081 ,

„Savage Arms Co.“,

,¹⁰⁸²

„ “ 1.

1928 1.

„Blish“, , „

1081

1082

„Auto Ordnance Corporation“.

1 1, 1

1083

„Tommy Gun“, 45

(.45), 11,2 (John Moses Browning, 1855 – 1926) „1911“, 75

1986. „“ 266

280 / . 813

6 1 1“ 4,82 ¹⁰⁸⁴

50 . ,

1085

2.

¹⁰⁸³ : Ian V. Hogg & John Weeks, *Enciklopedija ru nog oružja dvadesetog veka*, Novi Sad, 1994, . 242-243.

¹⁰⁸⁴ . 243. „Reising Model 50“, 3,1 .

¹⁰⁸⁵

3.

-41 „ “ -42 43 „ “

, -

” “ ,

7,62 (-).¹⁰⁸⁶

.

, ,

” - “, .

-28

„ “ /31 9 ,¹⁰⁸⁷ ” “

, , ,

: , , (,)

¹⁰⁸⁸

¹⁰⁸⁹

, , .

(1897 – 1952),

12,7 ,

2.

-47.

-41,¹⁰⁹⁰

„ “ (),

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

: Hogg & Weeks, ” . 206-207 (“ /31) 209 (” -28/II).

. 100-108.

-34 -38,

7,62

-40,

2.

: - (-).

” “
” “ , -41 71 , ,
35 ,
25.¹⁰⁹¹

(25 , 6) ,

266 200-300 ¹⁰⁹² “ ”
1942. 55.147,
298.276, 1943. 678.068, 1944. 1.427.085.¹⁰⁹³
-41 „ “
6
60-

* * *

1941. , ,
(1912 –
1946),

¹⁰⁹¹ ” “ 12. 1942.
1941. (. . , . , . 113-114.)
¹⁰⁹² , , -40 70-100 , 1,5
50 ” “ ” “
¹⁰⁹³ . . , . , . 112.

1942. -42,

(2,9)

-38 40.

7,62 ” “

200 .

-43. 7 -

42, (3,36). 18 ,254 ,

500 / (-42 488 /),

” “ ,

60- ¹⁰⁹⁴

9 parabellum, 709.¹⁰⁹⁵

2.

¹⁰⁹⁶

/ , 25.100

” “

4. _____

(” “ -

¹⁰⁹⁴ Hogg & Weeks, . . . 250; 44/46) . . . 209; . . . 121.
¹⁰⁹⁵ . . . 120-121.
¹⁰⁹⁶ . . . 120.

9 PARA (9 Model 44 i Model

Maschinenpistole,

MP) M -38 M -40.

M -41,

¹⁰⁹⁷

„ „

18/I

1938.

¹⁰⁹⁸

1933.

1942.

(Berthold Geipel)

(Heinrich Vollmer).

-36,

38.

2.

-40.

2.

1938

1938/42.

¹⁰⁹⁷

) M -41

¹⁰⁹⁸

-28

-28

M -41,

1938

-28

1938/42,

9 Parabellum,

-383,

1938,

1099

9 x 19 Parabellum,

9 Parabellum,

1.

19.

1099

SS-

, ,
, - .
, , (,
) , . ,
, (), 2-3
, , , , , ,
, , , .
, , ()
, .
(), .
(),
,
, .
, , , , ,
(, , ,),

1. _____ „ (BREN)

-
„ „ 2.
-26 -30. ,
„ - „
(Zbrojovka Brno)
,
1926.
1924. (1886 -1954),
,7,9 .

, .303,
 .
 .
 , .303
 , .
 , - ,
 , 20 . - 30
 , ” “ , 100 ,
 .
 1.156 , 635 .
 , . I
 10,35 . 743,7 / ,
 550, 1.850 .
 - , . I,
 . II , ¹¹⁰⁰ Mk. III,
 , ,
 , .
 , ,
 .
 7,92 .
 2.
 , 7,62 , 1971,
 1981.
 1991.
 - ,
 1.
 , 2. . ” “ ,
 , 60- ,
 1968. ” “ ,
 ,
 () .
 ,

¹¹⁰⁰ Mk. III

Mk. IV.

1942,

„ “ . I,

1101

.303.

15.837

E . I,

2.

„ () -27

„ “ -27

1927.

7,62

1944.

(=),

-27

(, 1880 - 1949),

7,62 x 54R,

1947.

-27.

” “
49, 47
” “
” “
-34 (,, “)
” “_ 1102
840 / , (9,12
; 1,6, 2,7),
(1,27 , , 604,5) 1.500 ,
2.500 ,
1103
795.000

1102
1103 , , , ***
-42
1.000 .

3.
„ 1910 1910/30

1904/5.

(„ “), „ “, .
„ “, 1910. „ “ 1910,
3 (7,62). 1930.
1930. .
1910/30. / -
1939, 2. , 70-
- , 2. ,
, . 721
250 .
863 / , 520-550 .¹¹⁰⁴
, 1.000 ,
24 60 . ,
„ “.
“ ()
,

¹¹⁰⁴ Ian Hogg & John Weeks, . 318. „ “, 1912,
745 / 450 (, . 286).

1943.

12,7

4.

-34,

7,92

1.000

3.500

1.219

627

762 / .

-42.

1943,

40.

-34.

533

755 / ,

1105

1.200

1106

-13

-15,

1.

1,5

1107

75

-34

-42,

-15

1108

-34.

30-

30"

6,5

1109

1110

37"

8 x 59R,

„FIAT-Revelli“,

1105

-34.;

1106

-34

800-900

1107

-13

1466

717

(Hogg & Weeks, . 275).

1108

¹¹⁰⁹ I. Hogg & J. Weeks, . 295.

¹¹¹⁰ „The modello 30 was one of those machine-gun designs that colud at best be deemed unsatisfactory.“ (C. Bishop, . 237)

2. . , :

19,5 .

20

1111 ,

“ , /05, /07

/07-12. (1.66), , 19,9 ,

(526 , 14

1924) 625 / .

/07/12, ,

” “ .

” “

” “ 1910/30. ” “

8-

7,92 ,

400 / .¹¹¹²

” 37“.

¹¹¹¹ , . 295-296.
¹¹¹² , . 254-255.

)

() ,

(, .)

“

1. _____

14,5 ,

114 .

1.227 ,

17,3 ,

” “ ,

500

25 .

, 2.134 ,

, 1.220 .

, 20,35 .

„ (Bazooka),

” “.

3. _____

PIAT („John Bull“)

, 1942,

„ (Bazooka). ,

50-

” “. ,

2.

2.

(Unusual weapons developing special unit).

(Sir

Millis Rowland Jefferis, 1899 – 1963).

” “,

1942.

PIAT

(Projector, Infantry, Anti-tank).

,99 ,

, 15

, 76 / ,

110 ,

320 ,

10 ,¹¹¹⁴

1

76 ,

9,

” “,

102 .

(15 ,,, “ 1 5,7)

115.000

¹¹¹⁴ C. Bishop, . . . 211.

1948,

” “

” “

” “

4.

1944,

1115

5.

, 16. 1944,

” - “

(

)

”““

1116

21.

” - “

(24-26.)

1117

1115

Tito, *Sabrana dela*, knj. 19, . 204.)

1116

1117

, . 82.

” “
“(, . 2125, . ” . 1-4/10; J. Broz –

, 1989, . 75-76.

1120
 1121
 30-
 1944.
 3. _____ „ “ 1911 1
 „ . 12 “,
 .45, 11,2 .
 „ “, XX
 (1855 – 1926),
 „ “, 1911. 1.
 . 1926.
 1911 1,
 1986.
 2.
 : „ “ „ “ „
 „ „ 1122
 474 230
 (14,9).

¹¹²⁰ I. Hogg & J. Weeks, . . . 78.
¹¹²¹ I. Hogg & J. Weeks, . . . 78; . . . 16-17.
¹¹²² Hogg & Weeks, . . . 75.

150-200 7 „ “ -08, 9 PARA. 1.130 , 216

4. .38

.38“ , ()
.38¹¹²³ . ,

„ “ 1911
12
.38.¹¹²⁴

5.

7,65 (.32 ACP) 9 : 9 Parabellum (9 X 19),
.380 ACP). (9 X 17 ,

¹¹²³ 9 9,6 .38 , .357, 9 , .38
„ “ . 2. .38

¹¹²⁴ I. Hogg & J. Weeks, .73-74.

9 Parabellum

” -08“,

” “ -38.

” “ 35, -38 ” “ -35,

7,65

” “

” “ HSC, 1940.

(hamerless) 2.

20-

-27,

” “
9 X 17 , ” -27“ ” -37“
7,65 .

9 X 17

” “ 1910/22,

” - “,

” - “ ” 7,65 ,

9 X 17

” “ -34,

2.

1944. , - . - 512 , 257
 „ “ (HB). , 132 ,

1. 12,7

1938. ,
 1125
 12,7 x 108 , 18,8 19,2 , 500
 15 , 20 .
 1125 „[] - „ 1938 “.
 : „12,7 -

3

¹¹²⁷

3. _____

„ “ RM Modd 31, 13,2 .

¹¹²⁸

-34

-42

)

¹¹²⁷ I. Hogg & J. Weeks, . , . 311-312.

¹¹²⁸ I. Hogg & J. Weeks, . , . 294.

3. _____

, „ “ 35, . 20/65 „ - “ 20/77
2.
1129

3.

- ,
„ “ , .

388

12

120 -38.

¹¹²⁹ J. Campbell, *Naval Weapons of World War Two*, Naval natural press, 1985, . 202.

, , .
)

, (),
,

2.684

6.000 , 3.364

1.50

50

, , ,
" "

(50,8)

50

2

45

50

45 „Brixia“

1941,

37 „ “

2.81

Modello 35.

3.106 (4,2)

8. , . , .

4.120

1944. 25.
120

-38. - , ,

, 122- -30. , ,

, 12 . , ,

- . , , 36.

, 3. () 10 ¹¹³⁰

120 -38

35 ,

(1880-1960) . , 38 ,

280 . . 16

, 6 , 6 .

12.000 .

, 120- -41 43.

(275 .)

(1913-1981).

¹¹³⁰ Z. Kardaševi , *Artiljerijska brigada 36. vojvo anske divizije*, .22.
3. () .

38,5700 .

5. _____

45 50 .

50- 2 (50,8) .

„ “ (Brixia) M 35 465 .
530 .¹¹³¹ LeGrW 36.¹¹³²

45 ,

„ “,

81- Modello 35,

2.

, a

60 .¹¹³³

59,5

(8,3) 4.000 (3,26), 1.500

(6,86).

)

¹¹³¹ J. Norris, *Infantry mortars of World War II*, Oxford, 2002, . 34-35.

¹¹³² : Leichte Granatwerfer Model 36.

¹¹³³ C. Bishop, . , . 202. J. Norris, . , . 36.

	1.	76,2	„	-3“	
76,2		-3			
	2.			103.000	
			.92 (_ 92)
				(1900-1980).	
				12	
			8	76	.42 -3 4
122	.38. ¹¹³⁴	,	-		96
				¹¹³⁵	
	1,2	,		1,8	
	13,29	,		25	
	3	(2,994),		54	,
-5 37.		53- -350,			,
		680 / .			
	2.	122		-30	
				-30.	
	1940.	,	1955.		19.266

¹¹³⁴ Z. Kardaševi , *Artiljerijska brigada 36. vojvo anske divizije*, Novi Sad, 1991, . 16.

¹¹³⁵ , . 14-15.; M. Pajevi , *Artiljerijske jedinice u NOR-u*, Beograd, 1970, . 384.

, 17.526 1940-1945.
 2. .
 „ “- , .
 5,9 , 1, 975 . 1,82 ,
 2,36 2,5 , 2,9-3,1 .
 2,8 . 121,92
 : - 53- , 53- 53- ,
 53- - 460 , (, ,
).
 10.800 11.720 , ,
 , 2.000 .
 , 48 ,
 , ,
 , ,
 , .
3. 105 3 1
 3 . . . 1941, 1943. 1945.
 (Rock Island). 2.580 .
 ,
 3 1,
 . 3,94
 (), 1,7, 1,27 . ,
 , 168 189 . 2,18
 . - , 50:50, 18,34 .
 311 / , 7.600 .

4. _____ 75

75

...

26. 75 1.
 1944, 3. 1927,
 3.
 3, 3,68 , 653 .
 ,381 / ,
 8.
 2 15, 1. 8
 1-4, 4
 29. -

5. _____ 45 37

37.354 . 1937. 1943.
 12
 12
 (42
) - .
 37. , , , .

6. _____ 57

10 , 1.
57 .¹¹³⁶

6-pounder ().

1940.
15.000 . 1.650
.¹¹³⁷

7. _____

-28 75

14/19,

100/17.¹¹³⁸ 100-

-28,

¹¹³⁶ M. Babi , *Oklopne jedinice u NOR* , . 104.

¹¹³⁷ I. Hogg, *Allied artillery of World War Two*, Marloborough, Wiltshire, 2001, . 140-141.

¹¹³⁸ C. Bishop (editor), *The nyclopedia of Weapons of World War II*, . 142.

2. -34/85

65 ,
 2. 2.
 -34/85
 75 , 85 .
 480 27,9 , 6,75,
 2,45 -34
 7,62 56 / , 26 / ,
 465 , ¹¹⁴⁴
 1945. , ,
 „ “ , 2. „ “
 - .

3. (AEC) . II

„AEC Armoured Car“ „Associated
 Equipment Company“ (AEC),
 (Southall, Middlesex).¹¹⁴⁵
 „ ¹¹⁴⁶ ,
 1941. , 1.
 24 . II,
 57 („ “)

¹¹⁴⁴ C. Bishop, . , . 37.
¹¹⁴⁵ C. Bishop, . , . 91.
¹¹⁴⁶ , . 97. „ “ ,

1. ,

, ” “ . , , , - , . -

158

1.

, , -
 . II 12,7 65 / .
 5,18, 2,74, 2,54 . , ,
 - . 16 65 ,
 400 ,

1. ,
 1147

, . II
 : , ,7,92 , .
 , . ,
 -53,

1936. . 37,

7,92 . 74
 2.700 / .

225 .

1. .

1147 : C. Bishop, . , .91.

1148

5.

) _____

: „ “ Mk. Vc „ “ Mk. IV.

2.

1. „ “ M . Vc

1149

“ Mk. Vc,

“

(Reginald Joseph Mitchell, 1895 – 1937),

– , 1936.

“

,

,

–

“

,

.

1148

629.
1149

352.

- .

1150

M . I.¹¹⁵¹

Mk Vc

Mk IX.

Vc,

1. 2. 13. 1944.¹¹⁵²

Mk Vc

2. „ M . IV

„ M . IV

2. 1153

(M . V,

M . XI M . XII)

„ – “ „ “ 24 27.

V-12- 1620 , 3832

1154 531 / ,

9.906 , . 32.500 . 708 .

4 „ “ M . II 20 . 500-

8 60-

„ “ 1- .

1150

1151 John Dibbs, Tony Holmes, *Spitfire: Flying Legend*, Southampton, 1997, . 190.

1152 , . 1449, . 7, . 11, 2.

1153 351. - .

1154

2. „ 1155)

„ -2“ 11. „ 42. -1.

1. -2 „

42. / „

-2“ 66 1156

„ “ -2, 1157 17. 1945. 96.

18 1158

„ -2“ „ „

2.

36.000

1954.

11,6 4,17 14,6

38,5 2. „ -38 (-38),

1.665 1.760

450 / , 7.800 , 638 ,

625

2,5,

1943. 1159 , 2,5 „ 1,5

1155 . 121.

1156 P. Pejić, 42. vazduhoplovna divizija, Beograd, 1991, . 29.

1157 , . 289.

1158 , 17-25. 1945, . 72.

1159 „

60-70

280

192 4 48 10

10, 100 50.

37 „ - 37“.

1942-1945. 3,4 , 140-170 , 2,3 .

880-900 / . 735-760 , 240-

260 50 200 .

„ -9 “ „ -3“,

6.833 1160

20 „ “1161 23 „ “ () .1162

12,7 ,

1163 20 X 99 ,

96 . 750-790 / .

1936. 1946. 100.920 . -16 - “, „ -153“.

“ , 64.655

23 X 152 ,

196-198 , 905 / ,

25 400 .

550-650 , „ “ 700-800

1160

1161

1162

1163

8.000

12,7

¹¹⁷⁰ 1.650 – 1800 ,
 780-850 / . 2. , 150.000
¹¹⁷¹ .
 „ -1“ 2.960 ,
 600 / , 850 . 10.000 ,
 1.200 / .

¹¹⁷⁰ : (),
¹¹⁷¹ . . , . . , . 227 – 232.

” 1“

” “

2.

“

” -41“

” “

330.000,

95%.

”

“

， 28. -1. 1943.
2. - ，

” “
1943，

1944.

1944，

， 19.

” “
”

“ ”

22. 1941.

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

-

-
-

-

- (Cabinet) (War Cabinet) – CAB
- (Prime minister’s Office) – PREM
- (Air Miistry) – AIR
- (War Ofiice) - WO
- (Cypfer School) - HW

1941. ,1-2. ,1969-1987.

Biber Dušan, *Tito – Churchill strogo tajno*, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, Globus, Zagreb, 1981.

- , . I,II, III, , 1961.

- , . I,II,III, , 1959.

Broz Josip – Tito, *Sabrana djela*, t. 6-28, Beograd, Zagreb, 1983.

, 1941-1945, - ,1971.

, (), : / . 1,2, , 1998.

Vlahovi Veljko, *Izabrani radovi, knj. II*, Beograd, Titograd, 1981.

1944-1953 ., I, 1944-1948 „ „ „, – , 1997.

Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ, 1941-1945, knj. I-II, Jugoslovenski pregled, Beograd, 1988/9.

Dimi Ljubodrag, Životi Aleksandar, *Napukli Monolit – Jugoslavija i svet 1942 – 1948*, Arhipelag i Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2012.

Zapisnici sa sednica Ministarskog saveta Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941-1945, priredili Komnen Pijevac i Dušan Jon i , Javno preduze e „Službeni list SCG“ i Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore, Beograd, 2004.

- , : , Beograd, 1949-1986.

dokumenata sanitetske službe NOVJ, knj. 1 i 12.

Ministarstvo spoljnjih poslova SSSR-a, *Tajna prepiska Churchill-Staljin*, urednik i prevodilac Frane Barbieri, Epoha, Zagreb, 1965.

Ministarstvo spoljnjih poslova SSSR-a, *Tajna prepiska Roosevelt-Staljin*, urednik i prevodilac Frane Barbieri, Epoha, Zagreb, 1965.

Nešovi Slobodan, *Svet o nama 1941-1945*, Beograd, 1981.

Nešovi Slobodan, Petranovi Branko, AVNOJ i revolucija. Tematska zbirka dokumenata, Narodna knjiga, , 1983.

Nešovi Slobodan, Petranovi Branko, *Jugoslavija i ujedinjeni narodi 1941-1945. Zbirka dokumenata*, Beograd, 1985.

Velebit Vladimir, *Se anja*, GLOBUS, Zagreb, 1983.

“ (), „
“ , „
“, , 1980.

Vukmanovi Svetozar - Tempo, *Revolucija koja te e, 1-2*, Komunist, Beograd, 1971.

Glez fon Horstenau Edmund, *Izme u Hitlera i Paveli a (Memoari kontroverznog generala)*, NOLIT, Beograd, 2007.

Dap evi Peko, *Kako smo vodili rat*, NDIP „Privredni pregled“, Beograd, 1975.

“ , ,
“ , 1951.

Bazil Davidson, *S.O.E. izme u etnika i partizana*, Sveu ilišna naklada Liber, Zagreb, 1983.

Dikin F.V.D., *Bojovna planina*, Nolit, Beograd, 1973.

“ , , , 1994.

“ , —
“ , 2012.

Maklin Ficroj, *Rat na Balkanu*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1980.

Nikoliš Gojko, *Korijen, stablo, pavetina*, Liber-Prosveta, Zagreb, 1980.

Tikvicki Geza, *Slike iz ustanka u Bačkoj*, Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, Beograd, 1989.

Huot Louis, *Oružje za Tita*, „Globus“, Zagreb, 1981.

Čolaković Rodoljub, *Zapisi iz oslobodilačkog rata*, 1-3, Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb, 1947.

Ambrožić Novljan Lado, *Petnaesta slovena kao divizija*, Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, Beograd, 1987.

Anić Nikola, *Dvanaesta dalmatinska udarna brigada (1. otkona)*, Domicil 12. dalmatinske NOU brigade, Supetar na Brač, 1984.

Anić Nikola, Joksimović Sekula, Gutić Mirko, *Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije. Pregled razvoja oružanih snaga narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta 1941-1945.*, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 1982.

Antonić Zdravko, Perić Jeremija, *Borba u narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi*, Univerzal, Tuzla, 1982.

Atanacković Žarko, *Vojvodina u borbi*, Forum, Novi Sad, 1959.

Babić Manojlo, *Oklopne jedinice u NOR-u 1941-1945.*, VIZ, Beograd, 1968.

Barker Elizabeta, *Britanska politika na Balkanu u 2. svjetskom ratu*, Globus, Zagreb, 1978.

Čolaković Rodoljub, *Zapisi iz oslobodilačkog rata*, 1-3, Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb, 1947.

Chris Bishop (editor), *The Encyclopedia of Weapons of World War II: The comprehensive guide to over 1,500 Weapons Systems, including Tanks, Small Arms, Warplanes, Artillery, Ships and Submarines*, Metrobooks, 2002.

Bjelajac Mile, *Jugoslovensko iskustvo sa multietni kom armijom 1918-1991.*, UDI, Beograd, 1999.

Bogdanovi Branko, *Puške. Dva veka pušaka na teritoriji Jugoslavije*, DP Sportinvent, NIP „Privredni pregled“, Istorijski muzej Srbije, Beograd, 1990.

, , , 1990.

Boži Nikola, *Rovovi i mostobranci (Osmo vojvođanska brigada)*, Institut za istoriju, edicija „Vojvodina u borbi“, Novi Sad, 1989.

, , , 2011.

, ,

, 1987.

Bokan Branko, *Prvi krajiški NOP odred*, Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, Beograd, 1988.

, ,

, - , 1995.

Bondarev Nikita, *Misterija Tito – moskovske godine*, izdavač i štampa, Beograd, 2013.

Borkovi Milan, *Kontrarevolucija u Srbiji – kvislinška uprava 1941-1944.*, knj. 1-2, Prosveta, Beograd, 1979.

Borovčanin Drago, Škorović Slavko, *Dvadeseta romanijska NOV brigada*, Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, Beograd, 1985.

Bošnjak Ljubomir, *Diverzantska dejstva u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu*, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 1983.

Bulat Rade, *Deseti korpus „zagrebački“ NOV i POJ*, Globus, Zagreb, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd, 1984.

Vasić Goran, Savić Sreta, *Prva vojvođanska brigada*, Institut za istoriju, edicija „Vojvodina u borbi“, Novi Sad, 1979.

, 1944. –

,
ALIAS, , 2010.

Heather Williams, *Parachutes, partisans and patriots*, Hurst, London, 2003.

Vojna enciklopedija, 2. izdanje, , 1970-1976.

John Walter, *Rifles of the world, World's Definitive to Centerfire & Rimfire Rifles*, Krause Publications (3rd. Ed.), 2006.

, , , 1972.

Gon in Milorad, *U rovovima Sremskog fronta*, Vojnoizdava ki i novinski centar, Beograd, 1988.

Dvadeset prva tuzlanska brigada, Univerzal, Tuzla, 1988.

,

John Dibbs and Tony Holmes, *Spitfire: flying legend*, Osprey Publishing, Southampton, 1997.

, , *1941 – 1945*, , ,

2014.

Dimitrijevi Bojan, *Jugoslovensko ratno vazduhoplovstvo 1942-1992*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2006.

Dini Dragoljub Mi a, *Topli ki narodno-oslobodila ki partizanski odred*, Vojnoizdava ki i novinski centar, Beograd, 1990.

onlagi Ahmet, *Dvadeset sedma*, , , , 1983.

onlagi Ahmet, Kazazovi amil, *Borbeni put 16. muslimanske NOU brigade*, Istorijski arhiv, Sarajevo, 1981.

, (21.) , ,

, 1982.

, , , , 1978. *

ureti Veselin, *Saveznici i jugoslavenska ratna drama, 1-2*, Politika, , 1985.xx

, *1941.* , , ,

1982.

, , , ,

, , 1997.

, ” ”

, , 1973.

- , „“, 1986.
- , 1986.
- Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, Izdava ki centar „Komunist“, Narodna knjiga, Rad, 1985.
- 1941/42., 1981.
- , 2012.
- , 1960.
- , 1989.
- 1941-1945, 1998.
- (.), EVRO, 1992.
- Karasijevi Drago, *Peti korpus NOVJ*, Vojnoizdava ki zavod, Beograd, 1985.
- Kardaševi Zdravko, *Artiljerijska brigada 36. vojvo anske divizije*, Institut za istoriju, edicija „Vojvodina u borbi“, Novi Sad, 1991.
- John Campbell, *Naval weapons of World War Two*, Conway Maritime Press Ltd. 2002.
- Klanjšek Zdravko, *Narodnooslobodila ki rat u Sloveniji 1941 - 1945*, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 1984.
- Klanjšek Zdravko i dr, *Narodnoosvobodilna vojna na Slovenskem 1941-1945*, Partizanska knjiga, Ljubljana, 1978.
- Kolo Aleksandar, Dimitrijevi Bojan, *Spitfajer*, Aero art, Beograd, 1997.
- Kommenovi Danilo, Kreso Muharem, *29. hercegova ka divizija*, Vojnoizdava ki i novinski centar, Beograd, 1979.
- , 1-2, 1995.
- Krizman Bogdan, *NDH izme u Hitlera i Musolinija, tre e izdanje*, Globus, Zagreb, 1986.
- Krizman Bogdan, *Ustaše i Tre i rajh, knj. 1-2*, Globus, Zagreb, 1986.

- , , , 1973.
- Lazarevi Božo, *Vazduhoplovstvo u NOR-u 1941-1945*, Vojnoizdava ki zavod, Beograd, 1972.
- , *1941 – 1945*, , , 1997.
- Lah Borivoj, *Prva slovenska artiljerijska brigada*, Ljubljana, 1975.
- Lekovi Mišo, *Martovski pregovori 1943. godine*, Narodna knjiga, Beograd, 1985.
- Luka Dušan, *Tre i rajh i zemlje jugoisto ne Evrope, knj. III*, Vojnoizdava ki zavod, Beograd, 1987.
- , , ”
“ , „ “ , 1981.
- Marjanovi Jovan, *Draž Mihailovi izme u Britanaca i Nemaca*, Globus, Zagreb, 1979.
- Marjanovi Jovan, *Ustanak i narodnooslobodila ki pokret u Srbiji 1941.i*, Institut društvenih nauka, Odeljenje za istorijske nauke, Beograd, 1963.
- , *1942-1945*.
, , 2010.
- , –
, , 2012.
- , , 1995.
- Miki Vojislav, *Italijanska avijacija u Jugoslaviji 1941-1943.*, Vojno-istorijski institut Vojske Jugoslavije, Beograd, 1998.
- Miki Vojislav, *Nema ka avijacija u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945.*, Vojno-istorijski institut Vojske Jugoslavije, Beograd, 1998.
- Miljani Gojko, *Velike bitke na jugoslovenskom ratištu 1941-1945.*, Narodna knjiga, Beograd, 1987.
- Miljani Gojko, *Rukovo enje i komandovanje u oslobodila kom ratu 1941-1945*, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 1980.
- , ,
, , 1991.
- , () , ,
, 1983.

Papi Radovan, *Hercegovina u revoluciji*, NIŠRO „Oslobo enje“, OOUR izdava ka djelatnost, Sarajevo, 1985.

Pej i Predrag, *Prva i druga eskadrila NOVJ (352 Yugoslav Squadron – 351 Yugoslav Squadron)*, Vojnoizdava ki i novinski centar, Komanda RV i PVO, Beograd, 1991.

Pej i Predrag, *etrdesetdruga vazduhoplovna divizija*, Vojnoizdava ki i novinski centar, Beograd 1991.

Petranovi Branko, *AVNOJ. Revolucionarna smena vlasti 1942 – 1945.*, NOLIT, Beograd, 1976.

Petranovi Branko, *Balkanska federacija 1943 – 1948*, Zaslun, Šabac, 1991.

Petranovi Branko, *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, knj. 1-2*, „Rad“, Beograd, 1983.

Petranovi Branko, *Revolucije i pokreti otpora u Evropi*, „Samoupravna praktika“, Skopje, 1985.

Petranovi Branko, *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu*, Vojnoizdava ki zavod, Beograd, 1992.

Plen a Dušan, *Me unarodni odnosi Jugoslavije u toku Drugog svjetskog rata*, Institut društvenih nauka, Odeljenje za istorijske nauke, , 1962.

(.),

- , – , , 1984.

Popovi Jovo, *Prva li ka proleterska brigada „Marko Oreškovi “*, Vojnoizdava ki i novinski centar, Beograd, 1988.

Popovi Nikola, *Jugoslovensko – sovjetski odnosi u Drugom svetskom ratu (1941-1945)*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 1988.

,

Alfred Price and Mike Spick, *Handbook of Great Aircraft of World War II*, Enderby, Leicester, 1997.

Pribilovi Kažimir, *etvrti pomorski obalni sektor Mornarice narodnooslobodila ke vojske Jugoslavije 1943-1945*, Vojnoizdava ki i novinski centar, Beograd; štampa: Vojna štamparija, Split, Split, 1988.

Savi Sreta, *51. vojvo anska divizija*, Vojnoizdava ki zavod, Beograd, 1974.

Savi Sreta, Atanackovi Žarko, *Tre a armija*, Institut za istoriju, Novi Sad, 1981.

, – , , 2004.

Sanitetska služba u narodnooslobodila kom ratu Jugoslavije 1941-1945., .I-IV, Vojnoizdava ki i novinski centar, Beograd, 1989.

- , – “, , 2012.
- Ian Skennerton, *The Lee – Enfield*, Arms & Militaria Press, Gold Coast, Queensland, 2007.
- Ian Skennerton, *The Lee-Enfield story*, Arms & Militaria Press, Gold Coast, Queensland, 1993.
- , ; , ,1985.
- , 1941 -1944, , 1989.
- , 1934 - 1945, , , 1986.
- Strugar Vlado, *Rat i revolucija naroda Jugoslavije*, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 1962.
- Strugar Vlado, *Jugoslavija 1941-1945*, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 1969.
- , : 1943-1945, „ “, , 2012.
- Tihi Esad, *Posavsko – trebavski NOP odred*, Vojnoizdava ki zavod, Beograd, 1983.
- , ; 1941 – 1945, , 2014.
- Triki Savo, *Tre a krajiška proleterska brigada*, Vojnoizdava ki i novinski centar, Beograd, 1989.
- 32 divizija NOVJ*, Globus,Zagreb,1988.
- Ian V. Hogg, *Allied artillery of World War Two*, The Crowood Press Ltd., Ramsbury, Marlborough, Wiltshire, 2001.
- ,
- Ian V. Hogg & John Weeks, *Enciklopedija ru nog oružja dvadesetog veka*, M&N, Novi Sad, 1994.
- Hre kovski Slavica, *Slavonski Brod u narodno-oslobodila kom ratu i socijalisti koj revoluciji 1941-1945 godine*, Historijski institut Slavonije, Slavonski Brod, 1982.

Christopher Chant, *Drugi svjetski rat - avioni*, Alfa, Zagreb, 1977.

auševi Izudin, *Osma krajiška NOU brigada*, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd, 1981.

Šepi Dragovan, *Vlada Ivana Šubašića*, „Globus“, Zagreb, 1983.

Erich Schmidt – Richberg, *Das Ende auf dem Balkan*, Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft GmbH, Heidelberg, 1955.

Šepi Dragovan, *Osma krajiška NOU brigada*, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd, 1981., 1944., 52-72.

Ani Nikola, *Karakteristike razvoja oružanih snaga narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u Jugoslaviji u 1943. godini*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1984., 79-93.

4- Ani Nikola, *Oružane snage narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945.*, VIG, br.2, Beograd, 1981., 41-59.

Ani Nikola, *Osnove razvoja oružanih snaga narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u 1942. godini*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1983., 125-138.

Ani Nikola, *Snabdevanje jugoslovenske 4. armije u ofanzivi u proleće 1945. godine*, VIG, br.3, Beograd, 1983., 105-127.

Ani Nikola, *Stvaranje i razvoj jedinica veze u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu*, VIG, br.3, Beograd, 1981., 143-154.

Apostolski Mihailo, *O nekim karakteristikama ustanka i revolucije u Makedoniji, Oslobodilačka borba naroda Jugoslavije kao opštenarodni rat i socijalistička revolucija*, zbornik radova, knj.1, Zajednica institucija za izučavanje novije istorije naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije i NIP „Export-press“ Beograd, 1977. (Oslobodilačka borba), 321-329.

Babi Karlo, *Materijalno i operativno prevoženje mornarice NOVJ na području sjeverne Dalmacije (septembar 1943 – oktobar 1944.)*, VIG, br. 2, Beograd, 1985., 71-114.

Biber Dušan, *Dolazak britanske misije „Typical“ u Vrhovni štab Narodnooslobodilačke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1984., 399-402.

Biber Dušan, *Savezni ke misije u Slovena kom primorju 1943-45 godine*, VIG, br.3, Beograd, 1983., . 131-143.

Boji Mehmedalija, *Pripreme vrhovnog rukovodstva narodnooslobodila kog pokreta za Drugo zasijedanje AVNOJ-a u svijetlosti dokumenata Centralnog komiteta Komunisti ke partije Jugoslavije i drugih arhivskih izvora*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1983, . 27-49.

Bjelica Obrad, *Savetovanje u Stolicama i ja anje vojne organizacije u 1941. godini*, Vojno – politi ko savetovanje u Stolicama – zna aj i posledice za NOP (zbornik radova sa nau nog skupa), (: Savetovanje u Stolicama) Zajednica institucija za izu avanje novije istorije naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije, NIRO Eksport pres, Beograd, 1980, . 75-90.

, : , . 15-30.

Borkovi Milan, *Kontrarevolucionarna uloga prve kvislinške vlade u Srbiji 1941. godine*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 325-347.

Bošnjak Ljubomir, *Razvoj i rezultati diverzantske aktivnosti partizanskih jedinica na komunikacije i privredne objekte 1941. godine*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 307-323.

Bošnjak Ljubomir, *Snabdijevanje Narodnooslobodila ke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije u 1943. godini*, VIG, .1, , 1984., . 327-338.

Brankovi Slobodan, *O ustanku u valjevskom kraju*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1986.

Brankovi Slobodan, *Slobodn teritorije sa centrom u Fo i i Biha u u 1942. godini*, VIG, br.1, , 1983., . 239-256

23- Br i Rafael, *Vojne i politi ke mjere okupatora i kvislinga na gušenju ustanka 1941. godine*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 371-382.

Vavi Milorad, *Ibarski narodnooslobodila ki partizanski odred*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1982., . 79-100.

Veg Šandor, *Pripreme za ustanak i partizanski odredi u Banatu 1941. godine*, Vojvodina 1941, radovi i diskusija sa skupa istori ara u Subotici 9. i 10. decembra 1966., Pokrajinski odbor Društva istori ara SR Srbije za Vojvodinu, Novi Sad, 1967. (: Vojvodina 1941.), . 7-59.

Viskovi Berislav, *Ratna 1943. godina kao presudna faza bitke za Jadran*, VIG, .1, , 1984., . 199-212.

Vujovi uro, *O nekim karakteristikama ustani ke 1941. godine u Crnoj Gori prije i poslije savjetovanja u Stolicama*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 147-151.

uriši Mitar, *Formiranje Primorske operativne grupe i njene prve borbe*, VIG, br.2, Beograd, 1988., . 89-112.

, (–
1944. .), , . 95-129.

Živkovi Nikola, *Osnovne aktivnosti narodnooslobodila kog pokreta na oslobo enim teritorijama 1941. godine*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 383-399.

, , 1942-1943, 1942-1943, . 103 -109.

Ivanovi oko, *Organizacija i izvori snabdevanja oružanih snaga narodnooslobodila kog pokreta tokom 1942. godine*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1983., . 65-76.

Ivanovi oko, *Snabdevanje Narodnooslobodila ke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije u 1943. godini*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1984., . 317-324.

Ivanovski Vlado, *Oružani ustanak u Makedoniji 1941.*, *Oslobodila ka borba*, . 97-103.

Ivanovski Vlado, *Savetovanje u Stolicama i stanje u Vardarskoj Makedoniji septembra 1941. godine*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 187-199.

Iveti Velimir, *Dejstva jedinica narodnooslobodila ke vojske Jugoslavije u Hrvatskom primorju, Gorskom Kotaru, Kordunu, Lici i Baniji u vreme i posle kapitulacije Italije*, VIG, br. 2, Beograd, 1985, . 117-141.

Iveti Velimir, *Kapitulacija Italije i razoružavanje italijanskih oružanih snaga u Jugoslaviji 1943. godine*, VIG, . 1, Beograd, 1984., . 367-384

Iveti Velimir, *etvrta operativna zona NOV i PO Hrvatske – prete a 8. korpusa*, VIG, br.2, Beograd, 1990, . 179-189.

,
1942-1943. , 1942-1943, . 345 - 354.

Jani Aleksandar, *Obrazovanje kadrova Narodno-oslobodila ke vojske Jugoslavije u 1942. godini.*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1983., . 51-58.

Jani Aleksandar, *Stru no osposobljavanje starešinskog kadra Narodnooslobodila ke vojske Jugoslavije u 1943. godini*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1984., . 35-42.

, 1944., , 185-204.

Jeli Ivan, *Savjetovanje u Stolicama i neki problemi razvoja narodnooslobodila ke borbe u Hrvatskoj*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 131-137.

Jeli i Branko, 1942. 1943., ,
VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1984., . 215-219.

, 1944., , .
133-146.

Jovi Stojan, *Prvi padobranski bataljon NOV i POJ*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1984, . 203-211.

, 1942.
1943., , 1942-1943., . 81 – 101.

Joksimovi Sekula,
1943., VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1984., . 95-115.

Joksimovi Sekula, *Formiranje i delatnost KNOJ-a*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1985, . 61-86.

79- Klanjšek Zdravko, *Razvitak narodnooslobodila ke borbe u Sloveniji i savetovanje u Stolicama*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 139-146.

Kljakovi Vojmir, *Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u periodu avgust-oktobar 1944. u svjetlu sporazuma u Krajovi*, VIG, br.3, Beograd,1981, str. 39-65.

Kljakovi Vojmir, *Me unarodni aspekti Jugoslavije do savjetoanja u Stolicama*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 97-106.

Kljakovi Vojmir, *O elementima socijalisti ke revolucije u oslobodila kom ratu naroda Jugoslavije*, Oslobodila ka borba, . 375-386.

, 1942. 1943., , 1942-1943.
, . 231 – 245.

, (1943-1944),
, . 73-81.

· ·,
, . 247-271.

Kosti Uroš, *Borbena saradnja Narodno-oslobodila ke vojske Jugoslavije i Crvene armije u drugom svetskom ratu*, VIG,br.1, Beograd, 1981., 49-62.

Kosti Uroš, *Oslobo enje Istre, Trsta i Slovena kog primorja 1945. godine*, VIG, sv.2, Beograd,1981., str. 61-86.

, - 1942-1943, 1942-1943, . 329 - 343.

Laki Zoran, *Stolice i razvoj narodne vlasti u Crnoj Gori 1941. godine*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 153-168.

, - 1942-1943, 1942-1943, . 247 - 296.

Latas Branko, *etni ko-nema ki odnosi u 1943. godini*, VIG, .1, , 1984, . 417-438.

Lekovi Mišo, *Motivi odluke rukovodstva NOP o prelasku na oslobo enu teritoriju zapadne Srbije krajem leta 1941.*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 41-48.

94- , 1942-1943.- 1942-1943, . 169 – 199.

Maslo Adem, *Prilog prou avanju odbrane slobodne teritorije u narodnooslobodila kom ratu*, VIG, sv.2, ,1981., . 107-120.

Miki Vojislav, *Neprijateljska avijacija u Jugoslaviji 1943. godine*, VIG, sv. 1, Beograd, 1984., . 45-61.

Mileti Anutn, *Koncepcija Vermahta za gušenje ustanka 1941. godine*, Savetovanje u Stolicama, . 349-370.

Miljani Gojko, *Završne borbe za oslobo enje Crne Gore (septembar-decembar 1944.)*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1981, . 69-90.

Miljani Gojko, *Manevri divizija Narodno-oslobodila ke vojske u bitkama na Neretvi i Sutjesci*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1984., . 137-145.

Miljani Gojko, *Neki problemi rukovo enja ustankom 1941. godine*, *Oslobodila ka borba*, . 205-225.

Miljani Gojko, *Partizanski štabovi u prvoj godini narodnooslobodila kog rata*, VIG, br.2, Beograd,1981., . 87-105.

Miljani Gojko, *Rukovo enje oružanim ustankom u Jugoslaviji 1941. godine*, VIG, br. 2, Beograd, 1991.

Mir eti Dragoljub, *Dvadeseta srpska brigada u borbama za mostobran na Drini (12-31. decembra 1944.)*, VIG, br.3, Beograd, 1983, . 145-161.

, 20. 1944. , . 159-167.

- Momilović Goran, *Kara i oružje 1941. godine*, Vojvodina 1941., . 255-277.
- Morača Pero, *NOB kao oblik svenarodnog rata*, *Oslobodilačka borba*, . 141-157.
- Morača Pero, *Savetovanje u Stolicama*, *Savetovanje u Stolicama*, . 17- 29.
- Radisav Nikolić, *Uloga i značaj Narodnooslobodilačke vojske u 1944-1945.*, . 297-314.
- Nikolić Radisav, *Aktivnost vojnopozadinskih vlasti za vreme neprijateljskih ofanzivnih operacija u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu 1941-1945*, VIG, br. 1-2, Beograd, 1982, . 81-93.
- Nikolić Radisav, *Razvoj i delatnost srednjo-dalmatinskog vojnog područja 1943-1945*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1985, . 163-180.
- Orlović Goran, *Napad na Gračac (14/15. januara 1943.)*, VIG, br.1. Beograd. 1981, . 75-93.
- Pašalić Tomislav, *Stvaranje i razvoj oružanih snaga NOP-a u južnoj Dalmaciji (1941-1944)*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1986, . 155-180.
- Radisav Nikolić, *Uloga i značaj Narodnooslobodilačke vojske u 1942 – 1943.*, . 355 - 380.
- Petranović Branko, *Atlantska povelja i Antifašističke komunističke narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1984., . 27-34.
- Petranović Branko, *Narodnooslobodilački odbori 1941. godine – jedinstvo vršenja vlasti i političkih funkcija*, *Savetovanje u Stolicama*, . 49-52.
- Piljević Goran, *Ustanak u Hercegovini 1941. godine*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1990, . 29-90.
- Radisav Nikolić, *Uloga i značaj Narodnooslobodilačke vojske u 1942-1943.*, . 147-158.
- Pršić Miloje, *Prva tenkovska brigada u kninskoj i mostarskoj operaciji*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1986, . 123-151.
- Radisav Nikolić, *Uloga i značaj Narodnooslobodilačke vojske u 1942-1943.*, . 297 – 315.
- Radisav Nikolić, *Uloga i značaj Narodnooslobodilačke vojske u 1942-1943.*, . 31-51.

Radulovi Vaso, *Sadejstvo savezni ke avijacije sa jedinicama Narodnooslobodila ke vojske Jugoslavije u drvarskoj operaciji*, VIG, br. 3, Beograd, 1984, . 51-67.

Radulovi Vaso, *Temelji ratnog vazduhoplovstva Jugoslovenske narodne armije*, VIG, br.1, , 1983., . 219-237.

Radusinovi Milorad, *Beogradska kvislinška štampa o narodnooslobodila kom pokretu u Srbiji i Beogradu 1941. godine*, VIG, br.3, Beograd, 1984, . 235-254.

Ranitovi Boško, *Neke osobenosti usavršavanja organizacije oružanih snaga narodnooslobodila kog pokreta tokom 1942. godine*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1983., . 59-63.

Sarajli Abdulah, *Ustanak u Bosni i Hercegovini i njegovo prerastanje u opštenarodni rat i socijalisti ku revoluciju*, *Oslobodila ka borba*, . 241-254.

, , 1944-1948, . 393-418.

Stanisavljevi uro, *Nastanak i razvitak etni kog pokreta u Hrvatskoj (1941 -1942)*, *Istorija XX veka*, Zbornik radova, IV, Beograd, 1962, . 5-137.

Suboti Vojislav, *Evolucija taktike oružane borbe u 1942. godini*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1983., . 139-153.

Suboti Vojislav, *Partizanska taktika u narodnooslobodila kom ratu, I i II* , VIG, br. 1, . 21-47, br. 3, , 1981, . 93-120.

Taba ki Ljubomir, *Organizacija narodno-oslobodila kog pokreta u Kumanima 1941. godine*, *Vojvodina 1941.*, . 347-361.

Taba ki Ljubomir, *Pokrajinski komitet KPJ za Vojvodinu 1941. – delatnost u Banatu*, *Oslobodila ka borba*, . 105-121.

, (1944-1945), , . 272-281.

, , . 239-246.

, : , . 210-236.

Trgo Fabijan, *Bitne odrednice jugoslovenskog ratišta 1942. godine*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1983., . 19-26.

Trgo Fabijan, *Bitni elementi strategijske situacije na jugoslovenskom ratištu u 1943. godini*, VIG, br.1, Beograd, 1984., . 19-24.

Trgo Fabijan, *Organizacija i upotreba oružanih snaga narodnooslobodila kog pokreta Jugoslavije 1941-1945.*, VIG, br.2, Beograd,1981., . 29-40.

, - 1945-1947, , . 456-468.

Ferenc Tone, *Oslobodila ki rat slovena kog naroda i okupator*, Oslobodila ka borba, . 331-364.

Hre kovski Slavica, *O nekim politi kim i socijalnim iniocima koji su uticali na razvoj NOB-a u Slavoniji*, Oslobodila ka borba, . 227-239.

, 1942-1943. , 1942-1943, . 129 - 167.

Šumonja Miloš, *Zna aj formiranja prvih divizija i korpusa Narodnooslobodila ke vojske Jugoslavije*, VIG, br. 1, Beograd, 1983., . 47-50.

.1

BBC- 22. 1941.

.2

– 27. 1941.

. .567
27. 1941

1.

8

2.

,

, , , ,

.

, ,

,

.

.

:

!

!

!

,

,

.

,

,

.

,

,

.

.

, . . .

.3

11.

1941.

I

-

:

,

,

;

:

,

:

,

”

(.)

. 6

2.

-

II

” “

;

,

,

,

,

;

,

”

,

“

”

“

,

;

,

,

,

”

“

,

,

,

,

” “ ” “
” ;
” - “
” ,
” ;

II

” , “ ” ,
” , -
” ; , ,
” ;
” ;
” ;
” ;

1.

” , “ ” ,
” , .

2.

II

3.

” , ,
” -
” .

4.

5.

. 7

11. 1944.

Brigadier Maclean had now left for General Tito's Headquarters bearing with him the message from the Prime Minister to General Tito which was set out in the Annex to W.P. (44) 19. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were both anxious to bring about an understanding between the King and the partisans. The only question at issue was one of tactics. The Prime Minister considered that the chances of bringing about an understanding would be greatly improved if King Peter were, on his own initiative, to dismiss General Mihailovic. He had accordingly suggested that he should at once send to King Peter his message, of which the text was given in telegram No. 1184 FROZEN. The Foreign Secretary, on the other hand, felt that, for the reasons set out in the last paragraph of his memorandum, it would be better, before advising King Peter to dismiss General Mihailovic, to await the outcome of the Prime Minister's letter to General Tito.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that he was also reluctant that we should take a drastic action suggested by the Prime Minister without the support of the United States or Soviet Governments. The attitude of the U.S.S.R. on this matter was reserved; and no indication had been received regarding that of the United States of America.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ISMAY, asked to give the views of the Chiefs of Staff, said that they considered it most important, especially at the present time, to ensure that the maximum number of German divisions were contained by the partisans. They therefore felt that the best course was to strengthen and reinforce in every possible way the one man who was making a real contribution to this end, namely, General Tito. They therefore recommended that we should break with General Mihailovic, support General Tito and, if possible, bring King Peter and General Tito together.

”

—

“

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

I circulate, for the information of my colleagues, the summary of a report I have received through His Majesty's Chargé d' Affaires to the Yugoslav Government from Lieutenant-Colonel D. Hudson, who was recently returned from Yugoslavia. He was the first British officer to enter Yugoslavia after its occupation by the Germans. He has been there uninterrupted since September 1941, and has had unique experience of spending a considerable time both in Mihailovic and Tito territory.

Foreign Office, 1st May, 1944.

A.E.

SUMMARY OF LIUTENANT-COLONEL HUDSON'S REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. – *Conditions of Guerilla Warfare*

1. If any guerilla movement is to meet with general approval of the whole Serb population it must be:-

- (1) Dissociated from the non-combatant population, *i.e.* it must be mobile.
- (2) Completely non-political.
- (3) Maintained of a sufficiently large scale to inflict appreciable damage on the enemy for every village destroyed in reprisal.
- (4) So maintained and organised that the lowland Serbs can, in the case of reprisals against them, easily join the guerillas in the mountains.
- (5) Able to supply arms, ammunition and food to all who join it.

2. The Serb revolt of 1941 failed because it fulfilled none of these conditions and in general because the success of a guerilla movement depends of the protection it can give to civilians threatened by the occupational method of the Germans.

II.- *History of the Cetnik Movement*

3. The Cetnik movement is essentially one of *passive* resistance to the Germans when active resistance appears unprofitable.

4. In the autumn of 1941 the Partisans started a revolt in Serbia and Mihailovic was compelled to join in (a) by popular pressure, (b) by desire to destroy the Communist hold in the country, and (c) by the need to acquire for himself Allied moral and military support.

5. The Germans suppressed the revolt. Tito and most of his Partisans fled to Bosnia and Croatia, thus removing any hope of revenge or of safe harbourage in the Serbian mountains for Serbs threatened by reprisals. Mihailovic remained in Serbia and, convicted of the futility of active resistance, resumed his original function of „armed protector of non-combatants interests“. Since that there has been practically no armed activity against the Germans in Srebia as the few Partisans who remained practically adopted a similar attitude of passive resistance.

6. Meanwhile, the Cetnik policy of hostility towards irresponsible Communists and passivity towards the occupier, which had been fostered by Tito's failure to maintain guerilla resistance in Srebia, spread from Serbia into the Sanjak of Novipazar, Montenegro and Herzegovina. In these areas the Cetniks, attracted by promises of a greater Serbia to be established after the war in the expense of Croatia, and by the hope of booty when the Italians collapsed, collaborated openly with the Italian occupiers. In return for this collaboration the latter supplied the Cetniks.

7. This situation lasted until May 1943. when the Germans drove the Partisans into Herzegovina and Montenegro in the hope that the Cetniks would assist in to liquidating them. This the Cetniks failed to do and their organisation was either disbanded by the Germans or dissolved of its own accord because its rank and file would not fight the Partisans.

8. When Italy collapsed Mihailovic ordered his men in the Sanjak to join forces with the Italians and to move against the few Germans who had remained there. In so doing they came into conflict with the Partisans. The latter made the terms with the Italians over the

heads of the Cetniks and then proceeded to chase the Cetniks from all the towns in the Sanjak which they had taken from the Germans.

9. Embittered by this experience, the Cetniks returned to their old policy of collaboration with the occupier against the Partisans. „We are not helping Germans“, they say, „The Germans are helping us.“

III. – *The Organisation of the Cetniks*

10. The Cetniks are organised on a territorial form and the units exist only in a skeleton form. Except for the bodyguards of the district commanders, totalling approximately 3.000 throughout Serbia, the Cetnik forces, which theoretically embrace the whole men-power of the country, are static, *i.e.*, they remain in or near their homes.

IV. – *Difference between Cetniks and Partisans*

11. The Cetniks are a popular Serb organisation of the people. Their main object is not to fight the Germans but to protect the interests of the civilian masses not only from the greed of the occupier but also from the exploitation by irresponsible leaders whose activity leads to disproportionate reprisals. They are also a static and not a guerilla organisation and their forces are mainly restricted to the area in which they are recruited.

12. The Partisans on the other hand are primarily a combatant organisation. First the army drives the occupier out of his more weakly held position, and then the Communist party comes to exploit the military victory.

V. – *General Attitude of Serbian People towards the Partisans*

13. Serb hostility towards the Partisans is based on (1) the irresponsibility of the latter in initiating the 1941 revolt and leaving the peasants to face reprisals unprotected and (2) dislike of aggressive Communism. The average Serb peasant has little or no idea of what the Partisans have achieved since 1941 in Croatia and Bosnia.

14. The peasant's general line is that he will not fight the Partisans while the Germans are occupying Serbia, but neither will he join them. When the Germans have gone, however, he certainly intends to fight, if necessary, for his political liberty. Among the villagers and townspeople in areas in Montenegro, the Sanjak and the south-western border of Serbia which have been „liberated“ by the Partisans, the majority thoroughly dislike the

latter. This is greatly due to their of pro-communist proselytising and forcibly mobilizing man-power.

15. The peasants have, however, a healthy respect for a force which can maintain itself and inflict proportionate damage on the enemy. They are just beginning to see something of the Partisan ability to do this in the activity of the Partisan 2nd Division in South West Serbia.

VI. – *Proposals for utilising Serbian Man-Power*

16. Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson maintains that, if we insist on Marshal Tito trying to mobilize the Serbs and if we are in position to give him arms for them, he might be brought to agree to a relaxation of his political methods in order to obtain their support, as he knows perfectly well that they will not join him in present circumstances. Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson considers, on the other hand, that it is a mistake to damn Cetnik movement on account of a handful of collaborators who are exploiting it and that if we continue to make this mistake we will be merely assisting Communist propaganda, estranging the Serbian people and setting the stage for a full-scale civil war.

17. Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson estimates the reserve of Serbian fightingman-power at about 200,000 men. Their morale is high, they hate the Germans and they are only waiting to be shown that they can actively resist them with some hope of success and without prejudicing their political future. He suggests that active resistance can best be organised by bringing the Serbs under certain conditions to join Tito's forces, who are already beginning in south-western Serbia to show that successful resistance is possible.

18. Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson makes the following proposals:

(1) We should persuade Tito to agree to such a relaxation of his political aims as to permit the Serbs to fight in the Partisan ranks without being subjected to political commissars, with the right to wear the crown instead of the red star and with the right eventually to fight under their own Cetnik officers, provided they are not compromised.

(2) In order to encourage Tito to accept this, and in order to enable him to equip a Serbian army, we should, if he agrees to the above-mentioned conditions, greatly increase our assistance to his troops now on the borders of Serbia.

(3) We should persuade the King to call upon Serbs (I) in the highland area to join Tito (under the foregoing conditions), and (II) in the lowland areas to continue their Cetnik

organisation, which will help lowland Serbs to join Tito's army if the Germans attempt reprisals.

(4) We should direct our propaganda (I) so as to show that we appreciate the Cetnik movement and recognise its true function, which is to complement and support a guerilla movement in the mountains, and (II) so as to support Tito's appeal and the King's summons.

Foreign Office, 21st April, 1944.

Прилог 1.

Изјава о ауторству

Потписани-а ПРЕДРАГ БАЈИЋ
број уписа _____

Изјављујем

да је докторска дисертација под насловом

САВЕЗНИЧКА ВОЈНА ПОМОЋ НОТ-У
1943 - 1945

- резултат сопственог истраживачког рада,
- да предложена дисертација у целини ни у деловима није била предложена за добијање било које дипломе према студијским програмима других високошколских установа,
- да су резултати коректно наведени и
- да нисам кршио/ла ауторска права и користио интелектуалну својину других лица.

Потпис докторанда

У Београду, 13. 04. 2016.

Предраг Бајић

Прилог 2.

Изјава о истоветности штампане и електронске верзије докторског рада

Име и презиме аутора ПРЕДРАГ БАЈИЋ

Број уписа _____

Студијски програм _____

Наслов рада САВЕЗНИЧКА ВОЈНА ПОМОЋ НОП-У 1943-1991

Ментор проф. др ДУБРАВКА АЛИЋ

Потписани ПРЕДРАГ БАЈИЋ

изјављујем да је штампана верзија мог докторског рада истоветна електронској верзији коју сам предао/ла за објављивање на порталу **Дигиталног репозиторијума Универзитета у Београду**.

Дозвољавам да се објаве моји лични подаци везани за добијање академског звања доктора наука, као што су име и презиме, година и место рођења и датум одбране рада.

Ови лични подаци могу се објавити на мрежним страницама дигиталне библиотеке, у електронском каталогу и у публикацијама Универзитета у Београду.

Потпис докторанда

У Београду, 13.07.2016.

Предраг Бајић

Прилог 3.

Изјава о коришћењу

Овлашћујем Универзитетску библиотеку „Светозар Марковић“ да у Дигитални репозиторијум Универзитета у Београду унесе моју докторску дисертацију под насловом:

САВЕЗНАЧКА ВОЈНА ПОМОЋ
НОП-У 1943-1945

која је моје ауторско дело.

Дисертацију са свим прилозима предао/ла сам у електронском формату погодном за трајно архивирање.

Моју докторску дисертацију похрањену у Дигитални репозиторијум Универзитета у Београду могу да користе сви који поштују одредбе садржане у одабраном типу лиценце Креативне заједнице (Creative Commons) за коју сам се одлучио/ла.

1. Ауторство
2. Ауторство - некомерцијално
3. Ауторство – некомерцијално – без прераде
4. Ауторство – некомерцијално – делити под истим условима
5. Ауторство – без прераде
6. Ауторство – делити под истим условима

(Молимо да заокружите само једну од шест понуђених лиценци, кратак опис лиценци дат је на полеђини листа).

у Београду, 13.04.2016.

Потпис докторанда

